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The QUARTERLY REVIEW

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
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QUARTERLY REVIEW

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Art. 1.—THE KAISER: OCTOGENARIAN.

ON his coming birthday, Jan. 27, the Emperor William will be eighty. There was a time, even after the War, when the British public would not have cared to show an interest in anything that concerned the Kaiser, once a popular figure in this country. Too deeply impressed on its mind were the distortions and misjudgments worked by war-time passion and propaganda. But the Great War has become a memory. Twenty years full of misfortune, error, and noble effort, of violence, conflict, and peaceful progress—twenty years of multifarious life are behind Europe, and the world has changed. Perhaps the time has now come for England to rise to a juster appreciation of the Emperor William and his attitude towards this country. Such appreciation has not always been wanting. There are features in his character that are essentially English, and often has he been better understood here than in his own country; the best and fairest biography ever written of William II was published some years ago by an English author, Mr J. D. Chamier.

The Emperor realised at an early period of his reign that, seeing Germany's precarious situation between France and Russia, it was imperative for his country to be on good terms with England; he knew England and what England stands for, but the majority of his subjects only saw the British Isles, and not the British Empire, and so did parties, parliament, and government. The consequences of this diversity have been fatal. It is no wonder that the Kaiser—the descendant of a noble line of rulers—should have a keen political mind, a talent for which his subjects were not conspicuous. A

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constitutional German Emperor, however, only had the power innate and vested in the King of Prussia, and, as Emperor, the rights of a *primus inter pares*, but hardly more. Loyalty to the constitution and loyalty to the government of which he was the head induced the Kaiser more than once to abstain from enforcing his own better judgment, because it failed to correspond with the views of both his people and his government. The extent of the mischief worked by this diversity of opinion is illustrated by the two events which threw a flash-light on Anglo-German relations—the Kruger telegram and the ‘Daily Telegraph’ interview. The telegram, wrested from an unwilling and resisting sovereign—who only agreed for constitutional reasons—by a Chancellor and a Secretary for Foreign Affairs far too sure of their own superior wisdom and afterwards only too eager to disclaim responsibility, resulted in an outburst of violent indignation on this side of the Channel and a lasting estrangement between the two countries. The ‘Daily Telegraph’ interview, a compilation of private conversations aiming at a better understanding between England and Germany, met with undisguised anger, showing a complete lack of political insight, in Germany, and was exploited by the opposition there for attacking the throne. Between these two events we have, on both sides, a series of somewhat vague attempts at an entente or alliance that unfortunately led to nothing, partly owing to the mutual distrust of the statesmen concerned and partly to the different position of the two countries in respect to Russia. Or was it already too late? For, as Mr Ensor says in his book ‘England, 1870–1914,’ Lord Salisbury had moved away from Germany and towards Russia and France, and this movement can be traced as far back as Bismarck’s time, prior to the reign of William II. Mr Ensor thinks that the crux of Anglo-German relations was Russia and the Far East. Germany’s relations with Russia had been increasingly deteriorating ever since the Berlin Congress, yet the extent of the Russo-German frontier made an alliance directed against Russia extremely risky for Germany. The German Government’s refusal to renew the precarious re-insurance treaty with Russia—precarious because Austria was not informed of its existence—had certain undesirable consequences for Germany

in so far as it contributed towards the consolidation of the nascent Franco-Russian friendship and alliance. A study of the history of the abortive negotiations leaves the impression that Mr Joseph Chamberlain was the only member of the British Government advocating and decidedly in favour of a rapprochement.

The Kaiser's position was most difficult. No foreigner will easily grasp this problem in all its aspects. Certainly the conditions in a Federal State such as the former German Empire are complicated. Nor are there many in this country who are aware of the Kaiser's achievements as a ruler at home, apart from foreign affairs. Yet it is impossible to form an opinion of his foreign policy without some acquaintance with these facts. German policy under the reign of William II was decisively influenced by two essential factors. The first was the fact that fate called him to the throne at an early age to succeed, after the interval of the Ninety-nine Days, a monarch more than sixty years his senior. It was inevitable that antagonisms should make themselves felt when the great past was followed by the future without a link, the intervening generation being, as it were, superseded. It is certain that the young Emperor never meant to part with Bismarck, but it is equally certain that in the long run team-work was bound to prove impossible. The Kaiser, whose early years had been a severe school of submission and obedience, suddenly found himself in the possession of vast power and authority, placed in a position requiring his highest efforts, and was determined to devote himself heart and soul to his new duties. Prince Bismarck, conscious of the unparalleled achievements of his statesmanship, domineering and imperious, assumed the rôle of the master. At that time he had conceived a scheme for the suppression of Socialism by force, and when the Kaiser did not agree he was so annoyed that he neglected the respect which he owed him, refusing to acknowledge the sovereign's indubitable rights. And then came the rupture. There can be no doubt that in the matter of Bismarck's dismissal the monarch was in the right, but the great old man's bitter rancour was to be a heavy handicap on him at the outset of his career. What happened in those days had its origin in the circum-

stances, in the characters, in the antagonisms of two generations.

It was no simple task that now confronted the Kaiser. Certainly he was not exempt from mistakes. No ruler, no statesman, is. His acts were freely criticised, but his critics hardly ever tried to fathom the young Emperor's true nature and intentions, the purity of which was manifest enough. Foreigners realised what his aspirations and achievements were. British authors admitted that he was the ablest, most energetic, and most interesting monarch of his time. A prominent Frenchman exclaimed : ' Ah, si nous l'avions, nous, votre Guillaume ! ' But at home his qualities were never fully appreciated, and Reichstag politicians and intrigue-loving bureaucrats indulged in wholesale opposition to the ruler they stigmatised as ' too impulsive.'

At a time when Germany was enjoying remarkable prosperity and had begun to consider the amazing development of her commerce, shipping, and trade as a matter of course ; when the clouds that afterwards were to overshadow her were not yet visible, the second of the two factors became operative. Herr von Bülow, subsequently Prince Bülow, was appointed Foreign Secretary and a few years later Imperial Chancellor. Neither the Kaiser nor anyone else suspected the true character of this ambitious, unscrupulous man who on account of his gifts and accomplishments was believed to be the right chief for the German Government. When Bülow felt that his sovereign's implicit confidence in his statesmanship was on the wane he took to what is generally considered to be disloyalty and treachery to save his own power and position. The German historian Professor Haller says on this subject :

' He had known for some time that he no longer enjoyed the latter's (i.e. the Kaiser's) complete confidence ; now he was determined to keep his office, supported by Reichstag and public opinion, even against the Kaiser's will. . . . Harden's unscrupulous Press campaign . . . helped him on with his scheme, the " Daily Telegraph " affair, the origin of which is now quite clear to anyone capable of judgment, was to put the dot on the i. The Kaiser, condemned and exposed by public opinion, was to be eliminated once for all as an active factor of government, the unlimited dominion of the Chan-

cellor to be established on a parliamentary and journalistic basis. The scheme did not work, the archer was hit by his own arrow, Bülow had to go. . . .

In the 'Daily Telegraph' affair the Chancellor's conduct was barefaced treason. The origin of the affair was the publication in the 'Daily Telegraph' (in the form of an interview—the editor's idea—which as such had never taken place) of an article composed of a number of private talks which the Kaiser had had on the occasion of a recent visit to England with his Chancellor's knowledge and approval (this was confirmed to me by the late Admiral von Rebeur-Paschwitz, the aide-de-camp who accompanied the Emperor to England and was on duty during the stay at Highcliffe, and who distinctly remembered the telegrams exchanged). The English author had meant well, but the article showed inaccuracies and lack of judgment. The Kaiser, to whom the manuscript had been submitted by the editor, acted strictly constitutionally in sending it to the Chancellor for the latter's personal examination and revision. It was, however, returned to the editor practically uncorrected, but with Bülow's official imprimatur. A storm of violent abuse in Germany was the result, which was utilised by the Chancellor as a means of procuring for himself a false halo at his sovereign's cost. It is no exaggeration to say that Prince Bülow undermined the German throne. The consequences of his conduct are manifest. He paved the way for the revolution of 1918, which otherwise would not have been possible; a large share of the responsibility for it is attributable to him. In this country, as a result of his posthumous self-revelations in his memoirs, he was justly labelled a cad.

The deliberateness of the Chancellor's endeavours to eliminate the monarch appears also from the fact that he concealed from the latter a statement of the greatest importance which had accompanied Mr Chamberlain's offer of an alliance: the announcement that Germany's refusal would compel Britain to move towards the Dual Alliance. Had Prince Bülow informed the Kaiser of this intimation, the negotiations might have taken a different turn. His feelings in favour of an alliance the German Emperor had expressed in a speech at Marlborough House on February 5, 1901, before he left England after

attending Queen Victoria's funeral. Unfortunately the British public, for whom his words were meant, remained ignorant of them, as the speech was never published. Also his previous visit to England in 1899, during the Boer War, had been a demonstration of friendship made notwithstanding the pronounced pro-Boer disposition prevailing in Germany.

Some years later the Björkoe Treaty, often wrongly interpreted as directed against Britain, but really contemplating the maintenance of peace in Europe, was victimised by Bülow and Holstein before it was abandoned by the Tsar. In the course of the first Morocco Crisis Prince Bülow—who had engineered the Tangier visit—and M. Delcassé played dangerously with the fire. Europe was on the brink of war, but the situation was saved for the time by the moderation shown both by the German Emperor and the French Premier, M. Rouvier, and their active intervention for a less violent solution of the conflict. It appeared after Bülow's resignation that he had mismanaged German foreign affairs to such an extent as to make all attempts at readjusting them futile. Germany was definitely entangled in the net of encirclement, no matter whether the encirclement was intentional or merely the outcome of the political constellation. Dr Gooch says in his 'Studies in Diplomacy' that Germany's position was indubitably weaker in 1909 than in 1897, and that even a successor wiser than Bülow would have been unable to repair the mischief done by the latter; he thinks that Bülow did not appreciate the value of England's friendship.

In the early years of the Kaiser's reign the talk of a 'personal régime' had cropped up and he was described as indulging in autocratic tendencies. This was a misconception of his character, for his temperament and oratorical gifts, the desire to translate ideas rapidly into deeds, were always controlled by his strong sense of duty. Besides, he never refused to hear sound argument. In all stages of his reign he remained invariably loyal to the principle that the distribution of power as established in the Constitution had to be respected. During the War this unswerving loyalty rose to a self-abnegation that made him subordinate his own person without hesitation to his paramount object, his country's safety—'kingship

is service to the people,' as he expressed it—and culminated in the last supreme sacrifice of November 1918.

There is no doubt that a clear and sound judgment and the faculty for quickly grasping the essence of things are outstanding features of the Kaiser's mind, and it would have been better for Germany had her statesmen shown more readiness to accept his leadership. Although a soldier by education and inclination, he never confined himself to soldiership alone. His active mind neglected no sphere of national life. The legislation for the protection of the working classes, a matter of great concern to him, is traceable to his initiative. He was a patron of science; the 'Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften' (Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Promotion of Sciences), which he called into existence, is, with its many institutes of research, a lasting record of his patronage. He strongly supported the development of technics. Archæology and the history of the civilisation and culture of mankind always attracted his special interest; to this day prominent scholars engaged in this research work meet at Doorn.

Certainly he was particularly fond of his soldiers. During twenty-six years of peace he took the most active interest in his army and gave much thought and care to his country's military defences. The army showed its mettle and its high efficiency in the countless battles of the Great War. As to the German Navy, he is really its creator; the idea and the will and the power to carry it out were his. For an adequate navy was in his eyes a necessity for the protection of German interests. The increase of capital ships envisaged in a comparatively moderate naval programme was not undertaken until Great Britain had definitely chosen the Dual Alliance. It is an English author, Mr J. A. Farrer, who observed that 'the increase of the German Navy, which was interpreted in England as meant for an invasion, was also open to the interpretation that it was the result of a similar fear in Germany of England's intentions.' The opinion is now widely accepted that the Anglo-German naval competition was not the cause or one of the causes of the War. A French author, M. Delage, confirmed this recently in an article published in the 'Temps,' saying

that it had lost its edge and that the War had its origin not there but in the Balkan complications.

The political situation in the years preceding the Great War, when the Morocco Crisis had been definitely settled, was characterised by an increasing unrest in the Balkan countries. At that time the Anglo-German relations showed a marked improvement, and it was admitted in England that the wisdom of the Kaiser's policy had largely contributed to prevent the Balkan wars igniting the whole of Europe. King George and Queen Mary were the Emperor's guests in Berlin in 1913. But the outbreak of the Great War, caused by the Sarajevo murder and *déclenché*—as the French say—by Russia's general mobilisation, shattered for the time all hopes for better relations between the two countries.

The Kaiser's enemies found it convenient to charge him with the responsibility for the War, but the publication of documents and records covering the entire pre-war period has sufficiently proved that these accusations are unfounded. The statement in the second volume of Dr Gooch's 'Studies in Diplomacy,' that 'European politics had begun to revolve in a vicious circle which nobody seemed able to break,' will doubtless be the final verdict of history. Indeed, war came over Europe as a fate, and at the crucial moment, in July 1914, it was not in the Kaiser's power to prevent it. It must be considered most unfortunate that during the greater part of this month he was absent on a cruising tour in the Norwegian fjords. Had he been at Potsdam, war would probably have been once more avoided through his influence, as it was in 1909 and 1911. But the German Foreign Office thought that a cancellation of his holiday tour might give rise to alarm or even panic. The development of the situation during his absence, however, was portentous, chiefly owing to the pronounced pan-Slavic and pro-Serbian policy of the Russian Government and the feeling in Austria that the prestige and the very existence of the Dual Monarchy required vigorous measures to crush Serbian aspirations. The Kaiser, who returned abruptly when he heard of the Austrian ultimatum, was faced by a *fait accompli* which his government had not been efficient enough to prevent. It is true he wanted satisfaction to be given to his ally,

Austria, for the outrage committed, but he tried to exercise a moderating influence and to localise the conflict. The Russian mobilisation put an end to his efforts. To-day we all know, better than we did at that time, how great the risk is for unwilling countries to be involved in a war. More than one crisis in recent years was comparable in its gravity to the situation in 1914. Already the memory, once believed to be ineffaceable, of the frightful experience of the Great War seems to fade.

To William II the declaration of war by England was a shock, but not a surprise, for he had long since lost all hope. The latest volume of the 'British Documents' has revealed facts which amply justify his growing concern during the years immediately preceding the War. Incidentally, the dark hour of the outbreak of war brought him some reward for his many years' service. He must have felt the wave of loyalty and affection that surged to the grave-faced, grey-haired man at the window of the old Berlin Palace from the crowds below. Acutely feeling the responsibilities of his position, he had always earnestly wished to maintain peace. Neither during the Boer War nor during the Russo-Japanese War did he avail himself of the opportunity of launching a preventive war. Even so he insisted on a peaceable liquidation of the Morocco muddle. For he knew that in a war Germany had everything to lose and nothing to gain. At the time of the second Morocco Crisis, when war was on the cards, he once said in conversation that an armed peace was the only means of preventing war; the necessary military expenses would, perhaps, amount to some hundreds of millions, whereas a lost war would cost dozens of billions; the Germans, he added thoughtfully, had forgotten what it meant to lose a war. I was an ear-witness when he said this, and the seriousness of his words deeply impressed me at the time. To-day they seem almost prophetic, now that Germany has gone through all the misery of a lost war.

It is a remarkable fact and paradox that at the very time when in Great Britain the Kaiser was described as seeking to establish Germany's world hegemony by preparing an unscrupulous aggressive war, there was an equally fallacious tendency in Germany to attack the Imperial Government as failing in its duty to protect

Germany's interests with vigour and force. This opinion was voiced in 1911-12, at the time of the second Morocco Crisis and the Balkan troubles, by General von Bernhardi in his book 'Germany and the Next War,' a book which did not meet with overmuch attention in Germany, but aroused keenest interest abroad and during the War was given widest circulation in England for anti-German propaganda purposes. The irony of this is that while abroad it was believed to express the ideas of the Emperor and the German Government, to say nothing of 'Junkers' and 'militarists,' it was in reality meant as an attack on the Emperor's peaceable attitude. The spirited author, when he prepared his book, had been for years a general on the retired list living in the country, without any influence and not in favour in high quarters. He did not conceal his discontent with the Government policy, and more especially with the Kaiser's and Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's wish for amicable relations with England, while he sympathised with Kiderlen, and his criticisms were highly deprecating. I know this, for at that time I spent a few days as a guest at his country place in Silesia. I well remember that he was strongly advised by his friends, including his military friends, to check the violence of his opinions, which were liable to prejudice Germany. Indeed, the arguments of the Kaiser's enemies are largely based on this unfortunate book, which was interpreted by them as revealing the monarch's alleged secret ambitions.

At the end of four years of war Germany's strength and power of resistance were exhausted, but the disgraceful events of November 1918, the excessive terms of the Armistice and later of the Versailles Treaty, these Germany owes to the revolution that raised its head during the life-and-death struggle, stabbing the army in the back, as the French general Maurice said, and attacking the throne from behind at the very moment when absolute national unity was imperative. Certainly there had been no question of the Emperor's abdication until the Allies, in President Wilson's notes, had begun to insist upon it as a condition precedent to peace negotiations, refusing to have any dealings with an Imperial Government. The heavy pressure exercised by the Allied Powers together with the disastrous effects of the

hunger blockade were too much for a starved people. Hypnotised by a wild hope that salvation would lie that way, they yielded, forgetting honour and loyalty. Dissenting voices were drowned in the clamour. Only then, in the most desperate situation which a sovereign ever had to face, on enemy territory, deserted by his Government, deprived of crown and power, did the Kaiser decide to go to a neutral country.

Before he left Belgium and crossed the Dutch frontier the Berlin Government had completely surrendered both to the Allied Powers and the revolting mob. Crown and country were hurled into the vortex of the sudden breakdown. The Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, instead of taking vigorous measures, applied what energy he had to demanding over the telephone the Emperor's immediate abdication, which he proclaimed without waiting for his decision. At Spa, at G.H.Q., the general officers of the High Command, and more especially General Groener, who had succeeded General Ludendorff, urged his departure. General Groener coolly declared that the soldiers would march back in order, but not under the Kaiser's command. Field Marshal von Hindenburg's advice was that the Emperor should leave the collapsing army and go to Holland.

The Kaiser rejected this advice to the last. He wanted to remain with the army and restore order at home after the impending conclusion of the Armistice. But they insisted with increasing emphasis on the necessity of his going: his return with loyal troops would not be practicable and would mean civil war; his staying with the army would frustrate any prospect of tolerable terms of peace. In this situation he decided that his person should not stand in the way of an acceptable peace-treaty—that no blood should be shed nor the Armistice jeopardised for his sake. He did what his loyalty to his country bade him do: he went.

The sacrifice has been in vain. The collapse in Germany was followed by a preposterous Armistice. Disaster came, and with it civil war.

For twenty years the Kaiser has now been living away from his country. After the Dutch Government's flat refusal to comply with the Allied Powers' demand

for his extradition, he bought a small estate in Holland. Here, at Doorn, he leads the quiet life of a country gentleman. The place, an old moated house with a fine park, has been greatly improved by him, for he is a very keen gardener. Doorn House has seen grief and sorrow borne with dignity and faith. It is a house of exile, but it bears the stamp of its master's manly and noble mind, and the shadows cast upon it by fate are relieved by the light within.

The Emperor's life there is most regular. He is an early riser. After breakfast he takes about two hours' exercise—wood-cutting or sawing, or watering his roses and rhododendrons—then he reads his letters and works with an aide or private secretary. At luncheon there are frequently some guests, often Germans who come to pay their respects. The afternoon he spends at his desk writing or reading. In the evening, after dinner, he and the Empress sit round the library fire with the gentlemen of the entourage and such guests as may be staying at Haus Doorn; as a rule he will read to them from some book that has attracted his attention, his voice assuming all the expressiveness natural to an accomplished reader. Usually the evening is finished up with conversation, to which his reminiscences of important people and events or of his many travels give a touch of very special fascination. On Sundays there are morning prayers attended by the whole household and staff, to whom he reads a sermon prepared by some distinguished clergyman. Occasionally, but not often, he motors to the seaside or takes lunch or dinner at the place of some Dutch friends of their Majesties.

In recent years the Emperor William's continuous scientific work has been concentrated on cultural morphology, and more especially on prehistoric Sumerian and post-Sumerian Mesopotamia, and he has made a close study of the British and German excavations in Iraq. He has published a number of books and papers on subjects connected with these studies, the latest being a paper read to the Doorn Academy and subsequently published on 'Kingship in Ancient Mesopotamia.' Although his withdrawal from the political scene of this turbulent world has been complete, yet he watches with a keen interest the events in every part of the globe. His

outlook is wide, his insight deep, and the range of his experience unique. Nothing that is worthy of notice escapes his attention. Recent developments in the Far East largely confirm the concern he expressed nearly forty years ago. It was suggestive of the same acumen when at the earliest stage of the Abyssinian conflict he insisted in conversation on the necessity for England to come to terms with Italy on Mediterranean questions, seeing the gravity of the situation in Asia—a policy now fully adopted by Mr Neville Chamberlain's Government.

What his attitude towards this country is the Kaiser has manifested by his chivalrous tribute to the late Admiral Lord Jellicoe—truly a message of peace and friendship—and by sending his grandson, Prince Frederick, to convey his sympathy when England and the Royal family mourned King George V's death. These courteous acts, the outcome of a life-long inner attitude, disclose a deep tragedy in his relations with Great Britain.

That England and Germany should have faced each other as enemies in the battles of the Great War must be a matter of everlasting regret. This is what is being felt on both sides now the War is a thing of the past. The British and German soldiers who fought the battles have long since buried all war-time bitterness and have shaken hands. It is preposterous that one man should be excluded from this reconciliation, a man, moreover, who worked harder than anyone else for a friendship between the two countries, his father's country and his mother's. The respect of Great Britain is due to him.

D. VON BESELER.

Art. 2.—POST-VICTORIAN READING.

1. *After the Victorians*. By Amy Cruse. Allen and Unwin, 1938.
2. *Oscar Wilde, the Man, the Artist*. By Boris Brasol. Williams and Norgate, 1938.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the expression *fin de siècle* was a good deal overworked by the elegant in the arts and literature. It was the excuse or justification for all sorts of cultural indulgences or weaknesses and was implicitly a promise that with the turn of the century conditions, social, intellectual, and æsthetic, would be different from whatever they had been before. That, of course, was a mistake. A century is merely an artificial instalment of time, and as things happened to be at the close of the nineteenth century, so, too, with no essential alterations, they were after the beginning of the twentieth; the principal difference in social customs being perhaps that the phrase *fin de siècle* had come automatically to its welcome death.

Miss Cruse, in the attractive volume named above, establishes the truth—though it is hardly a new discovery—that the progress of a people, with its changes, developments, and failings, is frequently measurable in epochs, great or small; and that over such historical periods certain marked characteristics of popular judgment, tastes, and prejudices are to be discerned. In her volume 'The Victorians and their Books,' published three years ago, and to which I was privileged to pay an admiring tribute in these pages, she dealt with a highly marked period that was definitely different in its aims and tendencies from those of the years that went before and those that came after it. For some reason, however, that may not at once be apparent, in her first volume and for its purposes she ended the Victorian epoch well before 1897, although that was the year of the Diamond Jubilee and the culminating event of the reign of the Queen whose greatness as the monarch of these islands and the Empire was undeniable, and remains so, despite the disillusionments inevitable with the reactions of subsequent years.

Yet from the proverbial second thoughts that were stimulated by her new book, we recognise that Miss Cruse

had justification for bringing the Victorian period to a conclusion some twelve or fourteen years before it nominally ended with the death of the aged Queen. For although the Diamond Jubilee was a magnificent occasion which demonstrated, as never had been possible before, the might and splendour of the British Empire, tendencies had already set in that in the subsequent reigns of her son and grandson were marked, and caused vital alterations in the social conditions of the country. It is Miss Cruse's purpose in this book and in her own entertaining fashion to estimate the main literary interests of the ordinary people during that aftermath of the Victorian years. In consequence, she establishes what seems to be, when observed in retrospect, a definite, self-contained period, which in turn was brought to an end by the shattering catastrophe of 1914.

The 'nineties, with the noughts and the tens of the present century, formed, however, rather an interlude than a period, for they brought forth no very striking discovery or movement; but comprised rather a time of recuperation after energetic expansions in territory and spirit—though it had too much agitation and noise for a true recuperation—before Armageddon was to subject all resources to the breaking strain. That there was any survival of resources after the terrible upheavals of the War was due rather to new recruitments of strength than to the former reserves, which, like the old soldiers of the popular song, tended to 'fade away.' Until the ultimatums had passed and the outbreak of war ended the long tension, there had been in the twenty-odd years covered by Miss Cruse's volume a continuous menace from a heavily armed, threatening, and blustering Prussia, which clouded to some extent every interest of those days with the fear that it all might soon be ended in brutal stress and destruction—as so nearly it was. In those years the fevered spirits of the earliest worldlings before Noah's deluge drowned them were renewed. 'Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die,' was often the thought that led to hours of hectic or dismal merriment, with continuous unhealthy excitement and an increasing loss of faith in the ultimate rule of right.

In 'After the Victorians' Miss Cruse limits her concern to the appeal of the printed word to the popular mind,

as might have been revealed in the easy-going talk of a drawing-room or at a dinner-table. A complete chronicler of the mental aspects of the time could hardly have left out, as she does, the more popular worlds of politics, sport, and the theatre; all of which, then as now, were more likely to be the subjects of general conversation than books. For among the leading influences in those rival spheres at that time were—in politics, Joseph Chamberlain, with his raging, tearing campaign for Tariff Reform, and Mr Lloyd George, violently discussing, in Limehouse and elsewhere, pampered dukes and taxable hen-roosts; in cricket, 'W. G.' with 'Ranji' and a hundred supermen—as a whole unequalled to-day—who brought lustre to Lords and the Oval; with the stage adorned by the genius of Henry Irving, who was accompanied by a cluster of constellations that included the Kendals and Ellen Terry, Alexander, Tree, Edward Terry, Forbes-Robertson, and 'Mrs Pat.' To the popular interest books and their writers were comparatively of minor importance then; while also the newly come motor car and the silent film were increasingly insistent as current subjects of thought and talk. And in those years Signor Marconi was making his patient experiments that were to link together nations in an invisible union, that has not proved much of an encouragement to brotherly love, and to establish new vast industries and a recreation that is sometimes a tyranny. Yet the Printed Word in books and periodicals also made considerable appeal, as Miss Cruse shows; and anyhow its effects and reactions on the popular mind at any set time would comprise a subject worthy of a volume.

In reviewing Miss Cruse's impressions, that in large measure are gathered from the recorded opinions of such witnesses as the late John Bailey, Mr Henry Nevinson, Mr E. F. Benson, T. W. H. Crosland, Anne Douglas Sedgwick, Mr Wells, and some others—not all of whom carry much weight—we may as well follow her order of the discussion and begin with the popular view at that time on religion and the questions which still were agitating thought as a result of breakings-away from orthodox faith, due to the new assertions made as to the origins and evolution of most things; of justification by faith, and so on; of the 'religious millinery' that exercised the minds of ritualists and their opponents, and of much

else in a department of thought over which honest people often are deeply perplexed. There was a great output of literature on religion and its social applications, as with 'If Christ came to Chicago'—or to London; and the High Church fiction of Guy Thorne and others that sold like hot cakes, as well as crops of sermons and commentaries, which, however, because they generally beat about the impenetrable bush and could do nothing to reach an abiding solution, failed to win encouragement and went out.

But 'Lux Mundi' was different. Charles Gore, who after his death was extolled by half the obituary writers and the Archbishop of Canterbury as a saint, and deprecated by the other half as a theological Bolshevist, with that work which he edited cast a burning firebrand into the thick of the many complacent. Looked back upon, and having regard to the ways in which the religious and other worlds have since sped, it was not so fiery a document as all that; but with its acceptance of the destroying, but not altogether destructive, criticisms of the Old Testament it brought the Fundamentalists (to borrow a more recent term) especially to rage and tears. It had the advantages of being sincere, in a province that often had lacked sincerity through the desperate fear of any encroachments being permitted on the impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture, and was written by a number of godly men—such as Canon Scott Holland—who lived their faith ardently as well as taught it. It is a tribute to its times that such a volume was taken with excited interest and was effective.

It was, of course, the more elect of the pundits at the dinner-table who, with the confidence of having read it, could discuss the new heresies of 'Lux Mundi.' Lesser folk also discussed it, but mainly from what was said in the reviews and the ample correspondence in the newspapers which it evoked. But if 'Lux Mundi' was debarred to them, they could talk with all the seeming authority requisite of 'Robert Elsmere,' then also the rage, and did so, to such an extent that a City of London clergyman, Canon Shuttleworth, declared that he made it a condition before attending any priestly conference that the first reference to Mrs Humphry Ward's provocative novel should be followed instantly by the bodily ejection

from the meeting of the offender. It was, in fact, a dull book, and Elsmere was not striking enough as man or as unsettled priest to merit such vigorous attention as he got; but there is no doubt of the excitement caused by his discomforts of unorthodoxy, and it is creditable to the times that a religious novel was able to stir minds as amply as the serious 'Robert Elsmere' did.

In Miss Cruse's pages the religious is followed by the decadent, a piquant contrast of interests which possibly were not so dissociated as at first appearance might seem, so far, at least, as their literary trimmings are concerned. It was the period, that already is over-written, of Oscar Wilde and the Yellow Book, with Aubrey Beardsley and his wonderful line and frustrated sexual spirit to fix the high-water mark of decadence in the arts. The eccentrics who followed Wilde were fair game to the humorists, and got more substantial fame from such skits as Gilbert's 'Patience' and Robert Hichens' 'Green Carnation' than their own gifts—except for posing—could justify. One must, however, be prudent in judgment even of the decadent, and Beardsley at least had genius. The antics of that crowd certainly were amusing, as nonsense in earnest often is; and although Wilde's prose and verse, as in 'Dorian Grey,' his questionably sincere 'De Profundis,' and entirely sincere 'Ballad of Reading Gaol,' with his better plays, and especially that superb and cheeky triviality 'The Importance of Being Earnest,' may not live long, being only doubtfully of the stuff that endures, their writer and his wit made the world laugh with excellent mirth until his crash came and he fell almost to the worse fate of being a victim to the unscrupulous pen and friendship of Frank Harris, a journalist of those days who could not be fairly described as one of nature's gentlemen.

We are, however, tempted, and entitled, at this juncture to interrupt our survey of Miss Cruse's book and express appreciation of a new Life of Oscar Wilde, as man and writer, which has been published recently. It is by Mr Boris Brasol, and with discrimination is so frank and just a study of him, his literary efforts and very curious character, that we doubt if a better biography of him will be written. We do not go so far as Mr Brasol in his praise of Wilde's genius, as we cannot believe that with

all his cleverness and boldness in his writings and his public life that is the right word for it; but for Mr Brasol's sympathetic treatment of a difficult subject, with its innumerable lights and shades, we have only admiration. His study of Wilde the man is the more interesting part of the book, and we follow his clever, flashy courses along the pathways of fashion and would-be fashion with the interest and amusement that may be evoked by any daring charlatan show and from first to last, even in the days of his humiliation before death came to him in Paris, Wilde was a showman. The adulation he got in America, even more than at home, was enough to spoil the least immodest of persons; and he never was modest. His natural vulgarity, that was a real part of him and inherited from his ill-chosen parents, each of whom though in different ways was brilliant, was fully fed by the vanities of the hostesses and hosts who scrambled to entertain him. They played up to his cheapest and most blatant moods, and reading their silliness shrewdly, he responded to them in the expected spirit, uttered his darling witticisms, overdressed in his carefully thought-out eccentricities of costume, and with his tongue in his cheek, fooled them to his and their hearts' content. 'Punch' and the satirists enjoyed the opportunities given, and all would have been well, an ideal harlequinade to the end, had it not been for the sordid tragedy that waited for his last witticism, his last impudence, to be uttered, and then fell. Contrasted with the glittering follies of his early appearances, the ordeal of shame he suffered in exile was terrible, yet borne with a self-repect and fortitude which in the eyes of the recording angels must surely have wiped out the old stains. To Wilde's gifts as a conversationalist, which became so brilliantly useful in his plays, Mr Brasol rightly gives special praise. Surely, however, there is a slip in the quotation of Tennyson's rejoinder to John Wilson. It should be 'Crusty Christopher'—for 'Christopher North'—and not 'Crusty Charivari.' We return to Miss Cruse.

The foreigners also came into the country and its table-talk through translations and had, on the whole, a good effect on English fiction, tending to make it more real—Turgenev, Tolstoi and Dostoevsky, with Zola and—with

ample fantasy to enlighten his shrewd reality—Anatole France. Those writers are now familiar in our mouths, but then, as with Ibsen's influence on the drama, were regarded as disturbing and felt to be dangerous if not positively destructive. The Russians especially were helpful through building their novels on a range of events as vast as the plains of their own country. They took the detail of the whole earth, and especially of the underworld of passions and politics, into their ken. Although they were not followed to the same great breadths and depths by any writers here, they left their influence and helped to rid us of much of the romantic fustian which had followed a long way after the heroics of Victor Hugo and the robust and picturesque energies of Alexandre Dumas. Zola's realism was of narrower range than theirs, and, like some of the writings of Maxim Gorki, often insistently ugly, wallowing in dirt. Yet with 'La Débâcle,' an epic in prose of the Franco-Prussian War, he too wrought with a spaciousness comparable to that of Tolstoi's 'War and Peace,' and sad it is that his great powers, which found eventually an honourable outlet in his championship of the persecuted Dreyfus, were not more often given a similar universality. Massive as the Russians were and as Zola was on that occasion, the delicacy of touch of Anatole France, his gift for irony, his intellectual mischievousness, his wit and laughing mockery, which angered so many of the serious-hearted and, when daringly he touched theology, led to his works being put on the index of the forbidden, were the more valuable to his times—as they would be always where quickness of mind can inspire—though it may be that his effects are now a little staled, it being a consequence of the brightest wit and humour that they fade through repetition and their own allurements.

The poetry of those years was not of immortal quality, as could hardly be expected in an age that was generally so fidgety and uncertain of the future and eagerly following small men and ways. There was Alfred Austin, the Poet Laureate, whose song was insufficient; Sir Edwin Arnold, whose 'Light of Asia' ushered in a long-sustained banquet of oriental poetry and proverbial philosophy; Lewis Morris, not inaptly termed by Michael Field 'the grocer of Parnassus' and by Meredith 'the Harlequin Clown

of the Muses'—but his work was too commonplace for so fanciful an image as that; and William Morris—honest citizen!; poor John Davidson, whose Muse was melancholy and whose end was dreadful; and Richard Le Gallienne, born Mr Gale, whose handsome face and presence with the flatteries inevitable possibly spoilt him and deprived his works of virility of thought and diction; Ernest Dowson, who sang with a small voice and probably did not know it; and, better than posterity now measures him, Stephen Phillips, who was able to pen the mighty line and had massiveness and colour in his verse before, yielding to moods and moral weakness, he came to a sad end, drivelling out his life in personal degradation; with, finally, as also first, in this passing catalogue of the earlier post-Victorian verse-builders, Francis Thompson, who gave glimpses of rich poetic quality. Although Gilbert Chesterton, in his warm-hearted carelessness and the extravagance to which appreciative critics are prone, declared that Thompson's ultimate place would be between Shelley and Keats, one still can discern in him the music, assurance, and insight of true poetry as well as the probability that he might have written better and would have written more if he had enjoyed a cultured leisure in life instead of having to suffer those days and nights in want among the naked streets that were his misfortune.

Those were hard times for outcasts, the wastrels and unfortunates of the towns, to whom our industrial civilisation has been no organised benevolence. In those days there was little to relieve the harshnesses of want, especially for the aged and the out-of-work. It is difficult now to visualise the need in those years, the positive starvation and squalor abounding. A retrospect suggests that whatever its causes, and it is not easy now to determine them precisely, an enormous improvement in the standard of living has occurred in the last fifty years; while the realities of the seedy and hungry poverty that shamed those times are illustrated by the books that then appeared. Incidentally, they could not have been an easy topic at the dinner-tables which often, in the earlier Victorian phrase, 'groaned' under the burden of good things to be eaten and drunk. There were 'The Bitter Cry of Outcast London,' an anonymous tract which seared consciences,

and General William Booth's 'In Darkest England and the Way Out,' that was enormously successful and led Sir Squire Bancroft and others of good hearts and golden purses to pour their thousands into the coffers of the Salvation Army, which, indeed, was a light in the slummy darkness. George R. Sims, who knew London intimately in all its ways, was writing then a series describing 'How the Poor Live,' and Charles Booth, the shipping magnate, was scientifically analysing the populations of the larger cities, determining the proportions of those in work and those out of it; while, of course, it was a great opportunity for Socialism and hard-mouthed, practical Radicalism to flourish and preach their gospels of sour truth. Many books of purpose, fiction with sharp social intentions, were written: like Edward Bellamy's 'Looking Backwards,' Mr Blatchford's 'Merrie England,' sold on barrows for a penny and making effective propaganda, and Richard Whiteing's 'Number Five John Street,' which in parts was so realistic that conscientious readers could smell the rubber in the factory of the chief character's employment. All that serious fiction, which often angered and hurt, had its effect in practical legislation and a more sympathetic administration of the laws and led to the satires of 'Erewhon' Butler and to popular social studies by Mr Wells and others.

Simultaneously with the searchings of conscience then over the degradations of poverty and the attempts made to mend or end them, the Empire had become after the Diamond Jubilee more than ever a subject of British pride—and something of which the dinner-tables and drawing-rooms easily could talk; especially as its development, with the pioneering and explorations that led to its extension, was of the first class for fiction. Adventure was in the air, and the essence of that spirit appeared supremely in Stevenson's 'Treasure Island,' with its thrills of pirates and one-legged villainy, the breezes and salt of the seas, and dangerous searches for buried gold. It was just the stuff to make men boys again and give boys manliness. With that masterpiece of romance Miss Cruse brackets 'King Solomon's Mines,' which must have sent multitudes of spirited youths to South Africa in search of adventure and gold. The popularity of Rider Haggard, enormous in his day, seems to have gone. His

tale of mystery, 'She,' at the time of its publication seemed unusually horrible and eerie, but appears now incapable of causing the faintest shudder. The truth is that not only have times changed since then, but that author's heart was not altogether in his fiction; he preferred to write seriously on agricultural reforms and administration, and that possibly is why his vogue has not lasted. But it also may be that the romance of South Africa has been overdone.

And there is one other who whenever the Empire was the theme for pleasant talk was naturally remembered—Rudyard Kipling; not only for his plain tales of the Indian hills and his racy stories of soldiers more than three; but also for his 'Recessional,' the magnificent hymn of patriotism which made of our world-wide scattered heritage and possessions a spiritual trust. Through that exalted prayer—that it is said was most casually written—he helped to purify the idea of Empire and so discovered the strength which will keep alive the unity and brotherhood of the British Commonwealth. Referring to the decline of Kipling, Miss Cruse has a little misapprehended. She takes his jingle 'The Absent-Minded Beggar,' written in haste for a charitable purpose after the beginning of the second Boer War, as a sign of the lowering of his ideals and of the failure of his powers. The true cause of his declension, which was true enough, was his illness in America, in the course of which his little daughter died. From the shock of that bereavement Kipling never recovered, and *that* was why his later work, with a few scattered exceptions, had lost the old power, speed, appeal, and glamour.

Those also were the years of militant womanhood; an ugly, painful period in which the battle of feminism was fought and the claims for the vote resisted, only to end with the outbreak of the War, when the right concessions were made. It was a subject that lent itself easily to the inventions and embroideries of fiction (and burlesque) and revolting daughters, latch-key daughters, and the women who did were noisily evident, raging goddesses who led lives which, looked back upon from our own generation of liberties and licence, appear to have been examples of minor daring. Nora, the revolting wife of Ibsen's 'Doll's House,' was the dramatic forerunner of the ladies who

went; but in the volumes of fiction outpoured her ultimate act of protest was soon outdone, and with Mrs Lynn Linton and Mrs Humphry Ward on the other side—Mrs Linton almost approaching what were derisively called the shrieking sisterhood in her vehemence—there was plenty of eloquence and anger to disturb the thoughtful world. An example, different in kind, yet germane to this issue, illustrates the change that had come to domestic life in England, through the rising to limited independence of the daughters and wives of the middle classes. The 'Daily Telegraph,' in one silly summertime which extended to the autumn and the winter, gave much of its space to the discussion of the question 'Is Marriage a Failure?' in which 'matrimonial difficulties were exposed to the public gaze with a freedom that seemed to many people indecent, and the shrill voices of the accusing Feminists were answered by cries of shocked indignation by the upholders of the sacredness of marriage.' Miss Cruse assures us that about twenty-seven thousand letters were written in that newspaper correspondence.

That was not the only sign of the ways in which the newspaper press then 'extended itself,' for a series of popular weeklies was issued at the price of a penny and discovered a new host of readers. Doubtless they were a consequence of the foundation of national elementary schools less than twenty years before. *Demos* now was able to read and, therefore, the tastes of *Demos* must be considered by the providers of printed fare. 'Tit-Bits,' 'Answers to Correspondents'—the title was shortened afterwards to its first word—and 'Pearson's Weekly' were established to give information of a very light character in brief articles, with a tale and pithy paragraphs of picturesque statistics and gossip facts, the front page consisting of jokes that seemed infinite in quantity and in their quality at least were consistent. From that beginning, led by the Harmsworths, came endless developments, including cheap daily newspapers, the halfpenny 'Daily Mirror'—without illustrations and for women—and the halfpenny 'Daily Mail.' But already many classic English books had been made available to more serious readers in Cassell's cheap National Library, which before long was succeeded and excelled in scope by Mr Dent's famous Everyman's series and Temple classics.

Demos, with the golden treasures of the world's best inspirations opened before him, ought by now to be wondrous wise and full of exalted philosophy—the perfect citizen. But is he? The question may be asked, but calls for no answer here.

In propriety of order the fiction of crime should have followed that of adventure, without the intervention of journalism, for some of its writers have disclosed the belief that their burglars, footpads, forgers, and thieves, though sordid of aim, were generally blue-blooded, and fully as romantic as the adventurers who travelled the seas and lands to explore, hunt, and fight. There is, anyhow, no question of the enormous appeal of stories of crime-mystery, especially to the virtuous in the drawing-rooms who, although they love a good murder in fiction, would not rob a millionaire of a brass farthing or slaughter a mouse in hot or in cold blood-lust. Much of the zest, the thrill, and skill of workmanship in such fiction is due to Wilkie Collins, whose 'Moonstone' and 'Woman in White' were in many ways pioneer. His Count Fosco was a villain of the very first quality for attractiveness and repulsiveness combined. At once he fascinated and caused shivering dread. But in England Sherlock Holmes—as all the world knows—was the popular centre of such interests in those years. He and his deductive methods were taken as original, although he was directly due to the M. Dupin of Edgar Allan Poe's 'Murders in the Rue Morgue.' Conan Doyle, who had the fortune to exploit Poe's idea, declared that his model for Holmes was a certain professor of Edinburgh University; but indeed his methods of adroit deduction were learnt and copied with admirable success from the creation of the American of sad life and morbid genius. Sherlock Holmes's literary offspring in any case have been legion and will continue to be born or otherwise evolved so long as crime and criminals and the unexpected solution of a mystery attract. In fiction it would be an unusual dead man who told no tale. More original and compelling, because of its peculiar psychological interest, was Stevenson's 'Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde,' in which the transformation of a body and spirit were dealt with in a melodramatic way and yet with such sincerity and confidence of touch that it quickened an actual sense of horror. Through the date

of its publication the little book belonged to the 'eighties ; but the drawing-rooms continued for years thereafter to enjoy the sinister spell of Edward Hyde and his better self that suffered.

The fiction of those years was full-flowing. Novels (as ever since) were outpoured in spates, and, with the faith in the finenesses of the age which animates the majority in a decadent period, those of the later pre-War years were extolled. Meredith and Hardy were still the novelists most favoured and admired, though the former was already being regarded by a resolute minority as glittering and obscure—the Canon Shuttleworth already referred to, because of the obscurity, calling him not very happily 'a prose Browning'—while Hardy was held by Propriety and the nervous-minded to be dangerously pagan and frank, and particularly so in 'Jude the Obscure'—whose obscurity was not Meredithian. Since then the values of both those writers have faded—Meredith's more than those of Hardy, whose credit is the stronger because of his sincerity and the sombre power of his books. It may be that his reputation as novelist will live the more steadily through his natural and rural works, as 'Under the Greenwood Tree' and 'Far from the Madding Crowd.' It is, however, easy to be wise after the event, and Hardy's novels may easily have stamina enough to upset this rapid prognostic. His position as a poet and the writer of 'The Dynasts' concerns rather a later period. As the third of those leaders in the fiction that seemed the more likely to endure there was J. M. Barrie, who conquered the hearts of readers with his quaint originality and the earnest humanity that was at the heart of his pathos and his fun.

There were others. It would be as easy, as it now is unnecessary, to cast ridicule on the old excessive popularity of Marie Corelli and Sir Hall Caine, whose rivalry in chase of prodigious sales was as blatant as their vanity. He should have known better, for he revealed in his earliest work a genuine gift ; and if he had been content with the normal rewards of the artist—whatever they are—he might have secured an admirable place among continuing English novelists. But seeing Miss Corelli, who noisily refused to have her novels sent to the reviewers, counting her success in hundreds of thousands of copies sold, he chose to adopt her methods of showmanship and

gained in that way the commercial success he coveted—but in the process lost his literary soul. At no time was she an artist with the essential delicacies of touch, discretions, and restraints; but through her vigour and assertiveness she convinced her simple-hearted multitude of followers that she was not only an artist but second to none in imaginative genius. Happily there were others whose fiction stimulated and entertained. Anthony Hope was giving delight through his two Zenda stories and the 'Dolly Dialogues,' that were most delicate of charm, humour, and wit. Mr E. F. Benson surprised the world and especially the dons of Cambridge with 'Dodo'. Jerome K. Jerome to his annoyance was still taken as the humorist that he was, whereas he wished to write with seriousness and be honoured as one of the masters; Mr Jacobs was delighting us with his human and divine bargemen and Mr Arthur Morrison telling kindly tales of the mean streets; while Mr Wells, with such fantasies as his 'Sea Lady,' the humours and reality of 'Kipps,' and the scientific romances of warring worlds and time-machines and many other inventions, possible and happily impossible, so well proved his possession of genius in its wide variety that we are tempted to wish he would return to such simple and significant works—such enjoyable books—as they were and leave the prophetic heaviness to those who cannot invent good tales.

The social satirist in heavier vein (and with a heavier pen) that Mr Wells was to become was, however, not yet; but there were plenty of critics, other than the novelists, of the social aspects of civilisation then. Some in their onslaughts were serious, but the better ones were amusing, using the blandishments of satire, and among those smoother observers was G. W. E. Russell, who, though forgotten now, was an accepted genial critic of Stuccovia. In his methods he was gentle and a contrast to T. W. H. Crosland, whose satires of the Unspeakable Scot, the Wild Irishman, of Taffy, and Lovely Woman were savage in their angry humour. He had genius, as his poetry proved, but his bludgeoning attacks on his fellows and their womanhood were so bitter that they reacted on himself. Gilbert Chesterton was then beginning his career with delightful studies of Dickens and Browning—his prose being as yet unspoiled by the tangles of paradox and

thickness of over-assertive thought which came from his continuous journalism ; and Mr Bernard Shaw—but, with his faults and qualities of wit, prose and prosiness, that gentleman is too considerable a subject to be conveyed in a penultimate paragraph and, like ‘Charley’s Aunt,’ he is ‘still running.’

With no other writer of those days, however, can we better bring to an end these comments on an attractive compilation, as much of the book is, and the popular tastes in literature of a restless and strange but interesting time. Miss Cruse says nothing of countryside and nature books, such as Richard Jefferies wrote, that were increasing then in number and appeal ; or of the Kailyard school, that with its sentimentalities and earnest dialect grew very tiresome to readers in the south ; or of the Cockney humorists, like Barry Pain and Pett Ridge, who bridged the narrowing chasm between books and journalism ; but her omissions are few, and for the merits, interest, and charm of her volume as a whole we have reason to be grateful.

MAURICE DOWNING.

Art. 3.—PORTUGAL.

AFTER more than a decade of comparative obscurity, Portugal has assumed very sudden prominence in the complex motion-picture of European relationships. Through the genius of Dr Oliveira Salazar, Finance Minister since April 1928, and by her own considerable efforts she has risen in twelve years from political chaos, bankruptcy, and incipient decadence to an honourable status, consolidated by firm progressive rule, internal order, and solvency. Through the tension of war-fevered Europe, beset by problems of international strategy and self-defence, her international position has been likewise strengthened; she has become a valuable friend and a dangerous enemy. While no one was looking, Portugal the pawn has run the length of the chess-board and has become with disconcerting suddenness a queen piece, with all the strategic advantages which that lady carries. Five countries have been principally touched by Portugal's metamorphosis—Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Some have been quicker than others to spot the transformation and its implications.

A very mild dictator in President Carmona; an able but unostentatious executive in Dr Salazar; an unbroken record of sound finance for a decade; a contented people; and undisturbed international relations have all contrived to keep Portugal out of range of the more intensive international crises, and therefore out of the eye of press and public. The rare and minor alarms caused by bomb-throwing and abortive attempts to assassinate the Prime Minister, the revolts of 1927 and 1931 have been altogether overshadowed in the memory by bigger and far more horrifying events of this kind elsewhere. The mainspring of Portugal's foreign policy, a defensive alliance dating from 1392 with Great Britain, has been taken for granted—especially by Great Britain. Her attitude towards the Spanish war, though it has threatened minor and individual embarrassments from time to time, has not aroused any general alarm. Portugal has not been openly threatened by the totalitarian powers; defence of her colonies, as such, though recognised to be potentially a serious problem by well-informed opinion, has never been featured as more than a factor in the main

colonial problem created by Germany's demands. Portugal, in all, has justified the comfortable belief held, in particular, by preoccupied democracies that she is fairly well able to look after herself, leaving Britain, the power most closely concerned with her international welfare, free to cope with the more pressing problems of foreign relations in other fields. For a century or more Portugal had struggled along at the end of Britain's apron-strings, a grubby, graceless child, more or less incapable of directing its own progress, always impoverished by a chronically empty money-box. With the advent of General Carmona and Dr Salazar this unstable child grew sturdier, increasingly independent, no longer ragged, impoverished. But the most remarkable period of its adolescence—1930–1935—was obscured by more important events elsewhere, and the transformation, though observed, did not receive the appreciation it deserved, at any rate from the quarters whence it would then have been most welcome.

This tendency of apparent indifference observed by Great Britain until recent months did not pass unperceived by the Portuguese. A sensitive people, with an acute inferiority complex towards their larger and more powerful European neighbours, have misunderstood this attitude of detachment; have suspected it to be aloofness. As a result, very trivial incidents affecting Anglo-Portuguese relationships have been magnified out of all proportion to their importance. Certain actions by the British Government have been badly misunderstood, and skilful diplomacy has not always been convincing enough to prevent groundless suspicion, fostered by interested parties, from becoming harmful impressions. Such sensitiveness on the part of a small nation is not new or rare in international relations. But in this instance it forms such a highly important background to recent policy and events that it must be first and fully appreciated if the general position is to be understood.

Realisation of the need for a fresh understanding with the new Portugal—perhaps it would be more accurate to say, for a review and renewal of the understanding which has lasted so successfully for 566 years—came to the British Government in the fall of 1937. After some delay a strong British Services Mission, comprising representa-

tives of the British Navy, Army, and Air Force, sailed for Portugal last spring. Their purpose was far deeper and more significant than the mere review and consolidation of joint British and Portuguese strategy, suggested by the composition of the mission. Their visit was immediately preceded by an important demonstration of British friendliness in the shape of a visit to Lisbon by part of the Home Fleet. When the mission eventually sailed it was known that their success or failure would have a profound effect not only upon future relations between Britain and Portugal but upon that vital realm of British defence strategy in the Mediterranean and south-eastern Atlantic which hinges upon alliance with a friendly Portugal. Although the task of this mission is complete very little of what passed between representatives of the British services and their opposite numbers in Lisbon will become public knowledge. But analysis of certain of the broad problems which confronted them provides a fair picture of Portugal's international position, policy, and their place in current world affairs.

It may be well first to review briefly Portugal's personal assets—military and financial. Obviously Portugal can never possess a fraction of the forces by land, sea, or air which would be needed successfully to withstand a determined aggressor on her land frontier, her seaboard, or any one of her possessions overseas. On the east her land frontier extends for a distance of about 620 miles, a wide opening for an enemy in occupation of Spain. Her possessions, comprising the fourth largest empire in the world, are far-flung, scattered over Europe, East and West Africa, Asia, and the Atlantic Ocean. Portugal's population at home is barely 8,000,000, which under existing decrees could provide on mobilisation an armed force of not more than 150,000. There is, in addition, a Portuguese Home Army—roughly equivalent to the British Territorial Army—created as a second line of defence in event of war, which might bring the total potential force to 250,000. It should be added that as a result of reorganisation carried out at the beginning of this year the Portuguese army has been brought up to compact, modern, and efficient standards. The naval and air forces are still undergoing expansion. Portugal's Navy includes at most a score of effective war vessels,

among them six new sloops and three submarines. Some have been built by British firms. Her air force includes British Gloster Gladiator single-seater fighters, bombing and reconnaissance planes purchased from Germany and Italy. Purchases within the last year include perhaps thirty modern aircraft of these types.

Solvency is a big factor in defence, and thanks to the skill of Dr Salazar Portugal's finances are sounder than at any time in her recent history. After living on credit for the best part of a century, she has achieved a succession of ten balanced budgets since 1928. The surpluses accomplished by Dr Salazar in this decade are worth recording :

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1928-29	2,784,000
1929-30	407,000
1930-31	1,512,000
1931-32	1,363,000
1932-33	763,000
1933-34	1,184,000
1934-35	2,888,000
1935-36	2,080,000
1936-37	1,910,000
1937-38	330,000

These surpluses have totalled more than 15,000,000*l.*, of which two-thirds has been set aside as a reserve for emergency. The remainder has been well spent on public works throughout the country. Internal loans have been reduced to the minimum; no external loan has been contracted since 1928, and Portugal to-day is almost independent of international finance. So long as possible the Government intend to follow its present policy of meeting expenditure on defence with the accumulated savings of past years, and not with loans. This is an impressive record, which few other countries can better to-day—a record which Portugal feels might well have received greater appreciation from Britain.

There, in brief summary, is Portugal's domestic strength. It is sound, but on a small scale. As Dr Salazar observed recently with justifiable pride :

'When I think of the international scene—the disquiet, ruin, impoverishment of whole peoples, internal and external struggles, disorder, indiscipline, the instability and weakness

of governments and of principles, the precarious state of society ; when I think how wealthy countries cannot keep their currencies stable, when solid economic systems cannot or will not settle their liabilities and great nations are unable to balance their finance ; when I see life, wealth, and morals in a state of crisis—and then turn my eyes to our own house, small but orderly, swept and garnished, I feel that we all should be grateful to the National Revolution.'

In a world of assured peace Portugal's position might indeed be the envy of any country in the world, and she would be free to go her own way. In a world of power politics, vast armies and navies, air forces with front-line strength to be reckoned in thousands, annual defence programmes counted in hundreds of millions of pounds and dollars—in this world Portugal's strength alone is wholly disproportionate to her strategic value, vulnerability, and responsibilities.

From Portugal's viewpoint, therefore, the value of her alliance with Britain is pretty obvious—to-day more than ever before. Integrity of the Portuguese Empire is guaranteed at least by the letter of treaties with Great Britain. An enemy attacking her land frontier from Spain, her coastline or overseas possessions must know that such action will, in normal circumstances, bring British forces of some kind into play. Just what these forces might consist of in the changed conditions of recent years was one of the items of the agenda of the British services mission. For Britain a friendly Portugal is far more important, and this opens up a gigantic aspect of British strategy which can only be fringed within the scope of this article. It is just conceivable that Portugal might find another ally, capable of filling the role of guardian angel, willing to defend her independence. But for Britain nothing can replace the strategic advantages which Portugal and certain of her possessions can offer. Nearly a century ago Lord Palmerston, writing to Lord John Russell, summed up the alliance from Britain's standpoint thus :

' These advantages are numerous, great, and obvious—commercial, political, military, and naval ; and should we lose them, some of them would be not merely a loss but actually a powerful means of attack against us in the hands of an enemy power. For instance, the naval position of the

Tagus must never be held by a country—say France or Spain,—who may become our enemy. Only if Portugal keeps her independence and remains the close ally of Britain can we be sure of having the Tagus as a friendly, instead of a hostile base. Imagine for one moment Portugal as part of Spain and Spain allied to France in a war with England. What would be our naval position with all ports, from Calais to Marseilles, against us . . . and nothing between us and Malta except Gibraltar . . . on the other hand, if the Tagus were at our disposal, we should occupy an important intermediate position which would greatly impede the naval movements of France and Spain.'

It is easy enough to adapt these words to modern conditions and when this is done their force increases. Repeatedly through history Portugal's ports and nearby insular possessions in the Atlantic have proved of inestimable value to Britain. Lisbon, the Azores, and Cape Verde Islands are individually vital bases; as a triangle they form one of the most important strategic lines for Britain in the western hemisphere. Madeira and Cape Verde Islands lie athwart the British Empire's sea communications with the Mediterranean and South Africa. From the Portuguese coast also, these lines of communication could be defended or attacked. The Azores not only fringe the British trade routes to South America, but, looking to the future, they form a highly important link in the proposed winter route for transatlantic air crossings. Knowledge that Portugal's seaboard, the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the coastline of Portugal's West African possessions were on her side would be indispensable to Britain in time of war. Control of these bases not only ensures maintenance of trade routes; certain of them could control a blockade of the Mediterranean. The problem of defending Gibraltar—which will not be simplified by the outcome of the Spanish Civil War—is greatly eased by conception of a powerful air base in southern Portugal. This Anglo-Portuguese alliance is more than an interesting historical record. It is a real and immensely important bond between the two countries, which might well swing the balance in a European war.

How far has the Spanish Civil War and its complications weakened this alliance? What lay behind the

rumours, quickly scotched by both countries but persistent that Portugal might be glad to loosen the alliance? Has she taken any steps which may be interpreted as dangerous to the maintenance of friendly relations with Great Britain? Those were some of the questions which sent the British Services Mission hurrying to Portugal last February. It was principally Portugal's attitude towards the Spanish War which brought these questions to a head. To the outside world it may have appeared that Portugal chose, perhaps foolishly, openly to back the same side as Italy and Germany; and that in doing so she not only drove herself further into the arms of these countries, but flagrantly jeopardised relations with the strongest non-interventionist power, Great Britain, whose attitude has been interpreted by an enormous body of opinion in Portugal as slightly favourable to Government or 'Red' Spain. Further, it has been suggested that this alignment has brought Portugal into dangerously close contact with the two suitors, Germany and Italy, with whom she has found it advantageous to flirt in the hope of drawing warmer attentions from her lawfully wedded husband. These general ideas have a strong basis of truth, but they need elaboration.

Let us first examine Portugal's position in regard to the Spanish War. It is idle to deny that her attitude has caused a wide cleavage of political opinion with Britain. To Portugal the logic of non-intervention, propounded and persistently reiterated by the British Government, has been beyond comprehension. She has found it not only impossible to take a detached view of the war; she has, with some justification, viewed the outcome as absolutely vital to her future as an independent nation. Her very existence was endangered by the 'Frente popular,' who openly threatened to engulf her in an Iberian Federation. From the outset of hostilities in Spain Portugal has found herself in a unique and unenviable situation. As she sees it, this has not been merely a bitter and bloody struggle from which direct or indirect advantages may ultimately accrue to participants or neutrals. The outcome of the war has meant every bit as much to Portugal as victory or defeat meant to the Allies in 1917. Was it conceivable, asked Portuguese public opinion, that one of these allies, whose existence

was then threatened by Germany, should regard the outcome of the Great War with detachment? No more fantastic this, than that Portugal should be expected to suffer and support neutrality in a war which she conceived to be a real menace to her future independence. Portugal's attitude towards Russia, be it remembered, has been consistent and implacable. She has never recognised the Soviet Government. No Soviet citizen may land in Portugal or any of her possessions. Fear of the Communist peril has always been highly developed, recently to the point of mania. Yet when, as it seemed to her, these forces threatened to encircle and absorb her, her oldest ally maintained an attitude of frigid neutrality. No matter how unconvincing were the familiar excuses for intervention advanced by the two powers set against Iberian Communism. Portugal could point to a 620-mile frontier, most of which is open, which brought the war onto her doorstep; six hundred and twenty practical reasons against non-intervention.

Some reflection of this Portuguese viewpoint is provided by a recent speech of Dr Salazar, though his expression is far more temperate than Portuguese public opinion. 'We have,' said he,

'special interest of our own in the Peninsula and run risks which other countries do not. We believe that public opinion in certain countries, specially in France and Great Britain, is ill-informed as to the true nature of the Spanish problem and of the events that have taken place in that country. Some people do not believe in the Communist peril; we on the other hand, feel it, see it and fear that Communism with the connivance of other countries may take root in Spain, and so destroy any chance of the Spanish people working out their own political salvation—for there could be no national liberty or independent choice in a State largely controlled by several Internationals. Hence our uncompromising attitude from the very start; hence our opposition to any form of non-intervention which should prejudice the chances of Spanish Nationalism, which stands between Portugal and Iberian Communism; hence the odium which we have incurred in certain quarters, we may add, quite justifiably.'

There is an attitude, though justified by circumstances peculiar to Portugal, which was bound to align Portugal with Italy and Germany and create a cleavage of opinion

with Britain and France. It is an attitude which had both psychological and practical repercussions—both, it is to be hoped, superficial and temporary; but both charged with dangerous possibilities.

Psychologically it has tempted Portuguese public opinion bitterly to resent British and French policy, to produce a menacing suggestion—though no more than suggestion—of the relations which created such tension between Britain and Italy in the autumn of the Ethiopian War, 1935. Though Portuguese opinion has never suffered any delusions about the German and Italian régimes and has never felt politically or spiritually drawn to either country in recent years, the Spanish War has from the unique viewpoint of Portugal shown these two countries in a very favourable light as gallant adversaries of Communism. Both the Portuguese and British governments, behaving with admirable tact and diplomacy, have emphasised for the benefit of their respective publics and world consumption that such differences are the prerogative of old friends, have united in deploring the efforts of interested but nameless parties to inflame and exaggerate such differences. The psychological effect upon relations between the two Governments has not, in the opinion of the writer, been serious. The ultimate effect upon less well-informed and tolerant opinion in Portugal cannot yet be calculated; but though there is still amazingly strong preference for the British alliance above all other possible forms of international attachment, Britain's prestige has unquestionably suffered in the eyes of the Portuguese people—to what extent will be seen when the Spanish War is finally resolved.

The immediate practical effects of this cleavage have, it seems, been more serious; and to counter-act them was an important part of the task of the British mission. The Spanish War coincided with and, not unnaturally, quickened the Portuguese rearmament programme. Governments are not in the habit of making public knowledge of their choice or distribution of contracts for such purposes. There is, however, little doubt that had the British Government been so minded the lion's share of Portugal's defence programme for 1937–38–39 would have fallen into the laps of their armament manufacturers. The programme was not formidable by the

standards of Western Powers ; it involved, at a rough approximation, not more than between 2,000,000*l.* and 3,000,000*l.* in any one year. Unfortunately it coincided with a critical period in Britain's own rearmament programme—a moment when the British Government felt with justification ill-disposed to spare the time, labour, or machinery for anyone's defence programme but their own.

That in itself was a reasonable enough attitude and would have done little harm but for the well-founded suspicion of the Portuguese Government that the 'inability' of British arms manufacturers to supply her needs was founded less upon pressure of work than upon fear of the British Government that Portugal wanted the arms for General Franco. In fact, it may well be that no direct refusal to supply Portugal with arms was ever communicated by the British Government. It was made clear, however, that delay in fulfilling the orders was inevitable ; and it is now clear that the hint was sufficiently broad to convince Dr Salazar that he would do better to find another source for his supplies. This attitude was not confined to Great Britain, for in August 1937 we find that negotiations between Portugal and a small arms factory in Brno broke down because the Czechoslovakian Government refused to ratify the deal without assurances that the arms would not be sent to General Franco. After a good deal of bickering it was stated that 'the attitude of the Czechoslovakian Government to Portugal must be described as unfriendly.'

The opportunity thus provided for those blessed with men and machinery to spare or easy consciences on the definition of non-intervention was not ignored by the German and Italian Governments. Not only did they accept contracts on trading terms which would probably not have proved acceptable to English firms, but they begged no delay. In the case of Germany it is a fairly accepted fact that her manufacturers were pressed by their own Government into accepting commercial terms which were far from favourable to them. The items involved comprised mainly guns, rifles, and ammunition. It would be easy and misleading to jump to the conclusion that such transactions automatically opened the door to Germany in Portugal, and to exaggerate the headway which Germany has consequently achieved. In the cir-

cumstances it is not really surprising that Dr Salazar should have perceived advantages in making use of Germany's very obvious advances. This is a game which has been played with varying success by small nations of the world throughout history. Pique, caused by Britain's apparent detachment referred to earlier in this article ; genuine fear of a Communist invasion from Spain, at no time shared by Britain, always certain to arouse German and Italian sympathies ; the urgent needs of Portugal's defence programme ; belief, not unfounded, that a dangerous flirtation would arouse Britain to a sense of her responsibilities to Portugal—these are all factors which contributed to Dr Salazar's attitude, explain his actions.

At no time, would Dr Salazar admit, has Portugal acted disloyally. She persistently warned Britain that if English manufacturers could not supply her needs, she would be forced to seek further afield. But further, he would claim, Portugal has consistently felt the need for having other friends beside Britain ; her improved position now enables her to fulfil that need. Dr Salazar resents the suggestion that Britain's position as an ally gives her the prerogative to choose Portugal's friends for her. Within the terms of the alliance he claims freedom to establish such international friendships and relations as may seem expedient. Expediency is perhaps the keynote of Portugal's recent foreign policy, and it explains a great deal. But it is hardly to be expected that Britain should view this trend from the same easy viewpoint, and we may assume that she firmly conveyed her disapproval through the medium of the British Services Mission. She might be expected to point out, for instance, that whatever the exigencies of the Portuguese defence programme, there are obvious objections to an ally equipping herself with armaments manufactured by a potential enemy. Where, in the event of war, would Portugal obtain ammunition for the artillery purchased from Germany ? How would she refurbish her supplies, whence would she obtain spare parts for war-planes ? These are minor points which were certainly made clear by the British mission.

What are the chances of Germany supplanting Great Britain in Portugal ? Eighteen months ago this might have been a difficult question to answer. Portugal, fear-


ful of the consequences of Red victory in Spain, incensed by Britain's attitude, might conceivably have sold her birthright for a mess of pottage. An offer by Germany to guard the Portuguese frontier against invasion from Spain carried tremendous weight. At a time when Britain's rearmament programme carried far less prestige than it does to-day, the might of rapidly rearming Germany looked very comforting and impressive from Lisbon; her support and sympathy in what seemed a perilous hour of Portugal counted for even more. It was a bad moment for rumour to suggest that on top of everything else the British Government were toying with the idea of solving the German Colonial question at Portugal's expense. It was at this point that Anglo-Portuguese relations may be said to have reached their lowest ebb. In the nick of time, the British Government perceived the danger, and a conciliatory mission was hurried off to Lisbon.

Their path was never easy. In this dangerous interim Portugal had discovered how pleasant it is to possess friends anxious to flatter and please. The British mission's arrival followed an imposing visit from the German Fleet. A similar call from the Italians, coinciding with the courtesy visit of two British submarines, occurred within a fortnight of the mission's arrival. It was an intriguing situation, vastly interesting to the Lisbon diplomatic corps. But Germany's strategy is stronger than her diplomacy. She had gained a valuable foothold, but she failed to make good the ground she held. Her rather clumsy advances, typified by the wholesale and rather indiscriminate distribution of a certain German order among Portuguese notabilities, raised a smile among the well-informed Portuguese. It is easy, one repeats, to take a very grave view of the extent to which German blandishments and propaganda have penetrated Portugal. Such a view is not justified by the prospects. Germany's campaign in Portugal has been pressed forward on an ambitious scale. Much of it has passed without comment. It has even been furthered by one or two sympathisers prominently placed in the Portuguese Government. But it has, in my opinion, reached its limits.

One factor in particular sets a limit upon the German

diplomatic and commercial advance in Portugal—the Portuguese Colonial Empire. Portugal might have accepted German harness as an expedient alliance against the Communist menace in Spain; she could never comfortably share her colonial policy with a partner such as Germany. In this realm Britain has always been above suspicion. Britain could afford to be disinterested in Portuguese colonial policy. Germany could not. It is well to emphasise the immense value which Portugal attaches to her colonies at the present time. She has stated categorically that she cannot and will not, in any circumstances whatsoever, consider selling, ceding, leasing, or sharing her colonies. The strategic centres of Madeira, Cape Verde Islands, and the Azores are covered by this emphatic and unshakeable declaration. It may be added that Germany's attempts to gain long-term colonial concessions in Portugal's African possessions have been strongly discouraged.

Portugal's Empire is still the fourth largest in the world, and she claims with pride that these possessions are not recent acquisitions, the fruits of Versailles, but hers by conquest and historical right. For many years before 1926 this pride was dimmed by the hopeless condition to which bankruptcy and mismanagement had reduced the whole Empire. Her entire colonial system had decayed into a dangerous liability, open to foreign domination or acquisition. As with the homeland, the financial wizardry of Dr Salazar transformed the situation within a few years. Inter-colonial borrowing was stopped, budgets were balanced, and the position consolidated by the Colonial Act of 1935. Pride in the empire was quickly restored during the years 1930–35, pride justified by a progressive policy in development and ambitious enterprise. Of late Portugal has shown increasing interest in her colonial problems. In March of this year a military mission was sent to Angola and Mozambique to study the defences of the Portuguese colonies in West Africa. An outstanding event last summer was the official two months' visit of General Carmona, President of the Portuguese Republic, to the colonies of Principe, Sao Thomé, and Angola. This is the first occasion on which a visit to the Colonial Empire has been undertaken by any head of the Portuguese nation.



Angola is the largest of Portugal's possessions, with an area of more than 500,000 square miles and a population of about 3,000,000. Though rich in possibilities, Angola's development is, it is admitted, in the early stages. In neither agricultural nor mining fields have the available resources yet been tapped. The biggest enterprise is the Benguela Railway Company, which runs 837 miles of track from Lobito Bay on the Atlantic to the eastern frontier of Angola. The Company is responsible for an important, though still tentative experiment in white settlement, and has already done a great deal towards making its property tolerable to visitors and promising for white settlers.

Mozambique, 298,000 square miles in extent and with a population of 3,500,000, including 18,000 Europeans and 3,500 Portuguese, is probably the most advanced of the colonies. Trade is expanding rapidly, and about 3,000,000L., which is equivalent to the annual budget, has been invested in long-term development schemes. Although much remains to be done, principally through lack of capital, in both these colonies, the Portuguese Government have tremendous confidence in their potentialities and in their own ability to make the most of these resources. Undoubtedly the ultimate aim is introduction of the corporative methods already governing the homeland. Opinion at home is being slowly re-awakened to the vast needs and possibilities of imperial development. Interest is being fostered by exhibitions, annual colonial weeks in Portugal and by historical celebrations. Neglect and mismanagement in the past is frankly admitted, but the urge vigorously to pursue the process of social and economic regeneration, while exploiting the riches which are available, has become a new and thrilling enterprise.

It is not to be expected that at this particular juncture Portugal would be found amenable to suggestions for sharing her re-discovered treasures. At no time in the recent history of her colonial empire has she felt less inclined to open the gates to unlimited, ambitious foreign exploitation. If and when the moment arrives for world examination of the colonial problem in relation to Germany's claims, Portugal is determined that her house overseas shall be in order, and that there shall be no

danger of neglect or mismanagement being used as arguments for the intervention of other powers.

Like her colonies, Portugal is growing up. Her political reincarnation dating from the National Revolution of 1926 has been followed by amazingly rapid development, and under the watchful eye and expert hand of Dr Salazar, the process continues. Her internal rebirth and ascendancy from the ashes of bankruptcy and dissension has, as we first observed, passed without the recognition which it might have received from a less disturbed, distracted world. As confidence in her ever-increasing internal strength and well-being grows it is inevitable that Portugal's eyes should rise above the limited horizon of international relationships to which her unhappy predicament prior to 1926 had confined her. An end of the war in Spain with victory for General Franco should, barring accidents, enable her to establish friendly relations with that Government for the first time since the fall of Primo Rivera. This is a situation which, in certain circumstances, may create fresh anxieties for the British Government.

It is by no means certain now that General Franco's victory will turn out to be the unmixed blessing that Portugal believed it would be a year ago. Just as the Republicans envisaged an Iberian Federation, so are some of General Franco's supporters likely to demand unification of the Spanish Peninsula. They may or may not receive German and Italian support for this idea. What would be the fate of Portugal's Empire in such an event? There are signs that this ominous little cloud on the horizon has not escaped the attention of Portugal's leaders, and they are watching it with growing apprehension. At the time of writing it is too early accurately to assess the significance of a situation still so remote; but it certainly constitutes another powerful argument for those who are trying to convince Dr Salazar of the paramount importance of a one hundred per cent. alliance with Great Britain, unweakened by expedient and promiscuous relationships elsewhere.

Fundamentally Portugal is and will remain aware that the British alliance should be the corner-stone of her foreign policy. In the long run, that policy is likely to survive as long as the present régime; and short of foreign

interference prospects of this régime are set fair. As we have said, Portugal is no longer compelled nor willing to accept British alliance exclusively, nor to regard it as a barrier to wider relations. It can only be hoped that she will be persuaded to choose these friends wisely. Undoubtedly, the British Government will in future have to work harder for her share in the alliance. The European situation has fully awakened Portugal to her own just worth, to the strategic values of her friendly co-operation. These are good cards and, as no doubt the British mission in Lisbon found out, Dr Salazar will play his hand to the limit of its strength. A crisis can only arise if Dr Salazar so misjudges the position as to call too high. He has a deserved reputation as one of the shrewdest rulers in Europe; he is shrewd enough to know when the time has come to stop bidding.

W. F. DEEDES.

Art. 4.—HISTORY IN BLUE BOOKS.

1. *A Century of British Blue Books, 1814–1914. Lists edited with Historical Introductions.* By Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson. Cambridge University Press, 1938.
2. *Foundations of British Foreign Policy, from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902).* Edited, with Historical Introductions, by Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson. Cambridge University Press, 1938.

THE editors of these remarkable books have set themselves the task, in a sense, of letting British foreign policy speak for itself. The first comprises lists of the titles of Blue Books ; that is, papers presented to Parliament or to one or other House of Parliament, concerned with foreign affairs. The lists are grouped under the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs responsible for them. Thus the volume begins with the Blue Books issued by Lord Castlereagh, next, those of Canning, and so on, through successive tenures of the office of Secretary of State, down to and including Sir Edward Grey. Mere lists by themselves are not very informing, though something can be inferred from the number and character (judging by titles) of the Blue Books issued by different Secretaries of State. Palmerston, for instance, was very prolific of Blue Books ; Grey was sparing of them. It would be unsafe, however, to infer that Grey was more secretive than Palmerston. The editors—and this constitutes the great value of their book—supply a commentary on the Blue Book policy which in effect amounts to the whole foreign policy of each Secretary of State. The book is a monument of the openness and of the discretion (popularly called secretiveness) of British diplomacy.

The second book, 'Foundations of British Foreign Policy,' has about 200 representative documents, for the most part dispatches and Foreign Office memoranda, selected in order to show the main trends of policy. It is in these documents, some of them celebrated state papers, that British policy may be said, in a sense, to be speaking for itself. Readers, naturally, will bear in mind that 200 state papers represent only a fraction of the total number

of Foreign Office dispatches—numbering many thousands every year—of the century. The 200 or so, however, that are here printed are all concerned with outstanding events or crises, and no big item of British foreign affairs is omitted. The editors have in all cases had access to the original documents; and if, in such of the documents as had already been published, any passages had been suppressed in the printed version, they have restored the suppressed portions. They have also written a suitable introduction to every document. The outstanding impression left by an examination of British diplomacy is continuity. Lord Rosebery in 1894 was perhaps the first British Secretary of State deliberately to advocate the principle of continuity; but all the other Secretaries of State had also adopted it, instinctively, through force of circumstances, and through the tradition of the Foreign Office itself. The editors write: 'Despite opposed parties and even opposed policies, the continuity of ideas in British diplomacy is striking. The famous State Paper written by Sir Eyre Crowe on Jan. 1, 1907, reproduces what are virtually Canning's ideas on foreign policy eighteen years before.'

Most of the assumptions underlying these views were accepted by all statesmen from Pitt to Salisbury, though their methods of application and interpretation may have differed. The balance of power, the sanctity of treaties, the danger of extending guarantees, the value of non-intervention, the implications of what Castlereagh called 'a system of Government strongly popular and national in character,' were understood by all. Readers of 'The Times' will remember a letter contributed by Professor Temperley in August of last year in which he printed an extract from a speech of Canning concerning the attitude of the British Government towards trouble on the Continent. Opposite the Canning extract he printed, in a parallel column, a passage from a speech of the Prime Minister, Mr Neville Chamberlain, concerning the attitude of the Chamberlain Government towards the current trouble in Central Europe and in Spain. The two passages, the Canning and Chamberlain extracts, were so extraordinarily alike, both in word and idea, that the Prime Minister felt impelled to write to 'The Times' pointing out that he had never read Canning's speech and

that the similarity of the two extracts only showed the continuity of British policy.

In the dispatch of Dec. 31, 1792, at a time of extreme disturbance and peril, Pitt and Grenville define three principles of British foreign policy—three principles which, if stated in so many words by Mr Chamberlain to-day, would be accepted as a matter of course. These three are: (1) Non-intervention in the domestic affairs of any country; (2) Freedom of the lower Rhine-Scheldt area from the dominance of a great Power; (3) Observance of treaties which constitute the 'political system of Europe.' This last principle, as expressed in the dispatch, did not exclude, but obviously comprehended, provision for revising treaties by mutual consent.

These principles were not recognised by the French Revolutionary Government. While the Pitt-Grenville dispatch of 1792 was being written, a Continental conflict was already in progress and the United Kingdom was soon involved in it. In the middle of the great conflict Pitt, in answer to a proposal from the Tsar Alexander I of Russia, stated his view on the restoration of peace, a view which carried the definition of British policy a step further. At the end of the war there should be, he declared, 'A general Agreement and Guarantee for the mutual protection and security of different Powers, and for re-establishing a general System of Public Law in Europe.' Pitt did not live to see the end of the war, but Castlereagh carried the master's views into effect, so far as circumstances permitted, in the Treaties of Vienna and Paris, 1815. These treaties not only restored what was considered to be a fair balance of power; they also created or recognised the Concert of Europe. The statesmen of the time—Castlereagh, Metternich, Alexander I—and the officials of the British Foreign Office frequently alluded to it as the *Confederation* of Europe. It was only an agreement, put into Article 6 of the Treaty of Paris, Nov. 20, 1815, to the effect that the Powers would meet from time to time in order to discharge their common responsibility for the peace of Europe. The Concert of Europe, though it did not have regular periodic meetings, continued to meet occasionally but frequently from 1815 to 1913, and was probably responsible for the fact that during these hundred years there was no general war.

The last meeting of the Concert before the World War was the Conference of St. James's, in 1913, over which Sir Edward Grey presided and which dealt with the liquidation of the Balkan War. On July 26, 1914, Sir Edward Grey proposed a meeting of the Concert to deal with the Russo-Austro-Serbian crisis, but the proposal did not meet with sufficient agreement. It must not be assumed that the British Government was the only serious advocate of the Concert of Europe. The Russian Government in the great period of its diplomacy, under Nesselrode, Gortchakov, de Giers, and particularly the Austrians under Metternich, were great champions of it, as was also Napoleon III. It would probably be just to say that the British Government was the most persistent advocate of the Concert, and that the Russian Government came next.

Balance of Power and Concert of Europe were the chief principles of foreign policy adopted by Pitt and developed by Castlereagh. A third principle, also stated by Pitt—non-intervention—was adopted and amplified by Castlereagh and Canning. It was Castlereagh, 'the most European of British statesmen' according to Professor Temperley, who fully stated the principle of non-intervention in 'a state-paper of May 5, 1820. 'It is the most famous state-paper in British history,' writes Professor Temperley, and the circumstances of the dispatch are curious, almost topical. There was a revolt of the Spanish army in 1820 in favour of a constitution—not against one. The Holy Alliance Powers—the autocratic monarchies—contemplated intervention against the constitutionalists on the ground that revolution, if left to itself, might spread from Spain to the rest of Europe. Castlereagh did not apprehend this. He asked the advice of the Duke of Wellington, and repeated the Duke's words in the state paper of May 5. 'His Grace does not hesitate, upon his intimate experience of Spanish Affairs, to pronounce that the Spanish Nation is of all European People that which will least brook any interference from abroad.' Castlereagh added on his own account, referring to the Concert of European Powers instituted in 1815: 'It never was intended as an Union for the Government of the World, or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States.'

George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs from 1822 to 1827, carried the principle of non-intervention a step further. He desired non-intervention from abroad in the domestic affairs of states. In certain circumstances he was prepared to take active steps to prevent such intervention. In April 1823 the French Government (Louis XVIII) sent an army into Spain, put down the insurrection, and so enabled the King of Spain to suppress the constitution. Canning did not like this, but he did not actively object. When, however, the French seemed to show signs of an intention to cross the Atlantic in order to intervene in the rebelling Spanish-American colonies, he put his foot down. As the result of a conference in October with Canning, the French Ambassador, Prince de Polignac, declared that his Government had no intention of interfering there.

In bringing pressure to bear on the French Government, Canning would have liked to act in concert with the United States. He actually proposed that the British and United States Governments should issue a joint declaration against intervention on the American continent. President Monroe of the United States was attracted by this proposal, but after taking the advice of his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, decided to make his declaration separately. He made it in his annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823, announcing what has since come to be called the Monroe Doctrine. As the Polignac Memorandum (ante-dating the Monroe Message by three months) in which the French renounced their intention of intervening in South America was secret, President Monroe received the credit for stopping them. Canning said nothing until 1826, when he burst out in a speech and said it was he who did it: 'I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.' Thus by the end of Canning's time at the Foreign Office the principles of British foreign policy were clearly developed. Balance of power, Concert of Europe (Canning himself was not too eager about this), non-intervention—and prevention of intervention, if not in Europe, at any rate overseas; and co-operation, or if that were not feasible, co-ordination with the United States.

The long series of tenures of Lord Palmerston either

at the Foreign Office or at No. 10 Downing Street began in 1831 and ended in 1865. Not any of the other Secretaries of State of the period, not Aberdeen, not Russell, not even Clarendon, had anything like his forceful personality, his power of trenchant expression and of action; nor had any of the Foreign ministers, not even Metternich, until the rise of Bismarck in 1862. The principles of British foreign policy were already established; but Palmerston operated them with an amplitude previously unknown. He did not involve Great Britain in a European war, for he was not Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the Crimean War broke out; many people believe that if he had been, the war might have been avoided, for he would have made the British Government's position clear from the opening of the crisis.

His great achievements were the recognition or the establishing of Belgium as an independent, neutral, guaranteed state in 1831-39; the settlement of the Egyptian question, for a time at any rate, by the recognition in 1841 of Mehemet Ali as hereditary Pasha; the settlement, also in 1841, of the question of the Straits—the Bosphorus and Dardanelles being closed to foreign warships so long as the Porte should be at peace. These achievements were not accomplished by Palmerston singlehanded. They were done in Concert of the Five Powers—Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, France. The first ten years (1831-41) of the Palmerstonian period were the triumph of the Concert system. Palmerston also assisted with benevolent neutrality the Union of Italy which Cavour, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, brought about in 1859-60. He was practically the creator of the system of open Treaty Ports in China—the result of two Anglo-Chinese wars of 1839 and 1859, which themselves were the result of Chinese attacks on the rights or alleged rights of British subjects. He assisted, with something more than just benevolent neutrality, constitutional government in Spain under Queen Isabella against the authoritarian Carlists. He had an *entente cordiale*—the phrase was currently used—initiated by the Duke of Wellington in 1831 but vigorously carried on by Palmerston, with occasionally chequered cordiality, in the reigns of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III. All this constitutes a very remarkable achievement. Its

main addition to the development of British foreign policy was the *entente cordiale*.

Palmerston also established the principle of taking the public into the Government's confidence. As Professor Temperley writes, his was 'the Golden Age of British Blue Books.' This, naturally, increased his vogue; for Blue Books, even if the public does not read them, are eminently quotable in the press. His vigorous language would give a firm tone to the conversation of the British Ambassador at the Quai d'Orsay, but would not be literally reproduced. In the same way, in the crisis of 1840-41, when the French Government not only would not join the concert over the Egyptian question, but actually looked like making war against England, Palmerston wrote to Bulwer to notify, discreetly, the French Government that 'if France throws down the gauntlet, we shall not refuse to pick it up.' It is obvious that the *entente cordiale* was ruptured at that time, but it was renewed when Peel became Prime Minister in 1841.

In 1859-60 the great events occurred which produced Italian unity. In 1859 the Kingdom of Sardinia, in alliance with Napoleon III, after a short war annexed Lombardy from the Habsburg Monarchy. In the early summer of 1860 the astonishing free-lance expedition of Garibaldi resulted in the overthrow of the throne of Naples and Sicily and the union of that kingdom with Sardinia. In the same year the populations of the Central Italian duchies and part of the Papal state were voting themselves into union with Sardinia; the whole to be called the Kingdom of Italy. All this amounted to a gigantic revolution in the territorial system, as established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, in regard to the 'geographical expression called Italy.' Naturally the 'Legitimist' Powers—Austria, which was losing Italian territory, Russia, even Prussia—objected; even the Emperor Napoleon thought that Sardinian expansion was going too far. Much—perhaps everything—would depend on the attitude of Great Britain, which commanded immense moral as well as material strength. Lord John Russell, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Palmerston Ministry, settled the Italian question, so far as Great Britain was concerned, in one of the most famous dispatches in modern history, Oct. 27, 1860. The dis-

patch was sent to Sir James Hudson, British Minister at Turin, and was also given out to the public. It was a moderately long dispatch, but the gist of it is in the ninth paragraph. After reviewing the trend among Italians towards unity, Lord John Russell wrote: 'Looking at the question in this view, Her Majesty's Government must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests.' The British Government exercised little or no influence on the Schleswig-Holstein affair, 1864, nor on the crisis which led to the Austro-Prussian War, 1866. On the outbreak of the Franco-German War, the Government, in which Gladstone was Prime Minister and Granville Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made certain that the neutrality of Belgium should be respected, not only under the Treaty of 1839, but under two special treaties, concluded for the duration of the war, between Great Britain and Prussia, Great Britain and France.

The victory of Germany in the war of 1870-71, the proclamation of the German Empire, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine opened a new era in Europe, sometimes called the Armed Peace, which endured until 1914. In the first twenty or even thirty years of the period the interest of the British Government in Continental affairs was mainly directed to Turkey-in-Europe. At first Bismarck was the outstanding, almost dominant statesman in Europe, with Salisbury, after 1878, growing in prestige and authority. The question of the Near East, of Constantinople, of the liberation of the Porte's Christian subjects, is now settled. The Crimean War of 1854-56 was a stage in the settlement, and checked—finally, as events have shown—the advance of the Russians towards Constantinople. In the Treaty of Paris, at the end of the Crimean War, in order completely to 'insulate' Russia and Turkey from each other, the Black Sea had been—to use a modern phrase—demilitarised: no fortifications were to be permitted on its shores and no ship of war on its waters. At the same time, the Turks were secured in control of the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; the straits were closed to the passage of warships in time of peace, but the Porte, if it went to war, could admit warships of its friends. Thus the demilitarisation of the Black Sea really put the Russian coasts at the mercy of Turkey's naval allies in any future Russo-Turkish war.

The situation was unfair to Russia, and the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortchakov, took advantage of the Franco-German War to repudiate the 'demilitarisation' clauses of the Treaty of Paris in a circular of Oct. 31, 1870. Bismarck, whose policy was always to be friends with Russia, had already approved.

The British Government—Gladstone being Prime Minister and Granville Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—recognised that the Russian Government had a good case for revision of the treaty, but objected to the way of doing it. To meet the British objection Bismarck proposed a European conference. It met at London in February–March 1871 and adopted a principle, in a protocoll signed by all the parties including the Russian Government, to the effect that: 'It is an accepted principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.'

The Disraeli Ministry, 1874–80, is generally regarded as one of the most significant in British history. It was, indeed, something of a halcyon time: harmony between Crown and Prime Minister; a secure and expanding commerce; a satisfying development of public interest in 'Greater Britain'; an assured touch in the handling of foreign affairs. It was the period of the beginning of Lord Salisbury's ascendancy in foreign policy. He became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in succession to Lord Derby, who resigned on March 28, 1878. Hostilities had just been concluded in the Russo-Turkish War. The Russian army had advanced almost to the gates of Constantinople, and imposed upon the Porte the Treaty of San Stefano creating a 'Big Bulgaria' and reducing Turkey-in-Europe to little more than Constantinople, Gallipoli, and Albania. Dr Temperley writes: 'The substitution of Salisbury for Derby as Foreign Secretary opened a new era in foreign policy. Vacillation was superseded by vigour and resolution.' It may be added; peace was preserved; some credit for this must also be given to the reasonable attitude of the Russian Government and to the good will (though not alacrity) with which Bismarck consented to hold a European conference at Berlin.

The first act of Salisbury on becoming Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was to state the point of view of the British Government on the Eastern Question in a circular dispatch to the Powers, dated April 1, 1878, and laid before Parliament and the public on the same day. In this dispatch he declared, among other things, that 'Her Majesty's Government could not recede from the position already clearly defined by them, that they most distinctly understood, before they could enter into Congress, that every Article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey would be placed before the Congress.' He quoted the Protocol of the Conference of London, 1871, in which the Powers recognised that no treaty could be altered without the consent of all signing parties—and the existing European treaties concerning Turkey, which would, of course, be affected by any new Russo-Turkish treaty, were covered by this engagement. The Russian Government showed readiness for negotiation on a European basis, and so the Congress of Berlin met in June–July, 1878, and achieved at any rate a stage in the settlement of the Eastern Question, with peace—'peace with honour.' The Treaty of San Stefano was revised and the size of Bulgaria reduced.

Lord Salisbury's dispatches on the Eastern Question, written in reference to the crisis of 1878 and the Congress of Berlin, are full of wisdom. He wrote to the British ambassador at Constantinople (May 9, 1878): 'The great problem which the Turk will have to solve, as soon as he has got rid of the Russian army off his soil is—how to keep his Asiatic Empire together. Sooner or later the greater part of his European Empire *must* go.' If the Turkish Government would concentrate on its Asiatic Empire Salisbury would be in favour of a British-Turkish alliance. He added: 'But for that purpose it is absolutely and indispensably necessary that she (England) should be nearer at hand than Malta.' It was for this reason that Disraeli and he obtained from the Porte a cession of the administration of Cyprus, at the same time guaranteeing the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. At the Congress of Berlin Salisbury used 'very friendly language' to the French delegate about the possibility of France assuming a protectorate over Tunis, a vassal-state of Turkey. Lord Granville, who became Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs under Mr Gladstone in 1880, was apprehensive that the French, if in possession of Tunis, would create a great naval port at Biserta, thus 'neutralising Malta.' Mr Gladstone commented (April 22, 1881): 'I do not see that it neutralises Malta more than it is neutralised by Malta.' Anyhow, the French Government went ahead and took over Tunis in July 1881 by treaty with the Dey. The best safeguard that Great Britain could have in regard to Tunis and Biserta would have been a Franco-British *entente*, which came into existence twenty years later. One other aspect of the Eastern Question which the Gladstone Government had to deal with was Egypt; this had itself become a 'Question' since Disraeli bought 4,000,000*l.* worth of Suez Canal shares in 1875 and a Franco-British Financial Control was established in 1876-79. Riots at Alexandria occasioned the sending of British battleships there in 1882 and a military occupation of Egypt. Dr Temperley's view is that England's position in Egypt 'led to the Anglo-French *entente*.'

There was a short Salisbury Ministry in 1885-6 and another, shorter, Gladstone Ministry in 1886, made memorable in domestic affairs by the introduction and rejection of the First Home Rule Bill. Lord Rosebery, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, adopted Salisbury's policy in regard to the Near East, thus disabusing the minds of foreign statesmen of the idea that changes in British Government brought changes in British foreign policy. The year 1886 began a long period of Conservative ascendancy in British administration which lasted until 1905 with a brief Liberal Ministry, the last Gladstone Cabinet, in 1892-95. During most of this period British foreign policy was directed by Lord Salisbury, whose authority as a European statesman was only equalled by Bismarck's and lasted much longer. A brilliant phrase-maker, he invented the phrase 'splendid isolation,' but practised it in a very guarded manner, for he kept on terms with Germany and Austria-Hungary and towards the end of his last premiership there was a notable and good lasting rapprochement with the United States as well as a momentous approach towards Japan.

Another of Salisbury's brilliant phrases, suggesting that perhaps Great Britain had 'backed the wrong horse' in the Crimean War, has often been repeated. It was

made in his last premiership. It did not assert that Great Britain had backed the wrong horse, but that, even if this had been the case in 1854, the decision then made must be consistently followed. Consequently, Salisbury steadily pursued the policy of preserving the authority of the Porte in Constantinople and on the Straits and at the same time upholding the independence of the Balkan States—all with a view to preventing Russian dominance in South-Eastern Europe. When in 1886 the Russian Government helped to bring about the abdication of Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria, Salisbury drew the bonds of Great Britain closer with Austria-Hungary. On October 2, 1886, he wrote to the British ambassador at Vienna, for communication to Count Kalnoky: 'We may not be primarily so much interested in the independence of Bulgaria and the smaller Balkan states as Austria-Hungary; but the growing power of Russia in those countries is of nearly as much consequence to us, and threatens us with almost as serious changes as Austria-Hungary herself can apprehend.' He followed up this approach by making the Mediterranean Agreement of 1887 with Italy and Austria-Hungary, for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Ægean, Adriatic, and northern coast of Africa—not an alliance but a declaration of policy made in an exchange of notes. The making of this Agreement was facilitated by Bismarck, who used his influence in a favourable sense upon his two partners in the Triple Alliance.

Referring to the Mediterranean Agreement Dr Temperley writes: 'It is true that it was engineered by Bismarck and that it brought England into Germany's orbit.' If this is so, it was done without any sacrifice of the British Government's interests or freedom: Lord Salisbury was much too cautious and far-seeing to do that. He pointed out (Feb. 2, 1887) to Count Corti, who brought him proposals from the Italian Government: 'That England never promised material assistance in view of an uncertain war, of which the object and cause were unknown.' At the same time, in the year of the Mediterranean Agreement, which brought Lord Salisbury's Government into close relations with the Triple Alliance, this great statesman's unruffled diplomacy achieved a *détente* with Russia and with France, not a clearing up of

difficulties, but, so to speak, a tacit return to good relations. It is to be noted that in this year also Bismarck, being already insured with his Triple Alliance, made his 'Reinsurance Treaty' with Russia.

Europe was now in a fair measure of accord from end to end. Bismarck and Salisbury stood out, head and shoulders, among all their compeers. So matters remained until the fall of Bismarck in 1890. Lord Salisbury regretted his departure and confided to the Austrian ambassador an apprehension that the Emperor William II, in taking full charge of German policy, might not show the steadiness, the reflectiveness of the fallen Chancellor. The Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria seemed to share this view. When Lord Salisbury went out of office in 1892 he wrote a letter to Sir Philip Currie, Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, for the incoming Secretary of State, Lord Rosebery, which amounted to a plea for the continuance of the British-Italian *entente*, even if that with Germany could not be maintained. Lord Salisbury's last prime ministership was from 1895 to 1902. It included an effort—unsuccessful—conducted through the Secretary of State for the Colonies to renew the good relations with Germany which had existed in Bismarck's last years. It ended with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and, therefore, with the abandonment of the policy, so far as there really had been a policy, of 'isolation.' It included also the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, by which the British Government finished off a fifty-year-old controversy with the United States over the American project to construct a Panama Canal.

From 1902 to 1914 British foreign policy developed rapidly. As the Near Eastern Question was settling itself through the growing strength of the Balkan states, Russia naturally ceased to be considered a danger to the British Empire. The Joseph Chamberlain idea of rapprochement with Germany having failed and the menace of the new German fleet growing steadily greater, it was natural for the British and French Governments to draw together. The Entente of 1904 was the last legacy of the Conservative Government (Balfour-Lansdowne). There had been a Franco-British Entente before (1830-56), and now it was renewed. The Liberal

Government which came into office at the end of 1905 accepted the principle of continuity in foreign policy, and in 1907 added the Russo-British to the Franco-British Entente. Sir Edward Grey maintained the traditional belief of British statesmen in the value—under certain conditions—of international conferences, and participated in the Conference of Algeiras, 1906, concerning Morocco, and the Conference of London, 1913, about the Balkan War. Grey took the public less into his confidence than most other Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs; he was prolific of Blue Books—except on the major subjects of his foreign policy. The French and British General Staff conversations which began in 1906 were not Foreign Office affairs; and in any case Grey felt that they could not be made public; they were not even revealed to the whole Cabinet. The concerted distribution of the British and French navy in the North Sea and Mediterranean in 1912 could not be kept secret, but the Grey-Cambon exchange of notes in the same year, providing for consultation of the two Governments in case of emergency, was kept secret. When the Entente of 1904, which was for diplomatic support between the two parties became, in effect though not on paper, a defensive alliance, a new principle was introduced into British foreign policy; and the public was not made aware of it. Neither, indeed, was the German Government made aware of it; so the alliance did not have any deterrent effect. Grey was in a most difficult position. He would have liked to be frank with the public, but the circumstances of domestic politics and foreign affairs seemed to make this impossible.

The new principle of British foreign policy—a defensive alliance in time of peace—required a new technique. At the end of the World War there was a widespread reaction among the peoples against 'secret diplomacy.' There was much misunderstanding about this phrase. One of President Wilson's Fourteen Points was 'open covenants openly arrived at'—which seemed to imply that the actual negotiation of treaties should be conducted in public. It required one of the most successful of the post-war Secretaries of State, Sir Austen Chamberlain, to point out that a really public negotiation would never

produce a satisfactory treaty at all, for it would make impossible the process of compromise or give and take through which the original demands of two parties gradually reach a common measure of agreement. But 'open diplomacy,' which is a condition in politics and diplomacy in democratic countries, does imply that no *completed* negotiation shall be withheld from the public, that the people, without its knowledge and approval, shall not be bound irrevocably for the future by its Government.

The course of British foreign policy in the eighteen years since the end of the World War shows the firmer and firmer establishing of the principle, on the part of the Government, of taking the public into its confidence. Parliament—both Houses—has become a great forum for the discussion of foreign affairs; and although the responsible Secretary of State has sometimes had reason to complain of the frequency of such full-dress debates—there were eighteen in the first six months of 1938—on the whole the result has made both for public enlightenment and public support of the Government. This method is in striking contrast to the theory held in authoritarian countries that the Government is an organisation working for the good of the people but in strict secrecy.

With the coming of peace the leaders of British policy picked up the strands and tried to restore the historic trends in the new world. They took part in the great effort to restore the Concert—Concert of the world, in the form of the League of Nations. The League stood for a reasonably 'open' diplomacy, for under the Covenant no treaty made after January 10, 1920, is recognised as valid unless registered with the Secretariat. The Council and Assembly have great possibilities for international conciliation; the International Labour Office was engaged from the start in framing conventions for raising the standard of industrial life all over the world. No Government has been more assiduous in attendance at Geneva than the British, none has sent more distinguished delegates, though the French Government has an equally good record. It has to be sadly admitted that this great experiment has not resulted in the restoration even of the Concert of Europe, owing to the withdrawal of Germany and Italy.

Parallel with its effort at international co-operation through the League of Nations is the effort of the British Government to revive the pre-war Concert of European Great Powers. The outstanding success here was the Pact of Locarno, 1925, which brought the British, French, Italian, and German Governments into a common system of guarantee. This was the achievement of Austen Chamberlain, Briand, Stresemann, and if Mussolini was not one of the prime makers he joined readily in concluding the treaty. The 'Locarno Concert'—for that is what it amounted to—functioned effectively down to 1935. It broke up over the Italo-Abyssinian affair and was ruined by the German unauthorised occupation of the demilitarised Rhineland zone on March 7, 1936. After that Mr Baldwin, as Prime Minister, repeatedly said that the British Government would seize every opportunity to bring back the Four Powers—France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain—to the same conference table. This persistent effort to restore the Concert had, down to the summer of 1938, only one success—and that very qualified—in the meeting of representatives of the European states, Great Powers and small, at the table of the Spanish Non-Intervention Committee. The tradition of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states laid down by Castlereagh in his celebrated state-paper of 1820 has been scrupulously maintained in regard to China and—in the face of considerable opposition—in regard to the Spanish Civil War. It is obviously possible to doubt the effectiveness of the policy of non-intervention in Spain, but it is not possible to doubt the value of conference on the subject. Mr Eden, when Secretary of State, called the Non-Intervention Committee 'an international fire-curtain.' A second, and more decisive, Conference of the Four Powers made the agreement of Munich, concerning Czechoslovakia, September 30–October 1, 1938.

The big development of recent British policy—on a perfectly historic line—is the Franco-British alliance. This is far more 'open' and far more definite than was the Entente as Sir Edward Grey handled it. In the years immediately after the War, the Entente seemed to be kept together by habit rather than by inclination. During the occupation of the Ruhr there was a bitter exchange of notes between M. Poincaré and Lord Curzon, at that time

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The reconstruction of German finances, however, through the Dawes Committee, brought the two Governments closer together, and when Ramsay MacDonald was Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs his relations with M. Herriot were extremely good. Yet there was still nothing but an indeterminate Entente until the last Prime Ministership of Mr Baldwin, when Mr Eden was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The rise of German military strength under the National Socialists; the re-occupation of the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland; and the danger of European conflagration caused by the Spanish Civil War gave the French and British a closer sense of partnership in a perilous, unstable world. Mr Eden and M. Delbos, *Ministre des Affaires Étrangères*, were in particularly good understanding with each other, an understanding which produced the Declarations of November-December 1937, the British and French Governments promising help to each other if either were attacked. Though not made in the form of a treaty, these Declarations are obviously binding within the terms that they specify. They are the completion of the work of Wellington and Talleyrand begun in the early days of the July Monarchy in 1830.

The rise of United Italy, which Lord Palmerston's Government so warmly supported, was bound to alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean, even while Austria-Hungary remained a Great Power and developed a Mediterranean fleet. Lord Salisbury negotiated the Mediterranean Agreement of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, in 1887. The effort at a new Mediterranean Agreement, conducted with such skill and patience by Mr Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax in 1938, was a continuance of the Salisbury policy carried on amid enormously greater difficulties.

Concert of Europe, Balance of Power, Non-Intervention, Freedom of the Trade Routes—present policies of the British Government—are clearly historic principles, consistently followed, with application to varying circumstances, since 1815. The freedom of the trade-routes requires not only such an international understanding as the Mediterranean Agreement; to be secure in all the trade-routes which the British must share with other

peoples, it requires a preponderant British navy. In the nineteenth century the preponderance of the British navy was unchallenged. It was the competition of the German navy in the early years of the twentieth century which produced the fatal Anglo-German tension of the Tirpitz-Grey period. In 1935 an Anglo-German Naval Agreement, concluded when Mr Baldwin was Prime Minister and Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell was First Lord of the Admiralty, at last solved this question, which had baffled all the statesmen of the immediate pre-War period.

Outside the Covenant of the League of Nations and the ancient Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the British Government has undertaken no obligations beyond the defence of the Commonwealth of Nations and the communications of the Commonwealth, the defence of Egypt on a basis of reciprocity, of France against unprovoked aggression (with a French equivalent assurance) and of Belgium and the Netherlands.* Mr Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons, March 24, 1938, proclaimed the traditional doctrine of the 'free hand' outside these areas of British obligation. Speaking on the question of a guarantee in respect of Czechoslovakia, he said :

' His Majesty's Government feel themselves unable to give the prior guarantee suggested. But while plainly stating this decision, I would add this. Where peace and war are concerned legal obligations are not alone involved, and if war broke out it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations. It would be quite impossible to say where it would end and what Governments might become involved. The inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements, and in that event it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries besides those which were parties to the original dispute would almost immediately become involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty, and determined to uphold them.'

In the summer of 1938 the Prime Minister's refusal to proceed to overt action against the Franco Government

* The Agreement of Munich, Oct. 1, 1938, envisaged a guarantee of the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia when these should have been finally delimited.

in reprisal against the bombing of British merchantmen was vigorously criticised by the Opposition in the House of Commons. An American historian commented: 'Mr Chamberlain's pacifism is merely patience.'* Thus he unconsciously repeated a statement made by Lord Aberdeen, Prime Minister, to Lord Clarendon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in 1853: 'The most difficult task in politics is the exercise of forbearance, especially when we have most reason to complain.' A remark to Count Apponyi made in 1863 by Lord Palmerston, whom nobody ever called pacifist, contains the same message in a more defined form: 'If one could not negotiate without fighting, diplomacy would be useless, and we should then need only generals and admirals.' The final statement on British foreign policy, as true to-day as ever, was made by Lord Derby in 1876 in a dispatch to Odo Russell, the British ambassador at Berlin, for communication to Bismarck: 'It is unnecessary to point out to Your Excellency that England desires no exclusive alliances, nor do the principles of English policy admit of such being constructed.'

The last word on British foreign policy may be left to Mr Chamberlain, broadcast on the evening of Tuesday, Sept. 27, 1938:

'I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me; but if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted. Under such a domination life for people who believe in liberty would not be worth living; but war is a fearful thing, and we must be very clear, before we embark on it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake, and that the call to risk everything in their defence, when all the consequences are weighed, is irresistible.'

R. B. MOWAT.

* Professor P. W. Slosson in 'Events' (New York, U.S.A.), August 1938, p. 127.

Art. 5.—WILD LIFE RESERVES.

WISDOM is born of experience, but with unfortunate frequency it comes to birth too late. This has happened with regard to the treatment of wild life in many parts of the world, the need for preservation seldom being realised before irreparable loss has been sustained. Our own fauna, never particularly rich or varied when compared with that of other lands, is not unreasonably regarded as insignificant by people accustomed to vastly different conditions elsewhere, and the recent suggestion of a South African that a few wild-fowl sanctuaries in private grounds would represent our capacity with regard to wild life reserves might be bracketed with the gibe that weasels and bats comprise England's mammals. Admitting our limitations, however, it cannot be denied that, comparatively speaking, this island has suffered less than many countries whose furred and feathered wealth was infinitely greater; and opulent sportsmen across the Atlantic still flock to Scotland when the heather is in bloom, the wild red deer, the grouse, and the black-cock offering facilities which cannot be enjoyed elsewhere. All considered, indeed, it is to the credit of British institutions and outlook that we have retained rather than lost so much of the wild, despite the insistent claims made by a dense population, industry, and progress. Our bird life might so easily have suffered the fate of Italy's avifauna, for example. None the less, a great deal that is irreplaceable has been allowed to go, and a realisation of our responsibilities is now manifested in the growing demand for more effective protection of the birds and beasts which have escaped extermination.

The necessity for action, so frequently urged, is not exaggerated. One might furnish an interminable list of transgressions against the Wild Birds Protection Acts, the Game Laws, and the even stronger unwritten codes of procedure which the modern outlook has evolved. Actual details are superfluous, however. Everyone is agreed upon the need for remedy, and it only remains to decide upon the measures that should be adopted. At the moment there seems to be a disinclination to agitate for further legal provisions, and this does not arise from the inadequacy of existing law, which might be held to

justify the contention that amendments would be likewise ignored, the leakiness of any structure only accentuating the need for repair. It rather proceeds from a somewhat pronounced aversion to the spirit of *verboden* in any form. At a recent meeting of an ornithological society it was proposed that boys infringing the Wild Birds Protection Acts should not be told that they were law-breaking, but remonstrated with upon æsthetic grounds—a principle which, beyond a certain point, is somewhat difficult to follow. One assumes that its aim is purely educational, but surely respect for the Statute Book is as essential to good citizenship as cultivation of an æsthetic sense.

The legal aspect of the case may be set aside for a while, however, the general disposition being to adopt the more popular alternative of Reserves from which much is expected. This idea has been widely acclaimed and rightly so, although as yet neither its full possibilities nor the difficulty of exploiting them to the best advantage have been realised. At present the scheme is little more than a figure of speech or at most a pleasing prospect likely to materialise in the future, providing, it is hoped, a solution to many complex problems, not to mention the realisation of aims widely divergent if not irreconcilable. There are, indeed, so many points to consider, so many interests at stake that it might be as well to examine categorically the primary objects that it is desirable to attain. They might, perhaps, be summarised as follows: First, the necessity upon scientific and national grounds for saving animals that are threatened with extinction; secondly, the providing of pleasure to the increasing number of people who derive interest and delight from observing wild creatures and their ways; and lastly—a most important consideration—the welfare of the animals and the betterment of their lot whenever possible.

Bearing these three essential objectives in mind, it becomes apparent that the combined purposes could not be served by one or two great national 'playgrounds.' The conception being comparatively new, so far as this country is concerned, there is a natural tendency to base one's standards upon institutions such as the Yellowstone and Kruger Parks or similar immense areas set aside in the Dominions, each containing as many square miles as acres would be available in this country. In Great

Britain, however, the circumstances are different from every point of view. The Yellowstone Park, for instance, is an area larger than any English county with the exception of Yorkshire, and caters for a need which does not exist here, since we do not possess the large animals for whose protection it provides. The more extensive the area, the better for all purposes, of course, but our aims, though less ambitious, are at the same time more comprehensive. In the new and comparatively thinly populated countries reserves have become desirable for the sake of big game and the numerous fur-bearing animals which were harried too keenly. The necessity for safeguarding the minor forms of wild life is not so great overseas as in this crowded island, where we have little else, and for which purpose far more intensive methods would be required. A few national parks, used mainly for public recreation or holiday camping-grounds, would not meet the case, and though a national park should certainly be a wild life sanctuary, it is not desirable that a wild life reserve should necessarily be a national park. In general principle, 'reserves' should not only save but materially assist the *distribution* of wild creatures, and with this end in view protected areas should not only be as numerous as possible but also strategically chosen. Suitable breeding-places, above all things, should be secured, and as Professor Huxley pointed out some time ago, it might even be necessary in the common interest to exclude the general public from places where special care is essential.

Were one or two comparatively large national reserves instituted, it might be advisable to run them upon purely scientific lines. These places might be regarded as big natural zoos, of necessity enclosed, and therefore, as far as four-footed creatures are concerned, in no way affecting the fauna of the countryside as a whole. To effect redistribution as well as to strengthen the status of our struggling creatures a more general plan is required, and to meet this need various sanctuaries are already established; but these, although exceedingly useful as far as they go, are too few, widely separated and limited in their dimensions to benefit the general cause to any material extent. Even small areas freely dispersed cannot be otherwise than helpful, but land is costly and we require some system under which a reasonable amount might be

obtained without prohibitive outlay either by the national exchequer or the many private societies willing to act. This would involve a big scheme, but not so difficult to operate as first appearances might suggest. Indeed, a great machinery that might be turned to helpful account is already in unofficial motion, only requiring the recognition of 'authority' to bring it into line. Ornithological and other associations exist all over the country, some of them already controlling sanctuaries of their own, and the co-operation of such bodies would not only assist the working of a general scheme, but would go far to solve the problem of cost, since many competent observers would not only supply valuable information but would doubtless act as honorary wardens when required.

Each county at least—one would like to suggest each district of not more than two hundred square miles—should possess some area in which its representative wild creatures could exist unmolested. The principal difficulty, needless to say, would be the acquisition of sufficient space, and here one is disposed to advance a somewhat revolutionary but practical suggestion which, if carried out, would go far to meet the case. There seems to be no valid reason why all common land should not be declared absolute sanctuary, at least for birds. There would be no cost attached to such a measure; nobody need be adversely affected in any material way. The land would continue to serve its present purpose, all the privileges of 'common and turbary' remaining unchallenged. Only the killing or molestation of the feathered inhabitants would be prohibited, and this restriction need involve no hardship. There would not even be any question of interfering with the 'poor' man's only chance of sport. As a general rule shooting is not among the common rights recognised by law, and where laxity exists in this respect or where sporting rights have been acquired by custom or grant, they are of little value to anyone, being rendered worthless by perpetual abuse. Free sport has always meant the extermination of the game the world over. I well remember that in Canada, where partridge or grouse-shooting was called 'hunting,' English people frequently remarked that the misnomer was apt enough, the entire proceeding amounting to little more than hunting for something to shoot.

There arises, of course, the case of landowners or game-preservers who hold manorial rights over adjoining commons, but in reality such people should ultimately gain rather than lose, the commons providing a stronghold from which a constant supply of birds would emanate; and after all it is not unreasonable to suggest that a trifling sacrifice upon the part of individuals might be made to further the cause. The pleasure afforded to many would outweigh any nominal loss sustained by a few. There would be opposition, no doubt, the measure being represented as interfering with the 'rights of democracy,' although, as already stated, in general it would merely necessitate a more precise definition together with a little enforcement of existing legislation. It is doubtful whether anyone at the moment possesses the legal right to destroy even an unscheduled bird upon publicly owned land during the summer months, common rights being distinct from occupation, which alone authorises the killing of an unprotected species. Needless to add, total protection of bird life in any sanctuary should apply also to eggs—a reform long over-due under the existing system, since the measure of license now granted in this respect only leads to inevitable abuse and genuine confusion. Under present conditions the ordinary village boy can scarcely be expected to discriminate between prohibited eggs and those which he may lawfully appropriate. He may certainly consult the list displayed outside the local police-station, but that is the one place which he is most anxious to avoid, while it seems undesirable that such information should be supplied in schools, since it inculcates the idea of egg-taking which should surely be discouraged, the principle being identical irrespective of species.

It is unnecessary, however, to embark upon the controversial topic of egg-collecting. General sentiment is exercising its influence slowly but emphatically, and reform in that direction is only a matter of time. There remain other points to be considered in connection with the commons suggestion, the most important, perhaps, being the question of mammals. Undoubtedly these ought to be granted protection also, although there might be difficulty in the case of eminently destructive creatures such as rabbits or deer, which, if the reserved areas were sufficiently extensive, might easily become a nuisance.

This would be a matter requiring careful adjustment. The problem would arise in any form of reserve which might be instituted, unless enclosed, and one can foresee inevitable complications which experience alone could unravel. In this respect, again, our position is not so simple as that of the Colonies, where conflicting interests are less numerous. One might solve the rabbit problem, for example, by the free introduction of their habitual destroyers, foxes, stoats, polecats, and martens, but protests from game-preservers would immediately follow, and even agriculturists would object, for although the rabbit is officially declared vermin, the farmer wages systematic war upon those animals which, if permitted, might be trusted to mitigate the pest. Actually in this particular case, any objections raised would be conventional rather than practical. There can be no doubt that the revival of carnivorous creatures would definitely benefit agriculture. They harm no crops, but merely make war upon the farmer's enemies, the poultry question being easily dealt with. There was no rabbit plague in the West when polecats were numerous. It does not exist to-day in any locality where stoats abound. Nothing scatters foraging wood-pigeon hordes more effectively than repeated attacks by sparrow-hawks and falcons or the interminable circlings of buzzards, yet one has heard this very dispersal of pigeons advanced by a farmer as an excuse for destroying buzzards.

The badger should be given absolute sanctuary upon reserves of every description. Indeed, one would like to see him protected upon all ground, at least from the usage to which he is too often subjected. The decorative red squirrel, once so abundant, might require reintroduction, since there is nothing even under present conditions to prevent the natural recovery which he appears to be incapable of effecting unaided. One is aware that his return would not be welcomed upon newly afforested lands, nor is it desired by many ornithologists owing to his alleged predilection for birds' eggs. This objection, however, constitutes yet another instance of the complications which beset attempts at wild life preservation in this country, where the involved interests are upon so minute a scale. Similar difficulty will arise in all reserves with regard to rapacious birds, the argument being that

no place can be a sanctuary in which the occupants are freely destroyed by others of the feathered race. One's attitude in this matter must depend upon the point of view from which the subject is regarded. The stronger birds will certainly prey upon the weaker, and this might be considered undesirable. Objections upon such a score, however, would be countered by the question whether a 'sanctuary' is for the benefit of all or merely for a few favoured species. If the former, then Nature must be the arbiter, as she would be in her own undisturbed kingdom where all her children follow her dictates and prosper under her rule. If the latter, or in modern phrase, if the larger birds are to be 'controlled,' then bird sanctuaries could only be regarded as preserves for the lower orders, involving the sacrifice of the mightier fowl. This is a matter which requires most delicate handling, and one would advocate artificial interference in extreme cases only. The precedent is too obvious. If the naturalist countenances the destruction of other birds to safeguard some species in which he is interested, he is clearly in no position to criticise the game-preserved, who for motives differing only in detail so depletes our finer avifauna. Abundance which may seem excessive at the moment is too easily converted into permanent scarcity, nor must one forget that it is the large predatory birds which become extinct, or virtually so, and not the little feathered people upon whom they prey. These remain numerous, and when a weaker race evinces a tendency to decrease, the decline is usually due to causes which no artificial help can arrest. It must always be borne in mind that the policy of sacrificing one species to another in the interests of ornithology is eminently unsound, since it seldom even achieves its ostensible purpose, is inconsistent with every argument advanced against the claims of materialism or sport, and is so elastic that it might be stretched indefinitely, for the black list would rapidly lengthen when once adopted. The destruction of every other cliff-breeding bird in Cornwall would not have saved the chough, nor did the pine-marten's banishment prevent the decline of the red squirrel; and if all birds that destroy others are to be controlled, there can be little doubt that the greater number of Nature-lovers would prefer the complaint to the remedy.

It is safe to assert that no wild animals require artificial protection except those which are artificially destroyed or introduced. Personal experience proves that wild pheasants or partridges seldom disappear from land where they are allowed to take their chance without being shot too closely, and examples upon a broader scale may be found in country where the law of the jungle—savage yet beneficent in its general operation—still prevails. One case might be cited as characteristic. Conventionally, antelope herds cannot remain in territory that has been invaded by wild dogs, but quite recently I happened to obtain some interesting information upon this point from the owner of 'a little private reserve'—a trifling matter of a few hundred square miles in Rhodesia. He has never discouraged wild dogs, which for many years have haunted his holding, yet hoofed game of every description maintains a reasonable status and the question of artificial control is not even considered.

It is against *man* that the wild creature requires protection. Nature may be depended upon to counteract excesses in any direction, and while correcting superabundance, she never exterminates through the agency of other animals. In general principle, the black-listing or scapegoating of a wild species is to be deprecated. Even the unpopular sparrow cannot justly be blamed for the swallow's decline, although responsibility has been laid at his door. Upon these and neighbouring premises the sparrow has never established himself, but the swallows which once nested here in fair numbers have gone, even as the red squirrel, to employ him once again, disappeared from Devonshire woods a quarter of a century before the grey alien, charged with his banishment, had penetrated within fifty miles of the county's boundaries. Upon this particular point one is merely expressing a general sentiment, urged in previous writings but reiterated because its importance, in my opinion, cannot be over-estimated. Upon the other hand, special circumstances might require special treatment. Where a few birds or mammals, regarded as virtually the last of their race, are making a final effort, the removal of an obvious menace might conceivably be advisable, but even here the utmost discretion should be exercised, and when reintroduction is attempted it should be done in places

where interference with resident bird life would not be necessary. In brief, ornithological or other similar experiments and interests must not be added to the many influences militating against our wild creatures, already subjected to excessive unofficial 'control.'

And perhaps one might here venture upon another word of warning. The principle of reserves is entirely to be commended and will most certainly be adopted upon a greater or lesser scale. Such institutions, however, will neither prove a remedy for all ills nor provide a solution for all our complex problems. In many respects, indeed, care will be necessary to ensure that our wild creatures do not suffer rather than benefit from the movement. To give a characteristic example, there is a real danger that many people who now preserve decorative but undeniably destructive birds and beasts may consider themselves relieved from responsibility when places are provided in which such animals are officially saved for posterity. If there is any relaxing in the consideration now shown to beautiful creatures, they will rapidly disappear, and the countryside will only be the poorer for this progressive step.

There is need for the utmost caution here, the last result to be sought from the reserve movement being the decrease of wild life in all other localities. That would be catastrophic. None the less, it is far from being a remote possibility, and when areas are selected care should be taken to determine whether the fauna of the district is more likely to gain or lose from being placed under official protection. Where the rarer and larger birds suffer little molestation, as in certain parts of the South-west, they are probably in a better case if left to Nature, under whose care they have contrived to hold their own. Again, many large estates in Scotland might already be regarded as reserves, their wild inhabitants enjoying more privileges than would be possible under any other conditions. There are landowners who preserve their eagles, buzzards, ravens, wild-cats, or martens with even more punctilious care than is bestowed upon their game, while deer, hares, blackgame, and other grouse are enabled to exist in greater numbers than any national park could maintain. It seems undesirable to convert any such areas into public or scientific institutions, although doubtless places of this

description would be selected for the national purpose, if procurable, being more or less 'ready made' and therefore obviating the need of introducing many animals, since it is always easier to *save* a rare species, even if thinly represented, than to reinstate fresh stock. In the general interests of the birds and beasts, however, one would prefer that sanctuaries were established in districts whose wild life is now harried, although suitability must perforce take precedence.

The value of game-preserving to other bird life, particularly when reasonable consideration is shown to rapacious species, is not always recognised. It is customary to regard an extensive pheasant-rearing estate as a place upon which many interesting creatures are systematically destroyed, and too often this may be true enough. At worst, however, land upon which game is reared affords security for all birds not considered inimical to the interests of sport, since they are provided with quiet cover in which to breed and are protected against both natural and human enemies. Thickets or spinneys segregated for pheasant cover are particularly helpful to species such as the nightingale and the warblers, and since preserves upon which rapacious animals have been reduced to a negligible minimum are numerous throughout England, minor feathered life should be amply protected, and this circumstance suggests that failure to thrive in certain instances—that of the Dartford warbler being a case in point—is not due to the activities of feathered depredators.

The degree of tameness which wild animals may attain when unharried depends upon circumstances, such as the extent of their range and also, very largely, upon racial disposition. With ample space or cover at their disposal, those which are averse to observation naturally retreat from it; and for this reason the larger the area the wilder its occupants remain. Also there are birds so inherently wild that a complete reversal of instinct must take place before they could be induced to accept security conditional upon publicity. The utter disregard of man, so often noted among big carnivora in colonial reserves, is not always due, apparently, to a tacit acceptance of the truce upon the beasts' part. Observations are usually made from cars, the mystery of which so completely

baffles the animals' comprehension that they have as yet evolved no course of action with regard to these modern monsters. The forest beast or bird has behind it centuries of precedent to dictate procedure in any natural emergency; a few years only in which to determine its attitude towards an automobile. A week or so ago a buzzard which would have flapped wildly away from a pedestrian, swooped upon and killed a rat within a few feet of a car passing slowly along a Devonshire lane, and it is not remarkable that the grim African lion looks with mild wonder at the mechanical vehicle which suggests nothing within his scheme of things.

The car is the talisman upon which the truce depends, the magic box which absorbs the identity of its occupants. When these emerge the spell is broken and the maintenance of the truce is subject to the animal's reactions. He may take fright, he may remain indifferent, and if he happens to be a lion or a grizzly other courses are not beyond his consideration, as evident from the long tale of casualties caused by the Yellowstone bears and Africa's felidæ. As a rule in such cases the animals have been closely approached—often contrary to regulations—and evinced no disposition either to pose for a picture or accept a peace offering. There have been complaints as to the inadvisability of disclosing the possibilities of a car to the more dangerous beasts. When, through the slow processes by which enlightenment comes to the wild creatures, the lion realises that the conjuring box is a mere container of life, the discovery may lead to closer investigations far from convenient to the motorist.

The nominal character of the truce was comically illustrated one afternoon when a pride of lions suddenly appeared upon the fringe of a corn-patch adjoining the great Victoria reserve where a hundred natives were at work. They had doubtless emerged from the bush to bask in the sunshine, but amicable intentions cannot always be taken upon trust, and had a cyclone swept the field its human occupants could not have vacated it with greater celerity. Every 'boy' of that hundred at work was well aware that officially 'nobody ate anybody' in that land of live and let live. Misgivings as to whether the lions had subscribed to the convention, however, suggested general post.

Reverting to the subject of general preservation, one must not overlook the purely humanitarian side of the question, and here we are upon peculiarly difficult ground, the path of the idealist being indeed beset with 'pitfall and with gin.' Whatever may be effected by reserves, their institution cannot settle the 'blood-sport' controversy. Rather, once again, they must complicate the entire issue, since if wild life benefits and is strengthened in consequence, the problem of dealing with the birds and beasts remains. If upon the other hand more animals are destroyed than ever before, or, in other words, if the movement led to the drastic reduction of all predatory creatures outside a few enclosures, it is difficult to detect any humanitarian purpose that could be served. Regretfully as the pronouncement must be made, the road to Utopia does not lie in this direction. As long as we have wild animals—and one is opposed to any system under which they might disappear—conflict between humanity and wild life, even as among the birds and beasts themselves, is unavoidable, the entire principle of life being competitive. So far as the creatures are concerned, it can matter nothing to them whether they are killed in the name of sport or necessity—like the thousands destroyed upon certain colonial reserves to reduce the stock—since the methods available not only leave little choice, but when one faces realities usually prove to be identical. With regard to the sport controversy and the deadlock at which discussion invariably arrives, one need only remark that a reasonable sense of proportion is needed upon both sides. Until this note is struck, the extreme points of view which now seem so diametrically opposed cannot be reconciled, nor reform effected.

In conclusion, there is one more suggestion that might be advanced concerning an evil too long overlooked. One assumes that the reserve movement also aspires to the suppression of unnecessary cruelty, and surely the occasion is ripe for more effective measures to restrict the heath fires, which not only devastate the early summer landscape in so many moorland districts, but wreak havoc among ground-nesting birds upon a scale that is scarcely realised. These fires, which have been aptly described as 'the curse of dry weather,' and the strong feeling expressed upon the subject from all quarters during the long drought

of 1938 when destructive conflagrations were so prevalent, forcibly emphasise the need for repressive action. The case is particularly urgent upon unenclosed land, such as the western moors or the New Forest, where the difficulties are accentuated once again by rights of common and turbary, ancient custom, and, most tenacious of all, incombustible prejudice. All technical questions may be set aside, each constituting a subject in itself and being immaterial to the point at issue. Upon humane grounds it is of no importance whether the blaze is ignited by 'authorised persons' to promote pasturage, or, as frequently happens, merely by village youths for amusement. However the fires originate or whatever their purpose, a great many are lighted too late in the year, being common during May and June at the height of the nesting-season, and for the destruction and cruelty involved there is neither occasion nor excuse.

In Scotland since 1773 the position has been regulated by a law which prohibits 'Muir burning or Heather-burning' between April 11 and Nov. 1, subject to a slight extension upon application, and it seems superfluous to remark that if control is possible in a country where the necessity for heather-burning is immeasurably greater, a corresponding date should be fixed for England. March 31 would meet all requirements, and even if this occasionally prevented any burning during an unfavourable season, there would be no grounds for complaint. Expert opinion has frequently declared the so-called 'swaling' practised in southern England to be excessive and, therefore, entirely uneconomical, so that the omission of a year now and again would be beneficial rather than otherwise. Upon Dartmoor such a measure would merely replace the old Forest regulations which have been permitted to lapse, and in all districts it might be regarded as an amplification of the Wild Birds Protection Acts if, indeed, these could not be held already to cover it. Specific definition is preferable, however, and ornithological societies might with advantage work for this end which would constitute a long step in the direction of wild life preservation.

DOUGLAS GORDON.

Art. 6.—BOSWELL IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DISCOVERIES.*

1. *Private Papers of James Boswell from Malahide Castle in the Collection of Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Isham.* Ed. Geoffrey Scott and Fredk. A. Pottle. 18 vols. (Index volume to follow). 1928-1934. Privately printed.
2. *The Private Papers of James Boswell from Malahide Castle. A Catalogue.* By Fredk. A. Pottle and Marion S. Pottle. O.U.P., 1931.
3. *Boswell Papers found at Fettercairn: A Catalogue of Papers relating to Boswell, Johnson and Sir William Forbes.* By Claude Collier Abbott. O.U.P., 1936.
4. *Boswell's Literary Career, An Illustrated Bibliography.* By Fredk. A. Pottle. O.U.P., 1929.
5. *Boswell's Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides.* Ed. Fredk. A. Pottle and Charles H. Burnett. Heinemann, 1936.
6. *Letters of James Boswell.* Ed. Chauncey Brewster Tinker. 2 vols. O.U.P., 1924.
7. *Boswell's Life of Johnson.* Ed. G. Birkbeck Hill; revised and enlarged edition by L. F. Powell. First 4 vols. O.U.P., 1934.

THE mere enumeration of the above volumes suffices to prove that much water has flowed under the bridges since Macaulay published the essay on 'Boswell's Life of Johnson,' in which he dismissed the biographer as a 'man of the meanest and feeblest intellect,' who, 'if he had not been a great fool . . . would never have been a great writer.' Thanks to the devoted work of many scholars and admirers, we are at last in a position to appraise what Boswell actually achieved and to do so after consulting the papers which he bequeathed to posterity in the Ebony Casket which for so long was believed to have perished. The story of the recovery reads like a romance and provides a thrill, perhaps unparalleled, in the history of modern literature.

As is well known, in his will Boswell left all the 'MSS. of my own composition and all my letters from various

* This article is based upon the material collected by the writer for her contributions to 'The Year's Work in English Studies,' vols. x-xvii. She is indebted to the editors for their kind permission to make use of it.

persons' to his literary executors, Sir William Forbes of Pitsligo, William Temple, and Edmund Malone, to be published at their discretion for the benefit of his younger children. The publication did not take place; it was assumed that the executors made no attempt to carry out Boswell's wishes,* and a statement by Rogers, his first biographer, led to the belief that the papers had been destroyed by inappreciative descendants. Geoffrey Scott surmised, with great probability, that Macaulay's attack on Boswell in 1831, which temporarily destroyed his reputation, was the cause of the complete suppression of the papers by the family. At any rate, Mrs Mounsey, his great-granddaughter, locked them up in an attic at Auchinleck and concealed the fact of their existence until they passed, at her death in 1905, into the possession of her nephew, Boswell's great-great-grandson, the present Lord Talbot de Malahide.

Meanwhile a complete revolution had taken place in regard to Boswell and his achievement. It had long been recognised that the 'Life of Johnson' was not produced by Macaulay's inspired idiot, but that it was, on the contrary, a work of consummate and conscious literary art. The change in his reputation was completed by the publication in 1922 of Professor Tinker's 'Young Boswell,' in which 'without any desire to patronise him or to sit in judgment on his occasional lapses from social propriety and moral standards,' the writer showed his obvious and infectious enjoyment in Boswell's society and his appreciation of the genius which trained itself to preserve 'human life in its actuality, yet ever at its best and fullest.' Dr Tinker's

* This assumption has no basis in fact. It has now been shown from their extant letters that, though the three literary executors published nothing from the heterogeneous papers entrusted to them, they perused and sifted them with much care, and earnestly considered the best course to be taken. Their task was not easy, and they finally decided to hold their hands until James Boswell the younger was old enough to be consulted. In 1809, as we now know, Malone wrote to Euphemia Boswell that 'a large parcel of them was sent from Scotland to London for the inspection and consideration of your brother James; who, after examining them, clearly co-incided with me respecting the impropriety of printing any part of them' (Catalogue of Private Papers of James Boswell in the Isham Collection, p. xv). Professor Pottle's comment is that: 'This decision, though disappointing, was inevitable. Anyone who has made even a cursory examination of the papers must acquit Boswell's literary executors and his son of undue squeamishness in suppressing, for the time-being, the contents of the archives.'

next work was his collection of 'Boswell's Letters,' in the course of which he advertised for information about any which might still be in existence. In reply 'he received a mysterious anonymous communication advising him to make approaches to Malahide.' After some fruitless attempts, he resolved to go to Ireland himself, and in 1925 was admitted to the castle and shown the contents of the Ebony Casket, which were indeed extant though still jealously guarded from publication. However, in the following summer the American collector Colonel Isham succeeded in purchasing from Lord Talbot a letter from Goldsmith to Boswell referring to 'She Stoops to Conquer.' From that time onwards, for a period of eighteen months, Colonel Isham carried on negotiations with Lord Talbot which finally resulted in his acquisition of what were supposed to be all the Malahide papers, by the spring of 1928. The treasure was, indeed, no mean one, since it consisted of large fragments of a draft of the 'Life of Johnson,' the entire manuscript of the 'Account of Corsica' (without the 'Tour'), 'Journals,' i.e. diaries kept intermittently from 1758 until Boswell's death, which are 'a constant reminder of how small a portion of Boswell's vivid and multifarious existence was associated with Johnson'; records and relics of various kinds, and, finally, Correspondence, including letters written by and to Boswell and many others of outstanding interest.

But the haul was by no means yet complete, for 'in April 1930, a further lot of miscellaneous manuscripts was discovered by accident in a croquet-box in a cupboard in which it was thought no documents had been kept.' These documents included a large portion of the 'manuscript of the "Life of Johnson," 120 quarto leaves, some written on one side, some on both,' '109 leaves without a gap, and only 6 leaves missing in the entire series.' 'The recovery of this long and continuous fragment of Boswell's MS. . . . enables us to state with perfect certainty what his method was in preparing his book for the printer and to confirm in every detail the brilliant conjectures of Mr Scott, which were based upon a short and rather ambiguous portion'—a triumph of textual criticism which sufficiently vindicates a method apt to be undervalued by those who think that imagination and originality are necessarily divorced from painstaking scholarship.

Second in importance only to this fragment of the MS. of the 'Life,' if indeed it is second even to that, are the 314 octavo leaves of the 'Journal of the Tour to the Hebrides,' which Professor Pottle describes as 'the best, . . . the most interesting and valuable Boswell MS. extant.' Be this as it may, readers may now test its worth for themselves, since at last, after more than 150 years, the 'Journal' has been published as Boswell wrote it and without the extensive changes and revision suggested by Malone. To-day we can rejoice in the unexpurgated version with its intimate, picturesque detail, even while we acknowledge that the first editors proved their wisdom when they revised the text and toned down its improprieties. Messrs. Pottle and Bennett have shown equal discretion by restoring and annotating it in a way that is completely satisfying to the modern reader. 'We are now able to read the "Tour," not as a book about Johnson, but as one of the best chapters in Boswell's autobiography.'

After Malahide Castle, Fettercairn House, and along with Tinker, Scott, and Pottle, Claude Colleer Abbott! It seems little short of miraculous that there could have remained after the Ebony Casket and the croquet-box a mass of unknown material relating to Boswell and his friends—'lost literature' not of the Middle Ages but of the end of the eighteenth century. The discovery was made almost by chance, as the fortunate finder was the first to admit, but it is bare justice to recognise the zeal, industry, and competence which were required for the compilation of the *catalogue raisonné* of 1,607 items which Professor Abbott ultimately unearthed and examined. He was put on the track of the papers at Fettercairn by the late Mr Alistair Tayler, who, in the course of investigation of Jacobite documents belonging to Lord Clinton, discovered some material relating to Beattie, in whom he knew Mr Abbott to be interested. By the kindness of the owner this was sent for inspection and proved to consist of the manuscript of Sir William Forbes's 'Life' of the poet, together with letters of Forbes to the printer. Since Forbes, as we have heard, was Boswell's friend and one of his literary executors, Mr Abbott asked and obtained leave to examine for himself the papers at Fettercairn House, Lord Clinton acting not merely as

his host but as his willing assistant. The tale of the discoveries should be read in the words of the Introduction to the 'Catalogue.' Here it must suffice to mention the main categories, namely (a) 1,030 letters to Boswell, including 160 from his friend Temple, 22 from Malone, 12 from the attainted Earl Marischal, 33 from Forbes, 19 from the Dilly brothers, 14 from Bennet Langton, etc.; (b) some 340 drafts or copies of letters from Boswell himself; (c) 7 major Boswell MSS., including his London 'Journal' from Nov. 15, 1762 to Aug. 4, 1763, which is 'complete, unmutilated and . . . in excellent condition,' and 'in many ways the most interesting and revealing of all Boswell's "Journals".' There are besides 209 pages of a 'Journal' from March to May 1778 and a 'Journal of the Northern Circuit,' autumn 1788; two registers of letters sent and received; Notes for his projected Life of General Oglethorpe and 'An Account of my last Interview with David Hume Esq.'; (d) 24 miscellaneous minor manuscripts in Boswell's hand; (e) a number of miscellaneous letters, newspaper cuttings, and pamphlets; (f) 119 holograph letters from Johnson to various correspondents. Many of these were collected for use in the 'Life of Johnson'; some, however, are still wholly or partially unpublished; (g) 17 Johnsoniana, including extracts from his Journal and a copy of the Round Robin of 1776.

This bare enumeration shows that the importance of Professor Abbott's discovery can scarcely be exaggerated, nor the value of his 'Catalogue.' Ultimately we hope he may be able to complete his labours by the publication of the documents themselves, which are at present in the custody of a Judicial Factor pending the determination of their ownership, so that for the time being they cannot be printed. Meanwhile the 'Catalogue' and the brief descriptions and summaries of its contents which are included give us very much for which to be thankful.

Luckily there has been no embargo on the publication of Colonel Isham's treasures. On the contrary, he has given every facility to the editors of his choice, and Geoffrey Scott and Professor Pottle have taken full advantage of the opportunities afforded them. It is time to examine the contents of their eighteen volumes somewhat more closely, since they are too expensive for most readers to purchase

and can be consulted in this country only at a few of the great libraries to which Colonel Isham has most generously presented sets.*

'The new material stretches from 1754 to a period after Boswell's death in 1795; it carries us into seven different countries; it contains much that is obscure,' much that requires elucidation and annotation. Naturally in so large a mass of material, not everything is of equal importance; some part is of outstanding value, some markedly inferior to this in interest. The six volumes edited by Geoffrey Scott and published in 1928 contain examples only of the first of these two classes. Briefly their contents may be summarised from the title-pages, viz. Vol. I, General Introduction. Early Papers of Boswell. David Boswell's Oath; Vol. II, Zélide and Papers in Holland; Vol. III, A Tour of the German Courts; Vol. IV, Boswell with Rousseau and Voltaire; Vol. V, Porzia Sansedoni. Papers in Italy; Vol. VI, The Making of the Life of Johnson. In these volumes 'the personality of Boswell pervades the pages and requires no showman. Or the material derives from the pen of his closest intimates or of his great contemporaries. These are the outstanding documents of the collection.' Each volume, however, possesses unity of subject; 'the papers are distributed according to matter rather than form' and, broadly, in chronological sequence. Volume VI, however, is different in character from the rest, being 'devoted to a consideration of the evidence, furnished by the Malahide papers, of Boswell's methods as a biographer, and to tracing the successive stages through which the "Life of Johnson" passed to its completion.' This fascinating volume gives us glimpses of Boswell in his laboratory; we can see the system of his work, and compare his rudimentary materials with their finished state and form our own impression of the way in which the great biography came into being. 'It is Boswell's workshop, with its litter, that is here described; not a corner within it, grouped for effect.' †

* The writer is indebted to Dr R. W. Chapman for kindly allowing her to consult his volumes.

† Those who cannot secure the entrée may be advised to avail themselves of the 'corner' provided by the publication of 'Boswell's Note Book 1766-1777, from the unique edition in the collection of R. B. Adam, with

With Professor Pottle's editorship of the collection a slight change of plan is adopted and the remaining volumes, VII to XVIII, 'consist in the main of portions of the Journal in strict chronological sequence,' together with a selection from the other MSS. Vol. VII contains the 'Journals' for 1765-8, including the tour in Corsica, and also a full account of 'The Writing of Corsica,' but this is by no means the only interest of the volume. For example, among the 'Notes in London, 1766,' there is a striking account of Boswell's interview with Pitt, a tall, ghastly figure 'in black cloaths, with a white night-cap and his foot all wrapp'd up in flannel and on a Gout Stool,' who thunders forth the memorable sentence: 'Sir, I should be sorry that in any corner of the world, however distant or however small, it should be suspected that I could ever be indifferent to the cause of liberty.'

Here, too, is the description of Boswell's *annus mirabilis*, 1767, when, in Edinburgh, he united a prodigious amount of legal work with the writing of four books and many newspaper paragraphs and also found time for a violent love-affair with Mrs Dodds. 'What strength of mind you have had this winter,' he soliloquises, 'to go through so much business and at the same time have so violent a Passion.'

But the Corsican material remains the outstanding feature of the volume, if only because the visit to Corsica marks a real dividing-line in his life, giving him a poise and self-confidence which he did not previously possess. There is also a rich store of evidence for a study of the 'Account of Corsica,' which enables the editor to sketch the various stages of the evolution of Boswell's first important publication.

Volume VIII contains the love-letters of Boswell and Margaret Montgomerie, together with the 'Journals' for 1768-9. The story of his courtship and marriage is best described in Boswell's own words: 'It does you great honour, and I appear a better man than people have imagined.' The tone of his letters is, indeed, very

the corresponding passages from the first edition of the Life printed on opposite pages,' O.U.P., 1925, 3s. 6d. net. They may there have 'ocular demonstration' that Boswell took untiring pains to secure accuracy of detail, and will also find proof that 'he was not a stenographer . . . what he gives us is not always—perhaps is not very often—*ipsissima verba*.'

different from that which he adopts when writing to *Zélide* or *Porzia Sansedoni*, or when ('Notes in Paris, 1766,' Vol. VII) he speaks of Rousseau's mistress (and his own), *Thérèse Le Vasseur*. Margaret's seriousness and faith in him, though he hid nothing from her, seem to affect his attitude, and with all his lapses after marriage, as before, for the time-being he became in truth, 'a better man than people have imagined' in his dealings with her. The marriage took place in November, 1769. The autumn before his wedding Boswell had a 'jaunt to London,' to Stratford-on-Avon for the Shakespeare 'Jubilee,' and to visit Temple in Devonshire. The account of his appearance as a Corsican Chief at Stratford is well known. Here he tells us that 'my Corsican dress attracted everybody. I was as much a favourite as I could desire.' We also have a description of his quarters 'directly opposite to Shakespeare's house,' where he had 'a tollerable old-fashioned room with a neat clean bed, at a guinea a night, the stated Jubilee Price for beds,' an account of his characteristic miseries at the church service, and, best of all, a facsimile of his Jubilee broadside. This last is reproduced from the unique original in the Isham Collection, which turned up, not at Malahide, but in Germany in 1927. Boswell writes complacently in his 'Journal' of Garrick's reception of his complimentary verses.

Volume IX contains 'two Journals of very different tone, separated furthermore by a gap of some two years, which a fine letter of Goldsmith'—his acknowledgment of Boswell's congratulations on the success of '*She Stoops to Conquer*'—'serves partially to bridge.' The fully written London 'Journal' of 1772 presents a sober and cheerful diarist. Boswell, 'for the first time in London,' is 'unvexed' by conscience, 'glories in his reformation,' and prides himself on being a fine specimen of a 'Scotch laird, and a Scotch lawyer, and a Scotch married man.' He may be unsuccessful in the lawsuit which has brought him to town, but on the other hand he meets everywhere with kindness and sympathy, and is, as he puts it, 'divinely happy.' Above all, he is in close intercourse with Johnson, who greets him 'with a robust sincerity of friendship, saying, "I am glad to see thee, I am glad to see thee."'

The other full 'Journal' in this volume, that of June

to September 1774, is of a different kind and unique in that it deals with one of Boswell's clients, an unfortunate man, John Reid, who was hanged for sheep-stealing. Normally Boswell kept his lawcases for separate treatment, Johnson having advised him to use the 'Journal' only 'to register the state of his mind.' But this case became an obsession for the time-being, and therefore rightly took its place in the 'Journal.' It is a lucky exception for Boswell's readers, since it shows him as he was in his legal work—benevolent and hard-working on behalf of criminals from whom he could gain neither reputation nor profit.* At the same time we see his curious delight in executions, his morbid interest in every horrible detail, combined with his distress at the sufferings of the victim and his friends. Even more characteristic are his exhortations to the wretched man, who dies protesting his innocence of the particular crime for which he has been sentenced.

Volume X begins with the untoward events which followed Boswell's unsuccessful efforts to save Reid's life. William Miller, son of the acting president of the High Court of Justiciary, challenged Boswell to a duel because of an anonymous letter in the 'London Chronicle' in which he protested against taking the advice of Sir Thomas Miller about the exercise of the king's prerogative of mercy. The challenge unfortunately fell into Mrs Boswell's hands and she, as well as her 'constitutionally timorous' husband, was much exercised as to his proper course in the matter. After much hesitation and many qualms, Boswell succeeded in avoiding the duel without any loss of prestige, but his frank account of the whole business casts much light on his character. To us in the twentieth century, he appears to have behaved sensibly and with dignity: in his own age, one can see that his avoidance of a duel on this occasion, as in six similar instances, must have laid him open to the charge of cowardice. The details given do not substantiate the charge, though he makes no secret of his dislike to risk his life. But he was prepared to do so rather than to

* Cf. also 'Boswell and the Girl from Botany Bay,' by Fredk. A. Pottle, Heinemann, 1938, 5s. net, for another example of Boswell's disinterested assistance, on this occasion to escaped convicts whose thrilling adventures had stirred his sympathy.

act dishonourably, though he preferred—as on this occasion—to extenuate or apologise for his conduct when he had been in the wrong, rather than to fight.

The rest of the Scotch 'Journal' (Edinburgh 1774–5) in this volume is mainly interesting on account of Boswell's quarrel with his father, before the birth of Alexander Boswell (who was to lay down his life in a duel), on the subject of the entail. This the old laird was anxious to break in order to allow of female succession in default of direct heirs male. Boswell was violently opposed and refused to agree to this course. 'I remained firm for the support of the Male succession as I considered this to be the only true representation of an ancient Barony. . . . I had the resolution of a Roman for the support of my family.' He was also guilty of the romantic exaggerations of a boy—swearing, in 1767, that if his father persisted, he would cut his throat; and, two years later, 'with a piece of the old castle in my hand, I knelt upon the ruins and swore that if any man had the estate in exclusion of the rightful heir, this stone should swim in his heart's blood (I keep the stone)—these [oaths] keep me as firm as the rock itself.' Even when Lord Monboddo argued with him that 'if Mr Johnson knew that you would submit to be disinherited yourself of a great proportion of your inheritance [i.e. that which was not entailed] rather than take the chance of cutting out a ninth cousin, he would not approve; and then you could not persist.' 'Nay,' said I, 'even Mr Johnson could not change me *there*. Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas.'

The London 'Journal' of 1775 enables us to see Boswell's method of collecting materials, for it records in much greater detail some of the best-known incidents in his letters and in the 'Life of Johnson.' As the editor points out, such 'passages were not, in the first instance, materials deliberately collected for the writing of a biography of Johnson. Each is a fragment of Boswell's autobiography torn loose from its context. His preoccupation during all those years was not with the writing of a book, though he had that in mind; it was with living his own life. "My avidity," he says, "to put as much as possible into a day makes me fill it till it is like to burst." He put in a great deal of Johnson as he put in an extraordinary array of other things, but it was seldom from a sense of duty.'

That is well said, and a perusal of the 'Journal' ought to dispel the myth of Boswell 'as a man with a notebook pursuing Johnson for materials to use in the "Life."'

Vol. XI contains the 'Journal in Scotland' from Nov. 11, 1775, to March 10, 1776, the 'Jaunt to London, Oxford, Birmingham, Lichfield, Ashbourne, Bath and Bristol,' March 11 to May 21, 1776, together with the 'Interview with the Celebrated Margaret Caroline Rudd, 22 April, 1776.' In some respects it makes sad reading in so far as it shows Boswell in his weakest and most vicious aspect. The 'Journal' reveals him as the subject of the melancholia to which he became increasingly liable as years went on. Conceivably it was as a relief from these fits of depression that he indulged in the gambling, licentiousness, and insobriety which have done so much to injure his reputation. In the year under review the Scottish journal records too many incidents for which excuse is impossible, nor does Boswell attempt to palliate them. He remarks on one occasion, after a night of gambling: 'My Wife . . . very justly complained of my behaviour. I pacified her by sincere promises of future attention. . . . I hope I shall be more firm in time coming. My good practice is never of sufficiently long continuance to have a stable consistency. It is shaken loose by occasional repetitions of licentiousness.'

The English 'Journal' of 1776 is, on the whole, much pleasanter reading. There we meet once more the cheerful Boswell of earlier days, making 'a prodigious jovial noise going through Wellwyn and other villages,' 'gay and merry' at the play, a pleasant comrade, earning Johnson's compliment that 'there is no house which he enters into which they will not gladly receive him again.' The London 'Journal' of this year is the longest and 'in many ways the richest' of those now forthcoming. For example, it affords an opportunity for comparison between the first account of the dinner, when, by Boswell's contrivance, Johnson and Wilkes met as fellow guests at Dilly's, with the famous and well-known version which appears in the 'Life.' Unfortunately this first description occurs only in note form in the portion of the diary which has not been written out in full, and there is no reference to the subterfuge by which Johnson's presence was secured.

The interview with Mrs Rudd, the forger, occurs in the same part of the 'Journal,' but for this we are lucky enough also to possess the letter written, but not sent, to Mrs Boswell, in which there is a detailed account of the event. The editor's summing up of Boswell's attitude to women and of his reasons for seeking Mrs Rudd's society may be recommended as eminently sane and fair: 'She was credited with irresistible power of fascination. . . . Though she was obviously guilty, she had cheated the gallows. How, Boswell wondered, had she managed it? Could she fascinate him too? He could not rest until he had given her an opportunity. . . . The one quality in a woman which roused his genuine interest was the power to enchant and allure.' Of Mrs Rudd, Boswell writes with epicurean appreciation: 'The peculiar characteristic of her enchantment seemed to be its delicate imperceptible power. She perfectly concealed her design to charm. There was no . . . direct attempt upon the heart.' The whole interview reveals Boswell the interviewer, and forms an admirable illustration of his methods as well as of the powers of Mrs Rudd. We may cordially echo one of his concluding phrases: 'I would not for a good deal have missed this scene.'

Vol. XII contains the 'Journal in Scotland,' May 22, 1776 to Sept. 9, 1777, Boswell's last 'Interview with David Hume,' July 7, 1776, and some of his correspondence in the year 1777. This 'Journal' 'illustrates perhaps more strikingly than any other in the series those violent and mysterious alternations of ebullient high spirits and abysmal gloom' to which reference has already been made. Boswell on one occasion talks of his 'affliction' as a 'mental disease'—a term scarcely too strong—and, as usual with him, its incidence was varied by outbreaks of gross moral depravity which seem equally to indicate a condition of instability or at any rate a complete lack of self-control. There is possibly some connection between these things and his continued inability to conquer his scepticism in religious matters and more specifically with regard to survival after death. Boswell hungered for the conviction of immortality. He could not permanently attain it, nor could he put the subject on one side. Professor Pottle ascribes his 'shuddering horror of extinction' to his 'extraordinary

avidity for sensation. In spite of the greed with which he devoured experiences, he always felt that the best part was escaping him for ever. . . . To have less than eternity was only to be tantalised.' To accept this view is certainly to find a solution for many puzzles in Boswell's career. His desperate desire for religious conviction combined with an almost entire disregard for its bearing on moral behaviour is only one aspect of the matter.

The 'Journal at Ashbourne' in September 1777, with which Vol. XIII begins, exemplifies another revolution in Boswell's state of mind, being especially full of 'zest' and even youthful 'buoyancy,' though it succeeds, without a gap, the morbid jottings which have just been discussed. The fortnight at Ashbourne is in the main passed in holiday mood, though there is reference to a 'serious conversation' with Johnson 'on Melancholy and Madness,' and the 'Journal' records with engaging frankness (Sept. 24): 'I have had little food for my vanity as a celebrated Man upon this Jaunt, Dr Brown never once mentioned my 'Account of Corsica.' Nor had I any kind of allusion made to my being an Authour.'

The next journal of interest is that of the 'Jaunt to Carlisle Assizes' in August 1778, when Boswell felt himself 'very happy in the midst of the hurry and crowd and noise and dirt,' and his interest in his experiences vivifies his account of them. From then until the middle of the following November he keeps his resolve to continue his Journal 'with more constancy than he has done for some time past,' though 'breaks' are inevitable and occur even during the 'London Journal' of spring 1779, when he was 'unaccountably negligent in preserving Johnson's sayings, more so than at any time when I was happy enough to have an opportunity of hearing his wisdom and wit.'

Vol. XIV is particularly interesting as illustrating Boswell's position in his family circle, his isolation and his longing for the love and respect of his father and brothers, which were denied him. The laird of Auchinleck, upright and industrious, had little affection for his eldest son, who, with all his weaknesses, was a much more lovable and affectionate man. Boswell's family pride was balanced by genuine feeling and consideration for even the least attractive members of the clan—his eccentric and

'difficult' uncle John, for example, or the mad brother of the same name who so often planted himself for long, unhappy hours on the household, or Brother David, who failed to meet James's advances and 'fretted' him by 'narrowness of mind and want of genial, open, cordial sociality,' 'precision and self conceit.'

The relations with his children show the biographer as a loving and careful father; Sunday after Sunday we find him hearing Veronica and little Sandie say their 'divine lessons,' or we listen to baby James lisping his first words, or to Veronica proclaiming her infantile 'atheism.' Nor with all his lapses in conduct is it possible to doubt the genuine love he bore to his wife, his anxiety for her health, and his just resentment at the way she was treated by her father-in-law. His disinterested love for his family is perhaps the finest element in Boswell's character.

The London 'Journal' contains several pleasant incidents at the Club and much about Johnson, whom he met for the first time on this visit (March 21) unexpectedly in Fleet Street—the occasion when the doctor told him 'I love you better than ever I did.' There are other tributes of respect for his judgment as well as of affection, which should not be overlooked. Paoli was in London at this period and Boswell lived in his house, and when he went to a levée, it was on the subject of Corsica and Paoli that the king conversed with him, flattering him by showing that his Corsican journey was remembered, so that he 'felt some allowable vanity.'

The central event in the 'Journal in Scotland,' 1781-2, is the death of Lord Auchinleck. Boswell's father grew 'steadily more dour and savage' in his later years—unrelenting to his son and unfeelingly harsh to his daughter-in-law, so that when he died, it was the lack of affection between them that caused most grief. As laird of Auchinleck, it seemed that Boswell might at last settle down happily in his new dignity and put aside his foolish ambition to shine at the English bar. But this was not to be, and after nearly three years of indecision, he determined to settle in London, where he had neither the means to live in the style necessary to support his social rank nor the knowledge of English law to secure him a practice. Moreover, he became increasingly the victim of his

intemperance, incontinency, and love of sensational experiences.

Yet it is certain that the 'Life of Johnson' gains by what his editor calls the 'ubiquity of human interest' and 'wonderful plasticity to human impression' which led Boswell to neglect his obvious duties at home in order to seek wider scope and intercourse. The main interest of the 'Journal' from 1786-1789 centres in the illness and death of Mrs Boswell, the ever-faithful and loving wife, whose mental and bodily sufferings, the former caused, the latter too often neglected by her husband, never finally estranged them. Always 'prepared in my heart to follow you,' her loyalty never failed him until the long decline ended in death on June 4, 1789. Her husband did not arrive in time to be at her side, and for the rest of his life he was full of remorse and contrition for the way he had treated her. On March 17, 1791, a few days after he had completed his MS. of the 'Life,' he wrote in his 'Journal': 'The recollection of my dear valuable wife came painfully across me. . . . The consideration of the happiness I enjoyed with her, the steady support which her good sense afforded me, the recollection of my improper conduct on many occasions, all crowded upon my mind, seem to overwhelm it.'

This was written at the moment when his ambition was at last fulfilled: he had completed his great 'Life of Johnson' and it was all that he had ever hoped to make it. He had published his 'Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides.' But he 'ended his long task in a state of mind approaching despair,' and this time there was to be no return of buoyancy or high spirits. One reason for his despondency was that his publications at once involved him in two serious scrapes, the first with Lord Macdonald, whose parsimony and greed were exposed in the 'Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides' with a frankness which nearly involved the writer in a duel, but now that the story is at last revealed in its entirety, Boswell does not come off so badly as might be thought. It becomes clear that his sole intention was to present 'the essential truth of the character of Samuel Johnson as it was manifested during a remarkable period of his life.' 'Petty scandal and scurrility' are not among Boswell's motives.

The account of the quarrel with Lord Lonsdale and

the record of the humiliations and misery inflicted upon his unhappy victim is written without anger or recrimination, and is the more impressive because of Boswell's restraint and dignity in the face of provocation. '*What are you, Sir?*' Lonsdale storms, and when Boswell replies with quiet courage, 'A gentleman, My Lord,' we feel that he has never more truly proved his claim to the title. But Lonsdale's enmity was the death-blow to his last hope 'of attaining consequence.' Finding he had no chance to achieve his ambitions in other directions: 'I tried to soothe myself with the consideration of my fame as a Writer.' When that consolation was also denied him, he was overcome by a sense of failure from which he never recovered, and from now on, the '*Journal*' is painful reading for very different reasons from those which sometimes made it so in earlier years.

Boswell's verdict on himself is, of course, very different from that of posterity. As the editor of the Malahide Papers rightly emphasises, his moral weaknesses are counterbalanced by numerous acts of benevolence and 'strenuous kindness' to many whom 'the Levites passed by on the other side.' Nor must we forget his care for his motherless children and his consideration for his family and friends. Johnson's judgment may be set against his self-condemnation, and it is well to 'celebrate' with the great moralist 'his good humour and perpetual cheerfulness' as a companion, and his capacity for friendship with both great and small. Moreover, there remains his unparalleled achievement as a biographer. 'We can no longer say that literary fame, consciously and deliberately sought, was his main ambition; nor can we maintain that his days . . . were really a long discipline, deliberately imposed, for writing the "*Life of Johnson*." But granting all this, there is the "*Life of Johnson*," and there is the "*Journal*.'" They more than suffice to overset Boswell's harsh self-criticism.

This is not the place to estimate Boswell's success as a biographer, his dramatic skill in the handling of incident, and his unique power of delineating character through speech and dialogue. These are now universally conceded. But a word must be said about the magnitude of Boswell's literary output, which Professor Pottle's bibliography enables us for the first time to envisage in its true pro-

portions. It will come as a shock of surprise to discover the variety and extent of Boswell's publications if the myth of his one or at most two great books has hitherto been accepted. Boswell had in fact acquired a European reputation as a man of letters before he was thirty; even as late in 1769 his fame was much more international than that of Johnson, and he was 'the celebrated Mr Boswell' long before the appearance of 'The Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides.' His contributions to periodicals were enormously varied in subject-matter and extremely numerous. Professor Pottle prints fifty pages of *references* to such articles, but says that this list is far from complete. The mere bulk of his work proves that he was much less dissipated and much more industrious than has hitherto been believed. It also shows him as possibly more prolific than Johnson himself and finally disposes of the idea that 'The Life' is his single great achievement, however true it may be that it remains his crowning glory. Books, Pamphlets, Broad-sides, Periodical Publications, Works attributed to or projected by Boswell fill some 300 pages of the bibliography, and there is an index to the book which runs to fifteen double-columned pages of small print. No wonder the compiler of such a volume feels that his study gives him the right to pass from the works to the man and to hand on to his readers his conception of the personality they have enabled him to reconstruct. The new biographical information here presented affects our whole conception of Boswell. If he was most assuredly not 'the witless parasite of Macaulay's smashing rhetoric,' as certainly his supposed idolatry of Johnson did not prevent his composition and publication of a ribald poem on the subject of his worship at the very time he was engaged upon the 'Life.' Whatever Boswell may have been, his was not so simple a character as both decriers and admirers have hitherto chosen to depict. Nor are the contradictions in his career likely to be solved unless by those who approach them in the spirit which inspired Johnson's words about Goldsmith: 'Let not his frailties be remembered; he was a very great man.'

EDITH J. MORLEY.

Art. 7.—IN GAOL FOR DEBT

CHARLES DICKENS, in a preface written in September 1847 to the first cheap edition of 'Pickwick Papers' commented on the social improvements that had taken place in England since he, 'a young man of three and twenty,' started writing that work. 'The laws relating to imprisonment for debt,' he wrote, 'are altered and the Fleet Prison is pulled down. . . . Who knows but . . . it may be discovered that there are even magistrates in town and country taught to shake hands every day with Common Sense and Justice.' It was in November 1836 that the young reporter was first approached by Chapman, the publisher, about writing 'Pickwick'; and it was just four years previously that Lord Brougham had appointed a commission of the High Court Judges to inquire into the problem of imprisonment for debt. These unanimously recommended its total abolition. Thirty-two years later the Debtors Act of 1869 was introduced into Parliament. This announced in its preamble that the object of the enactment was to abolish imprisonment for debt. Forty years later, in 1908, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the problem why imprisonment for debt was still flourishing here as a national institution in the first decade of the twentieth century. A mass of evidence was examined. In the result, after an exhaustive investigation, five members of the Committee signed a minority report to the effect that imprisonment for debt should be abolished. Six members issued a majority report agreeing with the general principle of abolition, but preserving it in two specific cases: (1) when the debt was incurred for obtaining the necessaries of life; (2) when the debt represented damages for torts in civil actions. Neither the minority nor the majority report was ever embodied in legislation. So the law remains to-day as it was laid down in the statute of 1869. In 1935, according to 'Judicial Statistics,' 11,000 citizens suffered imprisonment for non-payment of fines; 6000 for failure to pay orders for the maintenance of wives and bastards; 3000 for non-payment of rates; and 3087 for non-payment of judgment debts in the county courts.

What accounts for this discrepancy between the

statutory prohibition of imprisonment for debt and the actual imprisonment of over 23,000 citizens for non-payment in 1935? A complete answer to the question involves a wide survey of a many-sided problem. In a limited sense, the explanation may be found in two lines slipped into section 4 of the Act of 1869 during the progress of the measure through the House of Commons, namely, 'default in payment of sums in respect of the payment of which orders are in this Act authorised to be made.' On the face of them the words seem innocuous, and our legislators may be pardoned for having failed to realise that they contained the seeds of frustration of the main object of the bill. The best criterion for determining the value of any piece of legislation is that furnished by its administration, since it is only when a statute is put into operation that the policy of a legislature can be put to the test of practicability. This is perhaps what Alexander Pope had in mind when, in his 'Essay on Man,' he wrote:

'For forms of government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administered is best.'

During the Great War imprisonment for debt practically ceased owing to the abnormal demand for labour. No moratorium of debt was then granted to the wage-earning classes. The post-war depression, bringing with it the heaviest wave of unemployment in our national history, created an unprecedented degree of impoverishment among the wage-earning millions. This has served to bring the problem of imprisonment for debt once again into prominence. The truest reflection of this distress is found, not in the columns of the daily press, but in our county courts, and in the appeals and complaints addressed by voters to clergymen and ministers and social workers and M.P.'s. Both in 1935 and in 1938, as a result of such complaints, Parliament has had to intervene and bring in patchwork legislation for dealing individually with two or three specific aspects of this problem. In 1935 a departmental committee was appointed to deal with the result of one proviso in the Debtors Act of 1869, which empowers courts of summary jurisdiction to imprison debtors who fail to pay rates, bastardy orders, and wife maintenance orders. The report of the committee was embodied in the Money Payment (Justices Procedure) Act, 1935, which

came into operation on January 1, 1936. Again, in 1938, Parliament was stirred on all sides by the facts disclosed in debate on the hire-purchase scandal. The system of hire purchase or deferred payment now covers an enormous proportion of the total volume of domestic trade. About 90 per cent. of the hire-purchase firms carry on their useful work in a manner to which no exception can be taken. There are, however, black sheep in every flock, and the Wilkinson bill for mitigating the rigours of that method of trading has become law, after being supported by all parties. This subject is closely bound up with imprisonment for debt for the reason that the penalties imposed by the hire-purchase contract are enforceable in the county court, and the power of committing the debtor to prison is the weapon which traders are entitled to employ for the purpose of recovering the sums sued for. No doubt the two statutes were badly needed. Each deals, however, with a sectional or particular aspect of a wider problem. Both acts remind us that England is still at grips with that ogre of social degradation which Dickens described so vividly in the pages of 'Pickwick.'

In most civilised countries imprisonment for debt has been abolished. Its persistence in England is interesting historically. No system of jurisprudence in the civilised world yields a deeper regard for the sanctity of personal liberty than is enforced in our courts of justice. This characteristic of British law is so deeply imbedded in our system that it is reflected even in rules of procedure. Motions of *habeas corpus*, for example, take precedence of all other business both in chambers as well as in open court. Equally deep-rooted in our law is its regard for the rights of property. When both these come into conflict, the position that arises is one of the most interesting problems confronting the modern state. With the distribution of political power resting on the widest possible basis of adult suffrage, it is not surprising that voices are now heard demanding that the matter should be reconsidered in the light of the growth of popular rights and modern ideas. The question is as old as poverty itself. A wide chasm divided the attitude of the ancient state on the subject from that of the modern state. In Greece and Rome the creditor habitually exercised his legal right of taking the debtor and his family into slavery in

satisfaction of his debt. This subordination of personal liberty to rights of property which prevailed in ancient times survived in England much longer than is realised though it dwindled into an attenuated form. The period of transition through which the delinquency of the citizen in the non-payment of his debts has passed can be divided into three stages. In its earliest phase, non-payment of debt was regarded as a crime of such gravity as to deserve the loss of life and liberty. As the centuries rolled on, civilised nations evolved the view that it was a criminal offence of a lesser degree of gravity punishable with imprisonment. The third stage of the transition was reached when enlightened public opinion recognised that personal freedom was a human right that stood on a higher plane than private property. To-day, in most civilised countries, it is treated only as a civil wrong, which entitles the creditor to seize the property of the debtor but not to imprison him. In France, imprisonment for debt was abolished in 1867, in Belgium in 1871, in Ireland in 1872, in Switzerland and Norway in 1874, in Italy in 1877, and in Scotland in 1880.

But in England the struggle between the archaic conceptions of the ancient common law and the legislative needs of modern England is still going on. As far back as the reign of Henry VIII the state had recognised insolvency as a misfortune which deserved relief from the law, but it was limited to traders. Up to 1861, professional men, farmers, and artisans were denied relief from bankruptcy. The subordination of the human right of personal freedom to the higher claims of property still continued. If, for example, you had a writ served on you and failed to enter an appearance to it, you were subject to arrest by mesne process. This was abolished in 1839, though when its abolition was proposed, responsible men in the House of Commons argued solemnly that the foundations of the security of property were being undermined. If, to take another instance, a man not engaged in trade found himself insolvent, his creditors possessed the legal right of seizing his body by the writ of *Ca. Sa.* (*capius ad satisfaciendum*), and he was marched off to Marshalsea or to the Fleet, there to lie till his friends raised money to release him. In 1861, the doors of the bankruptcy court were thrown open to the rest of the com-

munity, except to poor workmen whose debts did not reach the statutory limit of 50*l.* (and these are now similarly provided for by the machinery of administration orders). All through its modern history the problem of imprisonment for debt has been treated as part and parcel of our bankruptcy system. After the general election of 1868, which returned the mercantile community into Parliament in larger numbers than before, they took advantage of their strength to push bankruptcy reform to the front. It was in 1868 that the logical framework of our bankruptcy system as it exists to-day was laid down, amended and improved, of course, by later Acts. The measure was brought in by the Attorney-General of the day, Sir Robert Collier (afterwards Lord Monkswell). In the same session he brought in the Debtors Act of 1869, as an off-shoot, which was to govern one particular phase of insolvency. Experience had disclosed certain forms of grave dishonesty and fraud on the part of bankrupts, and it became necessary to define clearly for the future some criminal offences which they must be prohibited from committing. But to reduce this principle to the precise language of a statute opened up a difficult question, namely, how to deal in the administration of the law with those exceptions which accompany every general principle as inevitably as a shadow accompanies a substance. For instance, there was the debt owing by a recalcitrant trustee who refused to restore trust property, or the default of a solicitor ordered to pay costs for misconduct, or default on the part of a debtor in not paying for the benefit of creditors any portion of salary or income under an order of the bankruptcy court, or default in not paying a penalty or some sum recoverable in a court of summary jurisdiction. Accordingly, these exceptions to cover cases of individual delinquency were set out in precise language and appended as provisos to section 4, which has the heading 'Abolition of imprisonment for debt.' The title of the statute runs 'An Act for the abolition of imprisonment for debt and for the punishment of fraudulent debtors.'

When Sir Robert Collier first introduced the measure, it did not contain the proviso which empowers the county court judges to commit any debtor to prison who fails to pay a debt. Whilst the measure was going through the

House of Commons, this power was set out as an additional exception to section 4, supplemented by a clause in section 5. How came this power, which has defeated the object of the bill, to be added to the original measure? Sir Robert Collier told the House of Commons frankly he did not like the clause, but he had inserted it because a deputation of county court judges had represented to him that recovery of small debts in the county courts would be impossible without the threat of imprisonment. Opposition to the abolition of imprisonment for debt had emanated from two sources—credit traders and those legislators who always see some deadly menace to property in statutory changes. The latter remained undisturbed by the taunt that they had advanced exactly the same argument against the abolition of arrest by mesne process in 1838. It was during the progress of the measure through Parliament that they were reinforced by recruits from the county court bench itself. Lord Cottenham had created our existing system of county courts in 1846. Their main function until the 'seventies was to deal with summonses for the recovery of small debts. The enlarged jurisdiction now enjoyed by the county courts both in contract and in equity, and the enormous burden of work thrown upon them by modern legislation such as the Workmen's Compensation Acts, had not been dreamt of. According to one speaker in the debate in 1868, county court judges did not then sit for more than two days and a fraction of a week. The proposed abolition of imprisonment for debt, it was suggested, had filled their minds with the fear that small debt summonses would come to an end and their occupation be gone. Sir Robert Collier's account to the House of Commons of his interview with a deputation of county court judges was as follows:

'He was not too friendly to this power of imprisonment by county court judges, and he could only say he would rejoice if the House came to the conclusion that this power could be abolished without danger to the working of these (county) courts. He had received a deputation of the county court judges and had put to them whether they could safely answer for the operation of the system if this power was abolished, and they replied they could not.'

An illuminating comment on the opposition of the county court judges was made by a Manchester M.P.,

Mr West, who was strongly opposed to the proposal to give them the power of imprisonment. This is what he said in the debate on Jan. 22, 1869 :

' His position in Manchester obliged him to deal very largely with small debt summonses, and his experience led him to conclude that the sooner they were put an end to the better. In the first place, the cost to the public of maintaining the prisoners and their families was very considerable, but besides that the sacrifices which the law forced the working classes to make in order to avoid committal amounted to a very serious burden. It had often been stated that the county court judges were opposed to abolition of imprisonment for small debts, but the weight to be given to their objection was diminished by the consideration that they seemed to think that society only existed in order to maintain some work for them to do. Now if the small debt summonses were abolished there would hardly be any work for the county court judges to do because, as it was now, they only sat on an average two days and a fraction of a week.'

When the bill reached the House of Lords on July 26, 1869, Lord Romilly spoke as follows :

' He believed the power of imprisonment for debt was very injurious. Credit was given for goods sold in the ordinary way because the vendors believed that the purchaser would be able to pay and not because he thought he would be obliged to have resort to compulsory measures, and the fear of imprisonment benefited no one but the tallyman who was thereby enabled to force his goods and relied exclusively on the compulsory power of imprisonment.

Whatever may be said for or against imprisonment for debt, one fact now is beyond controversy. It is that the reason advanced in Parliament in 1869 for the exercise of this power of imprisonment in the county court judges, namely, that they had little to do except to enforce small debts, has been destroyed by events. No branch of our judiciary has the right to impede a reform demanded by public opinion, for the function of the judges, whether on the upper or the lower bench, is simply to interpret the laws just as it is the function of the legislature to enact them. County court judges have now such enlarged jurisdiction beyond the recovery of small debts that they transact 75 per cent. of the total litigation in the country. And, incidentally, they have to solve a far wider range of

legal problems and under more difficult conditions than their brethren on the upper bench.

There are many lawyers and business men who uphold the principle of imprisonment for debt, though they do not go to the length of claiming that the state has a right to imprison a man for failing to pay money which he has not got. They put their case on another ground, namely, that all men (and also all the married women who carry on business on their own account), against whom committal orders are issued from the county court, are simply cases of fraudulent and dishonest debtors who have the means of paying their debts and refuse. They rely on the words of the Act which declare that the power of imprisonment is exercisable only where the court is satisfied that the debtor has, or had, means of paying the instalment ordered by the court and refused or neglected to do so. There is nothing in the language of the statute which makes it necessary for the creditors to prove any criminal or fraudulent or dishonest intent on the part of the debtor in this neglect or refusal to pay. It is true that there are *obiter dicta* in the decided cases which seem to give colour to a contrary view. For instance, in one case Lord Bramwell expressed the opinion that the power of committal can only be exercised against 'fraudulent' debtors, and judgments may be found in which it is asserted that the imprisonment is inflicted upon a debtor because he has been guilty of something in the nature of contempt of court, i.e. has disregarded the court's order to pay. But neither the clause added to the Debtor's Act in 1869 nor the discussion in Parliament which preceded its enactment supports this purely legalist view. What do the words 'the means of paying' mean? In the case of a man in easy circumstances what the phrase means is clear enough. But what does it mean in the case of the man unemployed or partly employed and on the dole, or the workman with a large family who is loaded with debt? Did Parliament fully realise in 1868 that it was imposing imprisonment on a man who neglected to pay a debt? If it did, did it also realise it was making an important addition to our criminal calendar? Imprisonment is the punishment that organised society inflicts on a citizen for his anti-social behaviour, that is to say, for a crime. It is only when 'the peace, crown and dignity' of our

sovereign Lord the King is affected that an act can be described as criminal, and the procedure in such a case is to vindicate the law by the weapon of retributive justice. A crime is the violation of a right when considered in reference to the evil tendency of such violation to injure the community at large. Prisons are only of value to the community when they impart a stigma to the character of the offender (a stigma which is in itself a punishment) and deter others from doing the same thing. It was to avoid this stigma in the case of a citizen who fell into crime for the first time that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, was passed. If it does not deter, imprisonment fails to function. But an action to recover a civil debt is simply a dispute arising out of a bargain between a trader and his customer. Has the trader any right to call upon the state to recompense him for his error of judgment in giving credit to a debtor unworthy of it? All that the debtor has done is to fail to discharge his contractual obligation to a fellow citizen, who always has the possibility of a bad debt in mind when he fixes the price of the article he sells.

Now, if all human transactions fell clearly within the category of crime on the one hand and a simple debt on the other, difficulties might not arise. But between the two categories is an undefined area of civil obligations which combine the characteristics of both categories. A man who refuses to pay his income tax throws thereby an extra burden on his fellow taxpayers, and so does the ratepayer who will not pay his rates. The husband who refuses to pay for the maintenance of his wife from whom he is separated, or the man who refuses to pay for the maintenance of the child of whom he has been adjudged to be the father, is also guilty of shifting the burden on to the community. In all these instances the default takes the form of a breach of civil obligation, but in its consequence it affects the rest of the community, and organised society will claim that it is entitled to punish the defaulter for his anti-social behaviour.

But the army of debt defaulters against whom committal orders are issued in the county court stand outside those dealt with in magisterial courts. The terms of reference of the departmental committee of 1935 indeed excluded the consideration of judgment debtors in the

county court. These, in the main, are humble wage-earners who find it difficult to make both ends meet at a period of unprecedented unemployment. Outside the United States there is no country in the world where the wage-earning classes have proved themselves so thrifty and provident as those in Great Britain. But there is a residuum of our vast industrial army who lack the fortitude to practise thrift or who are afflicted with extravagant wives, and these at the most trying period of unemployment in our national history have a desperate struggle to make both ends meet. The position to-day is fundamentally different from what it was when the Select Committee of 1908 was appointed. The surface of this old problem varies with every generation. The question to-day is complicated by factors that were unknown a generation ago. The interval has witnessed the growth of the million press and the prodigious rise of advertising therein, simultaneously with the enormous development of the sale of mass produced goods on the basis of deferred payment and hire purchase. A still more powerful factor that has grown up in the last decade is 'the finance corporation' which moves somewhat mysteriously behind the scenes of every hire-purchase transaction. When the Select Committee held its inquiry in 1908 this subtle development of our joint stock system of liability was not in existence. If you turn to the evidence given before the Committee you will see that trading among the poor then was on the footing that the individual creditor, trader, or shopkeeper dealt with the debtor. The local grocer or bootmaker or butcher in a mining village, for example, knew from personal experience the customers upon whom he could rely for the fulfilment of their obligation, though he was not free from occasional mistakes. In most branches of trade and commerce the rule still prevails that credit rests upon reputation and confidence. But this personal nexus between the trader or the producer and his customers has disappeared under the vast trading concerns organised on a national scale dealing in mass produced articles by means of mass advertisements in the million press. Among the masses of the workers to-day newspapers, morning, evening, weekly, and Sunday, sell by the millions in the homes of the poor, and to the variety of articles advertised there

is no limit. Side by side with this method of business there has come into existence also a vast army of door-to-door salesmen pushing the sale of wireless sets and automatic machines and vacuum-cleaners and other articles by the millions on the hire-purchase system. These start on their adventures equipped with contracts elaborately drawn up by lawyers and printed in small type. Such method of 'scientific salesmanship' originated in the United States where canvassers are known in some cases to undergo a course of training in the art of hustling or mesmerising the illiterate or the ill-educated sections of the community into signing documents of this kind. Once the unfortunate workman, who may be on the dole, signs the paper, he is in a helpless position legally. When he comes into court, he realises that the firm with whom he has contracted is not the producer or manufacturer of the article, but a 'finance corporation.' An examination of the contract in open court leads to the discovery that the canvasser who got him to sign the paper was expressly stated therein to be his own agent and not that of the other party to the contract, and that the corporation is not responsible for any misstatement or misrepresentation that may have been made by the canvasser. He discovers also that he has agreed under the contract to give the owners the absolute right to enter his house and take away the article on the default of certain payments, and that he has agreed to pay 50 per cent. of the purchase price of the article after it is taken away by the owner.* All this he learns when the owners obtain judgment against him, after which they issue a judgment summons, asking the county court judge to send him to prison (for from seven to twenty-one days) for not having paid the money 'when he had the means of doing so.' There are nearly sixty county court districts in England and Wales, and a very large proportion of the judgment summonses dealt with therein are cases of this description. To hundreds of thousands of workmen on the dole or in receipt of public assistance, wireless sets or gramophones or books sold in this way are not necessities, but are things beyond their very limited means. The firms who carry on such business would be powerless to recover the

* This is now provided against in the Hire-Purchase Act, 1938.

money but for the threat of imprisonment, for the calculation behind this particular method of trading rests on the 'committal order,' a sort of sword of Damocles hanging over the debtor's head until his friends or relations raise the money to buy off the creditor. No analysis of the statistics of the county court has been made to find what proportion of these cases figure among judgment summonses, but it is not inaccurate to say that they form an immense proportion.

There is, of course, another side to the picture. This is the undeniable fact that a certain proportion of the debtors who are summoned in the county court do not pay any instalments they are ordered to pay until the issue of a committal order. They belong to the type of debtor whom county court bailiffs describe as 'Won't pay till he's compelled to.' To be fair to the debtor, however, consideration must be given to more than one aspect of this matter. First of all, debtors rarely take the trouble to comply with the notice served upon them to attend the court to answer the complaint that they have had the means of paying the debt. They write sometimes to say that they are looking for work, or just got employment and do not wish to lose a day's pay. The only sanction now provided for enforcing the debtor's attendance is a fine. (A fine on a man who has failed to pay even an instalment of 2s. 6d. a month !). It is undoubtedly true that there is the same percentage, no more and no less, of dishonest people among the wage-earning classes as there is among other sections of the community. It is equally true that payment is not forthcoming in some cases except when the committal order looms behind the summons. This may only mean, however, that the debtor takes the line of least resistance. He may have several judgments out against him, and in his struggle to keep going gives preference, naturally, to the one that staves off imprisonment.

No programme of social legislation, whichever political party may be in power, can ignore a disease of the body politic which spreads the sore of social discontent in the homes of the poor. What the present situation demands is an investigation of a many-sided problem, an inquiry not political but partly economic and partly administrative. No one who peruses the evidence heard by the Select Committee of 1908 can resist the conclusion that

the composition of any body that inquires into this matter should be non-political. The aspect of the problem that requires treatment at the hands of the legislature has nothing to do with party politics, but is to some extent administrative, and to a larger extent economic.

It is to the credit of our governments in the last twenty years, whatever party has been in power, that their social legislation has been founded on the maxim that the insidious causes of social discontent should be uprooted gradually without disturbing the foundations of the fabric of government. One of the most interesting phenomena in our political life, since the adoption of universal franchise twenty years ago, has been the growth of a sullen, antagonistic attitude on the part of workers in industrial cities towards the law and the legal profession. Every barrister who has fought a labour candidate at a parliamentary election has found from experience that the great and learned profession to which he belongs is not exactly a passport to the good will of politically minded workmen. Unless care is taken, this attitude of distrust may extend to judicial institutions. No workman's son or daughter who sees the father of the family dragged to gaol for debt thinks any the less of their parent when the latter returns to the family fireside with the prison taint upon him. Nor do his neighbours. On the contrary, they cannot be blamed for coming to the conclusion that the law of imprisonment for debt is now becoming in its actual operation something which appears to their eyes as a rather mean instance of class legislation. In a world of *laissez-faire*, traders are entitled, if it is profitable, to make money by the supply of cheap articles of luxury to the most improvident sections of the population, and to carry on the business by means of canvassers skilled in the art of getting ignorant men and women to sign documents couched in terms they do not understand. Different considerations, however, arise when the money is recovered by subjecting poor men of clean character to the ignominy of the gaol. In this way imprisonment for debt may bring the fair name of British justice into disrepute in the homes of the poor.

THOMAS ARTEMUS JONES.

Art. 8.—THE PLEBISCITE : ITS USE AND ABUSE.

IN these latter days 'plebiscite' has become almost as blessed a word as 'Mesopotamia,' even in the eyes of many with a better claim to prescience than the legendary old lady. To suggest that one should be held is almost the normal procedure among the world's statesmen when confronted with a territorial claim or a recalcitrant minority ; and the fact that the result is usually a foregone conclusion hardly comes into consideration. In these circumstances it is not a little surprising that the literature on the subject should be scanty, for in its modern form the plebiscite has now existed for nearly a century and a half. Yet it is hardly an exaggeration to say that it has received small attention from the historian, though a careful study would throw a great deal of light on the ways of democracy since the French Revolution. All that can be attempted here is a consideration of a few of the more obvious aspects of the problem in the hope that some competent authority may thereby be encouraged to undertake a detailed study based upon all the relevant evidence.

The word itself has a respectable ancestry. The Roman *plebiscitum* was a law enacted by the plebs in the *concilium plebis tributum* on the rogation of a tribune : originally these resolutions needed confirmation by the Senate, but after the constitutional struggle which succeeded the long Samnite Wars the *Lex Hortensia* was passed in 286 B.C., and they became binding upon all citizens without reference to any other body. The terminology of the Roman Republic appealed to those who governed France at the close of the eighteenth century, so the plebiscite was, along with consuls and eagles, rescued from oblivion and launched upon a career of which the end is certainly not yet.

At this point one cannot help remarking certain differences between the plebiscite of antiquity and that of modern times. To the Roman a plebiscite meant one thing and one thing only, but since the revival of the institution it has been employed in two different ways : that is to say, as a verdict on a particular régime, or as an expression of choice by people in a specified area with regard to the State to which they wish to belong. Sometimes the two have been confused, as in the case of the

Italian plebiscites in the days of unification, when the voters were in fact called upon to condemn both the form of government and the State which they had previously known. In the twentieth century there is also a marked difference—not by any means always appreciated as it should be—between the referendum and the plebiscite, which are often regarded as two words for the same thing. Actually, there is a sharp distinction between them: the referendum is a normal method of voting in use in a number of countries, applied on a general system to certain classes of legislation, whereas a plebiscite decides a specific question *ad hoc* and *pro hac vice*. Nor is this all, for a referendum is usually held on some step about to be taken, whereas a plebiscite is generally to ratify a *fait accompli*. It may, perhaps, also be observed that the referendum is essentially democratic in its nature, while the plebiscite has often been employed for anti-democratic ends.

Indeed, the plebiscite commenced its career in eighteenth-century France as a protest against Parliamentaryism, and it was a useful instrument in the hands of those who were responsible for the return to authoritarianism which marked the policy of the Directory and the Consulate. Guido de Ruggiero, in his 'History of European Liberalism,' says of plebiscites that they are 'in fact nothing but a reminiscence of the old social contract converted into a national contract.' For this reason they made a strong appeal to those who were attempting to put some water into the heady wine of Rousseau's doctrine. The plebiscite possessed the double advantage of upholding the theory of the social contract and of weakening the Parliamentarians, for on no democratic ground had they any right to criticise a régime which had received a direct mandate from the people. In all ages dictatorship has owed much of its success to the skill with which it has turned the weapons of democracy against the latter, and as a method of rendering universal suffrage not only innocuous but positively helpful the plebiscite has been found extremely useful by successive dictators.

No one who has had any practical experience of elections will deny that, more often than not, their result depends not so much on the issue on which they are fought as the way in which that issue is put. The late

Earl Balfour, for example, always held that he had been improperly kept out of office in the autumn of 1910, and that if there had been a Conservative Government he could have won the second General Election of that year by stressing the fact that any diminution of the powers of the House of Lords would merely pave the way for Home Rule, for which there was no mandate. The election, it is true, was fought on the question of the Upper House, but this was posed in a different way, and the emphasis was placed on the alleged hostility of the Peers to all progressive legislation. The government of the day enjoys a great advantage in being able to decide both the time and the issue for a General Election. In the case of a plebiscite those who are responsible for its conduct enjoy an even greater advantage, for their opponents must answer with a direct negative (often to a question of the have-you-left-off-beating-your-wife type), since any attempt to side-track the issue is impossible.

The French plebiscites were marked by many features which have remained unaltered. The voter was always confronted with the fact that there was no practical alternative to the régime which he was asked to support: the choice lay between the existing order and chaos. He was not given the opportunity, for example, of saying whether he preferred the Bourbons or the Republic, and the results showed the success of this manoeuvre. In the Year VIII the plebiscite on the Consular Constitution, in which the voting was open, gave 3,011,007 for and 1,526 against; in the Year X there was another plebiscite on the proposal to make Bonaparte First Consul for life, and this showed 3,568,885 for and 8,374 against; and in November 1804 there was yet a third on the establishment of the Empire, when there were 3,572,329 votes for and 2,569 against. On the third occasion it is to be noted that Napoleon showed himself no mean exponent of the art of propaganda by holding the plebiscite immediately after the discovery of the plot of Pichegru and Cadoudal against his life: 'We hoped to give France a King,' observed the Chouan leader in prison, 'but we have given her an Emperor instead.' In all three instances the only possible answer was a definite affirmative or negative. It was not, however, only in France itself that plebiscites took place in these years. Napoleon held one in Holland

in 1801 on the constitution with which he had endowed that country, and there was another in Switzerland. Unfortunately the Swiss refused to provide a majority for the proposals which had been put before them, but faced with this difficulty, which might well have daunted a lesser man, Napoleon merely announced that those who abstained were to be considered as having voted in the affirmative, and so what he recommended had in reality been approved by the Swiss people.

With the fall of the First Empire the plebiscite went out of fashion. It was a contradiction of that conception of legitimate monarchy upon which the settlement of Europe at Vienna was based, and it recalled the two things which the high priests of the new order were, not without reason, most desirous of consigning to oblivion, namely the social contract and Napoleon. The lapse of a generation, however, brought its revenge, and as the Second French Republic began to yield to the Cæsarism of Louis Napoleon, the plebiscite once more came into its own. There was the same reaction against Parliamentaryism that there had been fifty years before, and the nephew, like the uncle, proved an adept at turning the chosen weapon of democracy, universal suffrage, against itself. He was also well aware that the way the question was put was everything, and that the voter must be confronted with no choice but to vote either for the existing order or for chaos. Accordingly the *coup d'état* of Dec. 2, 1851, was followed by a plebiscite on the 20th of the same month when the French electorate was called upon to accept or reject the following proposition—'The people wishes to maintain the authority of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, and delegates to him the powers necessary to frame a Constitution on the bases proclaimed in his proclamation of Dec. 2.' The votes were 7,439,216 for and 640,737 against. In view of the precautions taken to ensure the desired verdict, it is difficult not to share the astonishment of the great historian of the Second Empire, Pierre de la Gorce, at the number of negative votes. Since the Republican leaders were for the most part either in prison or in exile, these votes must be taken as an indication of the strength of the Legitimist and Orleanist opposition.

The procedure of more than one subsequent dictator was anticipated by the Prince-President in consequence of

the plebiscite : for a short space it rained decrees, and the administration of the country was remodelled in accordance with the views of its ruler. When the legislature met, it found itself not only with little to do, but also in a definitely subordinate position to Louis Napoleon, who had himself received so marked a vote of confidence direct from the people. Such being the case, the re-establishment of the Empire was a mere question of time, and, following a resolution of the Senate, a plebiscite was held on this subject in November 1852. Little opportunity was given to the opposition to make its voice heard, though it is to be noted that the 'Moniteur' published the proclamations of the Comte de Chambord and the Republican leaders. The Government, it was soon proved, could well afford to be generous in this way, since the voting showed 7,824,189 for and 253,145 against. It was a more notable triumph than that of the previous year, though there were 2,062,798 abstentions, chiefly in the districts of La Vendée, Maine-et-Loire, and Morbihan, which were Royalist, and of Bouches-du-Rhône, Rhône, and Gironde, where there were many Republicans. Once again, in May 1870, Napoleon III held a plebiscite, when he asked for his subjects' approval of the 'Liberal Empire.' On this occasion there voted 7,358,786 for, 1,571,939 against, while there were 1,894,681 abstentions and 113,978 spoilt papers. Even Gambetta, the inveterate foe of Napoleon, believed that the Empire was stronger than ever, yet in four months it was a thing of the past and some valuable evidence had been provided as to the exact value of a plebiscite.

The influence and example of Napoleon III gave the plebiscite a wide popularity in the sixties of last century in the countries that were dependent upon France, notably in Italy. The Emperor remained wedded to the plebiscitary principle, and when Nice and Savoy were ceded to him as compensation for Victor Emmanuel's annexation of the Central Italian Duchies, he insisted that this cession should be ratified by the people concerned. The result had been carefully prepared, and the votes for France were in Nice 25,000 to 160 and in Savoy 130,000 to 235. As in the French plebiscites, the issue had in fact been decided before the vote was taken, and the participants had actually no alternative save to ratify

a *fait accompli*. The real decision had been taken elsewhere.

The House of Savoy had little cause to complain of plebiscites, even if they lost their ancient home by one, for the plebiscite proved an extremely useful method of compelling Napoleon III to acquiesce in the unification of Italy, which had been carried a great deal further than he intended when he commenced his campaign in Lombardy. The Italian plebiscites conformed closely to the French model in that they were so contrived as effectually to prevent the opposition from expressing an opinion. In the Two Sicilies, for example, the electorate had to vote in the affirmative or negative on this proposition: 'The people wishes for Italy one and indivisible with Victor Emmanuel as Constitutional King, and his legitimate descendants after him.' The voting on the Neapolitan mainland was 1,302,064 for and 10,312 against; in Sicily it was 432,053 for and 667 against. In the Papal dominions the vote was in the Marches 133,072 for and 1,212 against; in Umbria, 99,628 for and 380 against. Perhaps the most apposite comment is that of Professor Trevelyan in 'Garibaldi and the Making of Italy': 'The voting was open, and every one who voted "no" did so in the face of a disapproving world. No doubt, therefore, the real minority was a very much larger proportion of the citizens. But if the plebiscite exaggerated it did not belie the opinion of the people.'

In Tuscany there was hardly even the pretence of impartiality, and Ricasoli literally marched the people to vote:

'The bailiffs at the head of their own administrations, the most influential peasant proprietor at the head of the men of his parish, the most authoritative citizen at the head of the inhabitants of one street, one quarter, etc. . . . will order and lead his voters in a troop, in a file more or less numerous, but always disciplined and marching in good order, to the urns of the Nation. The Italian flag will be at the head. Each one will lay in the urn his paper, and then retire, and at a fixed point the troop will be dissolved with that quiet and dignity which comes from the consciousness of having performed a high duty.'

All this has a curiously modern ring, and so has the announcement that the polling-booths were beflagged,

while municipal officers were present to watch, 'helped by good patriots.' Supporters of the old dynasty could only abstain, as the voting formula gave them no opportunity of stating their will, and those who tried to distribute a manifesto of the Grand Duke Leopold II were severely handled by the police. The result of these precautions was seen when there voted 386,445 for union with Italy and 14,925 for a separate kingdom; there were, however, no less than 127,630 abstentions. In the Central Italian Duchies it was the same.

As after the fall of the First Empire, so after that of the Second the plebiscite in its Napoleonic form was frowned upon for a time. It was the age of democracy and of Parliamentaryism, and the statesmen of Europe had seen enough of the uses to which a plebiscite could be put by the two Napoleons to have recourse to it themselves. There was, indeed, one in Norway, after the separation of that country from Sweden, but that was taken not upon the question of a republic but upon the acceptance of Prince Charles of Denmark as King. Once again there was no real choice, but in this case there can be no question but that the voting was perfectly free.

The close of the Great War witnessed a revival of the plebiscite as it had been applied to the case of Nice and Savoy. The Allied and Associated Powers had, at any rate in the later stages of the conflict, laid great stress upon the principle of self-determination, that is to say the right of races to say to which particular State they wished to belong, and the plebiscite was a convenient method of putting this into effect. It soon appeared, however, that plebiscites of this type were at least as doubtful a means of ascertaining public opinion as those by which the two Napoleons consolidated their position or Italy was unified: in the one instance the secret of success lay in the way the question was put, and in the other in the extent of the area in which the voting was held. To take an example from the British Isles: if a plebiscite was held in the whole of Ireland on Mr de Valera's recent proposals there would be an overwhelming majority for them; if it were held in Northern Ireland alone there would be an appreciable majority against them; and if it were held in Northern Ireland, less the counties of Fer-

managh and Tyrone, there would be a very large majority indeed against them. The technique of selecting just the area to give the verdict required was soon appreciated, and it has now become highly developed.

In consequence of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles several plebiscites were held during the years 1920 and 1921. The northern part of Schleswig opted for Denmark, and the southern part for Germany. This plebiscite was, it may be noted in passing, admirably conducted, and the Danish Government showed a commendable restraint at a moment when a different attitude might well have resulted in a considerable accession of territory, though probably at the cost of serious complications in the future. No such encomium can be passed on the Silesian plebiscite. The poll there resulted in 62·3 per cent. of the votes going to Germany and 37·7 per cent. going to Poland, but all the same Poland was awarded fifty out of the sixty collieries and 400,000 out of 570,000 tons of iron ore. It was travesties of justice such as this that were responsible for so many of the difficulties by which the world is now faced.

One of the most interesting plebiscites of all time was that in the Saar, which was most elaborately conducted. By Article 4 of the Treaty of Versailles the French obtained for fifteen years the exclusive right to exploit the coal mines in the Saar Basin as compensation for the German destruction of the mines in the North of France during the War; at the end of that time the inhabitants were to vote whether they wished to be united to Germany or to join France or to retain the existing order. When the date approached on which the vote had to be taken a Plebiscite Commission was established consisting of the representatives of the smaller Powers not immediately affected, and this body drew up regulations for the compilation of voting lists; for examining the claims of those to be inscribed or the objections to the names already there; for fixing the polling districts; and, finally, for setting up tribunals to inflict punishment upon those who offended against the regulations. To maintain order an international force was drafted into the area, and it consisted of 1,500 British, 1,300 Italians, 250 Dutch, and 250 Swedes. In actual fact these troops were under British command, and the headquarters staff was entirely

British, except for liaison officers attached from the other contingents.

Never was there a fairer plebiscite, and there have been very few that were so fair. The voting took place in a manner reminiscent of that of a British election, the 'tellers' being all German-speaking neutrals. At the close of the poll the boxes were placed in charge of soldiers of the international force, and then, accompanied by neutral tellers and witnesses, were sent by lorry or train to Saarbruck, where they were counted by the tellers under the supervision of the Plebiscite Commission. The ballot boxes were subsequently sent to Geneva, where the papers were taken out of them and destroyed. It was all very different from the methods of Ricasoli, and the crushing majority for union with the Reich certainly did not exaggerate the feelings of the voters. The Saar plebiscite was the exception that proves the rule. It had been provided for fifteen years in advance, the voters had three different solutions between which to choose, and it was organised by those who had no interest whatever in the result. In other words, it was unique. No plebiscite before or since has been held in similar circumstances, and no arguments can, therefore, be based on it.

In view of the rising tide of anti-Parliamentarianism which has set in during the last decade, it is in no way surprising that there has been a recurrence to the plebiscite on the part of the dictators for the same reason, and recourse to it. General Primo de Rivera held a plebiscite, arranged in the traditional manner so that all his opponents could do was to abstain, but it must be admitted that he obtained an impressive number of affirmative votes which testified to his undoubted popularity with the mass of the people. Recent General Elections in Italy have partaken of the nature of plebiscites, but they can hardly be classified as such, partly because they are a normal part of the constitution and partly because there is an alternative should the official list of candidates fail to secure a majority. Herr Hitler, too, has not been slow to grasp the uses of the plebiscite, though the present state of the German Constitution is such that it would require an Aristotle to say what is, and what is not, the usual procedure in that country. What is certain is that the Führer has well assimilated the lesson of Napoleon I

and his nephew, and has shown remarkable skill in turning the weapon of universal suffrage against the champions of democracy.

Herr Hitler's use of the plebiscite has, in fact, been so adroit that his skill would appear to have escaped the notice of his critics. After the annexation of Austria there was a plebiscite of the whole Reich, including the newly incorporated territory, to approve of what had been done, but when it was proposed to apply the principle to the Sudeten German areas no one suggested that the whole of Czecho-Slovakia should vote. The Führer was, too, very wise from his own point of view not to give Dr Schuschnigg time to hold a plebiscite; he knew too much about both plebiscites and Austrians. The story goes that in some remote village in the Tyrol a heavy fall of snow cut the inhabitants off from contact with the outside world for a few days, and the Schuschnigg plebiscite was held; it gave a hundred-per-cent. majority for the Austrian Chancellor; then the snows melted, the news of what had happened reached the village, and in due course the Hitler plebiscite took place; it gave a hundred-per-cent. majority for the Führer.

In one country, Greece, the plebiscite has been more or less regularly employed when a change was in question. When, in the sixties, King Otto was forced from his throne by the so-called Protecting Powers there was a plebiscite to chose his successor, and in 1920 King Constantine refused to return to Athens until another had been held. Four years later the establishment of the Republic was confirmed in the same way, though in spite of every sort of official pressure no less than 325,322 votes were cast for the monarchy, as against 758,742 for the new order. In November 1935 there was a plebiscite on the Restoration, when no less than 97 per cent. of the voters declared in its favour. King George II and his immediate advisers, it may be added, were not enamoured of the idea of a plebiscite, and they were criticised in some Royalist circles for insisting upon one being held. Such criticism was in reality beside the point, for, in different circumstances from those prevailing in October, the King had, earlier in the year, given his consent to a plebiscite, and it was felt that both in Greece and abroad the worst possible impression would be created if it appeared that

he had gone back on his word. Moreover, it was essential that he should not owe his return to military support, as would have been the case had he returned to Athens on the invitation of General Condylis. King Alfonso XII was unhappily restored by the *pronunciamento* of General Martinez Campos rather than by the civilian Cánovas, and the effects of this were felt in Spain throughout the whole of his reign and that of his son; the army was continually interfering in politics, with results that in the end proved disastrous for the monarchy. Above everything else, King George was determined to reign as King of all the Hellenes, and a plebiscite seemed a good method of calling attention to this resolution.

This policy was certainly justified by results. Conscious of the fact that he had behind him a majority to which no politician could aspire, the King was able to take a firm line with General Condylis over the question of the amnesty, and it has strengthened his hands in many ways. The Greek plebiscite of 1935, therefore, can be classed among the few against which no objection can be raised. No other monarchy has been restored by this method, which in normal circumstances is open to a good deal of criticism. Nevertheless, it might have been an asset to the Archduke Otto in his struggle with Herr Hitler for Austria had he at least professed willingness to put his claim to a plebiscite; he was, however, advised against it, for better or for worse, by his principal supporters in Vienna.

This brief survey of the history of the plebiscite, incomplete as it necessarily is, would appear to lead to certain conclusions. The first is that although in theory the plebiscite is essentially democratic, yet in practice the reverse has proved to be the case. If this was so in the days of the two Napoleons, when the art of propaganda was still in its infancy, it is far more true at the present time, when the exploitation of mass psychology has been developed almost to perfection. To group a large number of people in one electoral unit, and then to subject them to an intensive propaganda from the platform, over the wireless, and in the columns of the Press until on the appointed day they are stampeded into voting as they have been told, may be good politics, but it is certainly not democracy; yet that is what happens in a plebiscite under

modern conditions. No opportunity is given for reflection, and if the other side of the question is put at all it is in such a way as to appear unacceptable. In electing a representative to a legislative body the citizen does not abandon his right to reverse the decision, for if that representative proves unsatisfactory he can be removed in a few years' time; in a plebiscite a blank cheque is given to a man or a group of men, and there is no opportunity of going back on the verdict. In effect, it is generally little more than a sop to Cerberus on the part of those who hold democracy in the greatest contempt.

This is probably the reason why the plebiscite has always appealed to the dictator: it gives the people the illusion of power, while the reality is carefully withheld from them. It is, indeed, an interesting commentary upon human nature that those who most loudly proclaim their contempt for democracy are never so happy as when they have a cheering mob at their heels. Their methods of diplomacy, too, are those of the market-place and are calculated with at least one eye on the gallery. Such being the case it is hardly surprising that by dictatorship, which is only democracy standing on its head, the plebiscite should always have been so greatly favoured.

Another consideration which arises from a study of the past is that even if the principle of a plebiscite be admitted as an equitable means of ascertaining public opinion upon a specific issue, the plebiscite itself is open to every kind of manipulation: so much depends upon the way the question is put or the area in which the voting is held that it is putting humanity to too hard a test not to expect advantage to be taken of these opportunities. Nor is this all, for the circumstances of a plebiscite are usually such that the fiercest passions are unloosed and the prestige of powerful individuals and nations is at stake. The plebiscite in the Saar, as has been shown, was an exception in that it had been envisaged years in advance: it was held in relative calm, and there was an international force standing by to keep order. In normal circumstances, as in Italy at the time of unification and in Central Europe immediately after the Great War, a plebiscite is held in a hurry and at a moment when passions are inflamed. Furthermore, the result has generally been allowed for in advance and the interested

parties leave no stone unturned to ensure that the outcome shall be in accordance with their calculations.

What, then, is the lesson to be drawn from the history of the plebiscite? Where the area is compact and the issue one of local interest only, it is an admirable method of gauging public opinion. In England it is widely used to decide such questions as whether cinemas should be open on Sunday, and to solve problems of this sort it serves an extremely useful purpose. The problem to be solved is one that is easily understood, it is possible only to have one of two opinions, and if there are a large number of abstentions it shows, what is extremely valuable, that the district as a whole is indifferent. On the other hand, it would be absurd to elect even a rural district councillor upon so narrow an issue. He might hold the views upon the Sunday opening of cinemas which his constituents shared to the full, but on housing and a water supply he might differ from them fundamentally. Such being the case, no plebiscite would serve a very useful purpose.

It is when one comes to the more important questions and the wider areas that the difficulties occur. It is of no interest either to the Government or to the Opposition at Westminster whether or not the one cinema at Little Puddlecombe is open on Sunday; it does not concern them greatly if the whole county of Blankshire votes for Sunday closing, though one could imagine so firm a stand for Sabbatarianism intriguing the various party organisers; but if one of the provinces of Ruritania, especially if it be rich in minerals or oils, suddenly demands a plebiscite owing to its refusal any longer to be governed from Streslau, then the chancelleries of Europe will at once be agog. Neighbouring Powers, if they have not actually instigated this agitation, at once begin to fish in the troubled waters, while there is sure to be a very vocal minority which has no desire to shake off allegiance to Streslau and which also has powerful friends beyond the borders of Ruritania. Especially is this likely to be the case in these days of conflicting ideologies, when in so many countries men regard foreigners of their own way of thinking as closer to them than fellow-countrymen with whom they are not in agreement. If, after repeated disturbances, a plebiscite is eventually held, it will only

be as the last resort of embarrassed diplomacy : the voters will make their choice after being worked up to a delirium of excitement, and the result will be one that could as easily and far more satisfactorily have been reached by a few statesmen sitting in privacy round a table several months earlier.

In fine, if the League of Nations had ever come to attain that power not only over the bodies but also over the consciences of mankind which was the intention of its founders, and if Article 19 of the Covenant had been applied in the spirit in which it was framed, then the plebiscite might have become an extremely useful instrument of impartial international justice. As it is, it is likely to remain, what it has generally been, namely a pseudo-democratic mask for aggressive and often undemocratic purposes.

CHARLES PETRIE.

Art. 9.—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE NATIONAL GALLERY.

THE five years from January 1934 to December 1938 have been among the most active in the history of the National Gallery in Trafalgar Square. Established by Act of Parliament with the initial purchase of the Angerstein collection in 1824, the English National Gallery is essentially parliamentary in its constitution and development. The great picture-galleries of the Continent are, in the main, old royal collections which have passed under the management of the State. The Director and staff of our National Gallery are civil servants borne on the Treasury establishment. The board of ten Trustees, selected as vacancies arise by the Prime Minister of the day, are amateurs drawn mainly from the two houses of Parliament. The funds for new purchases, which are at the sole and absolute disposal of the Trustees, consist partly of annual grants-in-aid voted by the House of Commons and partly of the interest on investments bequeathed to the Gallery by private benefactors. Of recent years these funds have been liberally supplemented by assistance from the National Art Collections Fund, a voluntary society with over 10,000 subscribing members. Until January 1934 the Director was also a Trustee, but is so no longer, and the expenditure of money on purchases is the responsibility of the Trustees alone. The accounts and expenditure of the Gallery are under the control and inspection of the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, and questions in Parliament regarding the Gallery are put to and answered by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury.

The building is vested in the Office of Works, and the first Commissioner of Works is responsible for the structure, all new building, decoration, lighting, and heating, and the annual cost of these is voted by the House of Commons as part of the votes for the Office of Works. Successful management of the affairs of the Gallery depends, therefore, on the cooperation of the Trustees, the Civil Service staff, and the Office of Works, and ultimately on the wise control and direction of Parliament. In practice, arrangement, hanging, framing, and publications are the personal responsibility of the Director, and

the Trustees look mainly to the Director and his subordinate staff for technical advice on works of art offered to them for purchase or for acceptance whether by way of gift or bequest. The chairman of the board is selected by the Trustees for periods of two years at a time, the present chairman being Lord Balmiel, M.P. The present board consists of three members of each house of Parliament and four others, including the President of the Royal Academy.

The five-year period under review has been notable for great developments in every aspect of the Gallery's life. First, as to the numerous new acquisitions, by purchase, gift, bequest, or on temporary loan. Sixteen new purchases have been made. Of these six are of the English school, namely one each of Gainsborough, Constable, Richard Wilson, J. S. Cotman, David Cox, and Peter de Wint. The Constable of Hadleigh Castle, Essex, is the most important. Four French pictures have been purchased, viz. examples of Ingres, Gericault, Corot, and Degas. Two Dutch pictures of outstanding importance have been bought, the 'Mocking of Christ' by Jerome Bosch, our first and fine example of this fascinating painter, and from the Duke of Buccleugh the splendid portrait of his wife Saskia as Flora by Rembrandt. One Flemish picture has been purchased, 'The Watering Place,' a summer landscape by Rubens, also from the Buccleugh collection. One early Spanish picture, showing both Flemish and Italian influences, by Master Paulin, has been bought, and two very important Italian purchases have been made. The first of these Italian pictures are the seven panels by that rare and delicate fifteenth-century Sienese artist Sassetta. The panels, which are superb in colour and condition, represent scenes from the life of St Francis. An eighth panel of this series is at Chantilly and the central figure of the polyptych from which they come is in Mr Berenson's private collection at Settignano. The other Italian purchase, which has aroused some public controversy, are the four small panels by Giorgione depicting pastoral scenes from an eclogue of Tabaldeo, the court poet of Ferrara during the closing years of the fifteenth century. Their attribution to Giorgione is still the most likely—and certainly those critics who have suggested that they may be by Andrea

Previtali, an imitative and eclectic artist of inferior quality, cannot have made recent inspection of Previtali's many works at Bergamo.

In the last five years our Gallery has become permanently enriched by thirteen gifts and eleven bequests. Of these twenty-four new permanent acquisitions, nine are Italian, six English, three French, three Flemish, two Dutch, and one German. Among these one should draw special attention to the predella panels of our large altarpiece by Pessellino, given by Mr and Mrs Warburg; the vigorous battle of Centaurs and Lapithæ, by the Florentine Piero di Cosimo, bequeathed by the late Mr Charles Shannon; and the works by Raffaelino del Garbo and Filippino Lippi bequeathed by the late Sir Henry Samuelson. Among the other important gifts or bequests are examples of Vandyke, Hogarth, Hoppner, and Patinier. The Sisley landscape was presented by a body of admirers in memory of the late Roger Fry.

Quite outstanding have been the new temporary loans, far exceeding in numbers and quality those lent at any previous period in the Gallery's history. His Majesty the King has lent from the small but select collection of early Italian primitives, formed at Buckingham Palace by Albert the Prince Consort, the very important crucifixion by the first great Sienese master, Duccio, and the exquisite fourteenth-century 'Marriage of the Virgin' by the Florentine Bernardo Daddi. Lady Burton has lent to the Gallery since the winter exhibition of English Art at Burlington House her fine full-length Gainsborough of Captain Wade—master of the ceremonies at fashionable Bath. For nearly two years we were privileged to hang Prince Paul of Serbia's striking El Greco of Laocoon and his sons. Lord Bearsted has lent a lovely small 'Presentation in the Temple' by the Sienese Giovanni de Paolo, and the unique and striking death of the Virgin by Peter Breughel the Elder from Lord Lee's collection. Among five recent loans from Sir William Burrell is a beautiful 'Madonna and Child' by Giovanni Bellini. The decision to assemble at Trafalgar Square a representative collection of modern French paintings was only made possible by the loan from Mr Samuel Courtauld's collection (the Home House Trustees) of no less than twelve pictures, including four Cezannes, two Manets (one the famous 'Bar aux

Folies Bergeres'), and examples of Renoir, Van Gogh, Gauguin, Toulouse-Lautrec. and Seurat.

But in extent and variety even this fine list of loans pales before the Gulbenkian collection of twenty-five paintings still on view at Trafalgar Square. Covering nearly all periods and schools, the pictures are picked examples of the masters represented, and these include the great names of Rembrandt, Rubens, and Vandyke. Particularly welcome are the two exceptional Hubert Roberts of the construction of the Gardens at Versailles. When one thinks of the lavish display of eighteenth-century French paintings at Hertford House it is astonishing that so delightful an artist as Hubert Robert should not be represented there or in the National Gallery. The Guardis already in the National Gallery are fine, but Mr Gulbenkian's are finer. The Gulbenkian pictures fill one gallery and overflow into the modern French room, which owes not a little to Mr Gulbenkian's Renoir of Madame Monet in blue lying on a sofa, the Manet of a boy in a red cap with cherries, and the Claude Monet of the break-up of the ice.

In all, the public galleries at Trafalgar Square in these last five years have added for general public exhibition some seventy-five new works. Considering the standard of quality, this achievement is a remarkable one. But it is not only in new acquisitions, however important, that the last five years have been remarkable. In 1936 the Office of Works redecorated and opened to the public for the first time three new galleries on the ground floor for the display of the smaller Dutch cabinet pictures. These had either not been exhibited or had been crowded unsuitably in the large Dutch galleries upstairs. This development released the north-east corner room on the main floor for the exhibition of the fine collection of eighteenth-century Venetian paintings, with its unique series of works by Canaletto.

Early in 1938 the Office of Works added a new main gallery connecting the Duveen room with Room XXVII. This has not only improved circulation, but has transformed the lighting and appearance of the Duveen room with happy result. A new lecture-room with a magic-lantern has been provided and opened to the public in the basement, a new restorer's studio, and a laboratory with

specially designed X-ray and other scientific equipment has been installed. Five years ago there was no such equipment. A scientific officer, Mr F. Rawlins, has been added to the permanent staff of the Gallery. The library, which is an indispensable part of the working of the Gallery, had been seriously neglected. It was scattered in several rooms in the basement. It has now been brought together, enlarged, and arranged in a systematic manner in a single large room. A new board-room has been built.

But perhaps the most valuable new development carried out by the Office of Works has been the installation throughout the Gallery of artificial light. This has rendered possible evening openings up to 8 p.m. on four nights in the week and has made the whole difference to the public's appreciation of the galleries on dark days. Long and careful experiment was carried out to ensure that the new lighting was the most effective and scientific possible, and thanks are largely due to Mr MacIntyre, the present Chief Engineer of the Office of Works, for the success attained. The cost to the State of the installation of electric light has been approximately 6000*l*. The Office of Works in consultation with the Director have recently carried out the redecoration of the most difficult parts of the building, viz. the entrance hall, main vestibule, Room I, and the large octagonal domed hall with its four transepts. These had long been the least satisfactory features of the old Gallery. Now they are among the most pleasing and successful. The great Venetian room (No. VII), with the masterpieces of Titian, Tintoretto, and Veronese, has long been a special problem from the point of view of providing suitable background and lighting. A new fabric known as Tynecastle has been selected by the Office of Works, and when worked on by the painter can be made to look like rich old brocade without forming a happy home for London dirt! The galleries which were formerly unduly dark passed through a phase of reaction to extreme lightness (e.g. the Bellini Room); now, by varying the tints and adjusting intensity of colour to the scale and lighting of the rooms, a more pleasing and less insistent series of backgrounds has been introduced.

A rehung gallery is almost a new gallery, and in the last five years a great deal of general post has been going on. Success in arrangement can only be achieved by the

method of trial and error, and the time is now at hand when substantial stability is again in sight. As part of this general rehanging a large number of pictures have been reframed. The hunt for old frames of suitable sizes and characters has been carried on all over Europe. For example, the rich carved frame of the great Titian of the Vendranium family, from the Duke of Northumberland's collection, was recently found at Palermo in Sicily. About 100 pictures have been reframed in old frames of the appropriate country and period. Many others have been reframed in new frames specially designed for them. The thanks of the Gallery are specially due to the generous gifts of fine frames for some of our Rembrandts by Sir Malcolm Robertson, and to the Victoria and Albert Museum for the loan of four fine old frames from their department of woodwork. The general policy of re-framing, which has made such strides, leads us to the more controversial question of cleaning. The cleaning, after elaborate X-ray and infra-red photographs had been taken, of such important pictures as the large early Sienese Madonna (formerly attributed to Cimabue), Rembrandt's 'Jewish Merchant,' and Foppa's 'Adoration of the Magi' were entrusted to Mr Ruhemann. The following have recently been cleaned by Mr Holder: Velasquez's full-length portrait of King Philip IV, the large Parnigiano vision of St Jerome, our new Jerome Bosch, and a Dutch river scene by Van der Capelle. In addition, a great deal of ordinary repair work, surface cleaning, reviving varnish, etc., has been undertaken. One of the first duties of the staff is constant vigilance regarding the condition of the pictures. It is the special pride of the English National Gallery that its collection is kept in better condition than that of other great galleries. Frequent humidity tests, dust counts and other scientific experiments have been undertaken, and a careful look-out is kept for minor cracks and blisters. The result may be tersely put in the appreciation of an amateur who attended our centenary celebrations of the opening of the present building last spring, and remarked: 'What I like about the National Gallery is that there are no bad pictures.' This is perhaps boastful—but if it means that there are no pictures on view to the general public in dirty or bad but improvable condition the statement is now correct.

The recent expansion of the publications department of the Gallery has been marked. The personnel of this section has been increased. New publications include three comprehensive volumes (the British, Italian, and Continental other than Italian) of illustrations in gravure. These three volumes contain no less than 1700 new photographic reproductions of pictures in the gallery. A new publication is 'One Hundred Details from the National Gallery.' This is of great interest to students. The first of our volumes of reproductions in colour is just out, and the sale of coloured postcards and colour photographs taken in the gallery by a new American process has rapidly increased. A new popular volume with a large sale is 'One Hundred Masterpieces from the National Gallery.' An illustrated detailed catalogue of the Gulbenkian loan exhibition has also been published. But the Gallery still lacks a complete and up-to-date scientific catalogue of the whole collection. The staff have been at work on such a catalogue for nearly two years, and there can be no doubt that this volume is keenly awaited by students. Its production still entails a great deal of further research. In addition a new popular room-to-room guide for the general visitor will be needed, as soon as stability of arrangement has been reached. Contacts with the ordinary and technical Press have been improved, and art correspondents are given beforehand full details of all new acquisitions and loans. New framed posters in which photographs of important pictures can be displayed have been provided beside the public entrances.

During the last five years the public attendances at the Gallery have mounted steadily, and are now over 100,000 more annually than they were five years ago. The lecture programme has been enlarged and the evening lectures on the days when the Gallery is open till 8 p.m. have proved very popular. Something must be said too about outward loans. Until April 1935 the trustees had no statutory power to lend overseas, but since that date it has become possible, subject to proper safeguards, to lend works of the British school to special exhibitions outside Great Britain and to British Embassies abroad. This new power enabled the National Gallery to participate to the full in the recent magnificent display of British paintings in the Louvre. This has been followed by a small but

useful exchange loan between the National Gallery and the Louvre, whereby gaps in the French representation at Trafalgar Square can be filled from time to time from the Louvre in exchange for English pictures lent to Paris. National Gallery pictures have also been lent to furnish the reception rooms in the British Embassy at Paris. These are perhaps the first serious attempts to make British painting better known and more worthily exemplified on the Continent of Europe.

Finally I come to possible future developments. As regards the building, the two great desiderata are a new room joining the west end of the Duveen room with the north end of the large English room. This room is particularly needed for the separate display of British painting before Hogarth. The ceiling of the large Dutch gallery is most unfortunate and as long as it exists it will be impossible to get this difficult gallery well lit or the pictures in it properly seen by the public.

As regards desirable acquisitions, there are still a few artists of European reputation who are not represented at all in the collection—a notable example is the German Altdorfer, who ranks third after Holbein and Durer among the artists of that country. Among the Italian gaps are Magnasco and Bellotto. Certain great artists are still quite inadequately represented—particularly the Spaniards. We want more El Grecos, Goyas, and Zurbarans. A fine full-length Goya is a special need. In the British school there is no presentable example of Allan Ramsay. But gap-filling is rightly regarded as only a secondary consideration for the Trustees and Director. It must remain the duty of the National Gallery to acquire whenever opportunity offers and funds allow any notable work by the great masters of all countries and of all periods. Great Britain is still richer than any other country in the continued possession of historic private collections, especially in its country houses. The burden of taxation is forcing owners of these collections, many of them formed generations ago, to part with their treasures. Public acquisition is probably the only means of preventing their export to other countries, and particularly to the United States of America. Exemption from death duties of works of art which in the opinion of the Inland Revenue authorities are of national importance has been an immense help, all the

more so as the Finance Acts now provide that these duties are not payable if the work of art in question is sold to a national public gallery or museum or to the National Art Collections Fund. These two wise concessions have been the means of stemming the tide of export of irreplaceable works of art, which had reached undue proportions until quite recently.

These five active years coincide with the directorship of Sir Kenneth Clark, who came to us at the beginning of 1934 from the curatorship of the Oxford University galleries at the Ashmolean. By far the youngest Director of the National Gallery who has held this responsible post, he brought to the duties an infectious enthusiasm, wide and deep love of works of art, and a capacity for cooperation with the various Government departments and with the Trustees that is essential to the successful progress and development of the Gallery. The nation is deeply indebted to him personally for the part he has played during the last five years. It is notorious that on occasions in the past there have been difficulties in working harmoniously under our present constitution and the governing Treasury Minute called by the name of Lord Rosebery, who issued it when Prime Minister. Such difficulties have not been experienced in these recent years, and that this is so is due in no small degree to the courage, initiative, and tact of the present Director.

HARLECH.

Art.10.—CZECHOSLOVAKIAN ADVENTURE.

THE 29th September, 1938, probably left me as much relieved as anyone else in England. I put the thought of war out of my mind and prepared to settle down to writing a book I had been planning for some time. As I was breakfasting on the next morning, however, a friend rang me up on the telephone and asked if I would go to Czechoslovakia with him at once. The Foreign Office was sending out a group of 'Observers' to 'observe' the execution of the Munich Agreement and wanted volunteers. 'You know the Central European mind, and it will be good for you to get out of the study for a bit,' he shouted down the telephone, evidently while breakfasting and packing at the same time. Two hours afterwards I found myself invested with the status of 'Observer,' and feeling slightly dazed and annoyed at the prospect of the upheaval. Two days later I found myself in Prague, having flown there in four hours.

There were some thirty of us, mostly ex-officers of the Army and Navy, with a sprinkling of senior police officers. We assembled at the British Legation as soon as we arrived and in the so-called ball-room, overlooking the city on the one side and an enchanting walled-garden on the other, received our instructions. Our job, briefly, was to 'observe' the execution of the Munich Agreement and to do everything possible to ensure that it was carried out. We were to split up into pairs and spread out along the territory to be ceded to Germany, each pair undertaking a sector of anything up to eighty miles in length. The most important part of our task was to prevent the German and Czech troops from fighting.

There was a short pause following the reception of these rather impressive instructions, at the end of which one Observer asked what was the best method of carrying them out. Every Observer, came the frank reply, would have to evolve his own methods. He had his passport. The Czech authorities had issued military passes to all Observers and attached a Czech officer to each pair. The Germans had given a few Observers diplomatic visas. Lastly, the Legation had prepared an armband for each Observer consisting of two toy Union Jacks sewn together. (Eventually a number of our Observers received

German military passes as well but I was not one of those.) It was not much authority with which to induce a couple of million troops, that a few days afterwards were to be on the verge of fighting, to remain at peace. Looking back on it, however, I am inclined to think that the meagreness of our authority had its advantages. For we were compelled to use our own initiative and invent our own means of augmenting our status. So it is possible that ultimately we succeeded in exercising more influence than would have been if we had got an exact programme and a definite status.

As soon as we had received our instructions we began to pair off. My friend had gone off to one of the frontier districts before the rest of us, so I had to find another companion. I was lucky enough to pick on a senior ex-officer of the C.I.D., with whom I got on splendidly from the start. Then we returned to our hotel to meet the Czech officers who were to be attached to us. We gathered in the lounge *en masse* and began to sort ourselves out. After looking one another over closely yet unobtrusively, rather in the manner of choosing partners for a cotillon, my companion and I picked out an obviously good-natured, unsophisticated-looking, rather bucolic Czech colonel. Good-nature promised to be a valuable asset in view of the feeling in Czechoslovakia towards Great Britain just then. We christened him Stanislaus. In a surprisingly short time all the Observers and Czechs had sorted themselves into trios and were sitting together at tables, poring over maps.

At the beginning, Stanislaus held himself aloof, coldly and rigidly. Speaking rather poorer German than ourselves, he talked stiffly of his country's humiliation, and as he spoke his stiffness turned to angry bitterness. This grew and became uncomfortably intense, until it reached a point at which it was painful to us. He clapped his hand to his pocket and stumbling in his speech through using an unfamiliar language, declared in a wild whisper that he would shoot as many Germans as he could and then himself before he allowed a yard of his country to be handed over to them. With that his anger was spent and he became apologetically silent. Soon afterwards our car appeared. Our Czech soldier-chauffeur tied a small Union Jack to the radiator cap and we drove off. It was

raining. I felt depressed and had been so from the moment I arrived in Prague, even though I had encountered nothing there but courtesy. The coolness of the official who examined my passport at the aerodrome, the hint of scorn in the eyes of a woman who overheard me talking English, the stiffness of the post-office clerk who accepted my telegram home ; all contributed to that impression. Finally there was the outburst of Stanislaus. If his feelings were typical of the Czech army, there was trouble before us.

Our first destination was Budweiss, a town of fifty or sixty thousand inhabitants near the Southern frontier of Bohemia. We had arranged to meet several other Observers there to settle the boundaries between our areas and then to disperse amongst them on the following day. As we approached the town in the dusk, the atmosphere seemed warlike. Outside Budweiss we were stopped at several successive barricades piled across the road as obstacles to tanks and armoured cars. The troops manning the barricades stared curiously and sullenly at us and our Union Jack as we crawled through the narrow openings and passed them. The great open space in the centre of the town, as large as Trafalgar Square, was packed with a vast crowd, wandering about in uneasy, restless silence. Troops were everywhere. The doors of the hotel in the square that we were making for were surrounded by refugees who were obviously very poor. Here and there in that crowd a woman wept or a man ranted. We seemed to be in a besieged town in which the population of the surrounding countryside had sought refuge.

We found my friend and his companion, who had taken up their headquarters in Budweiss, in the restaurant hurrying through a scrappy meal. They had only arrived one day ahead of us, but already seemed buried in the troubles of the town and the surrounding districts. They outlined what was happening. The Czech troops had retreated from the frontier in order to avoid the danger of a clash with the German army and occupied a line a few miles south of the town. Beyond that line, between the Czech troops and the frontier, there was chaos. It was a no-man's-land in which the Czech civil authorities and Sudeten Germans struggled for control.

In some towns and villages the Czechs managed to maintain control. In others the Sudeten Germans, reinforced by armed units of Free-corps organised in Germany, had driven out the Czechs. In other places guerilla warfare was going on and there was no authority whatever. Many had been killed and wounded. Should the Czech troops return and restore order? Should the German troops be asked to advance for the same purpose? Such problems, accompanied by reports, rumours, protests, complaints, lamentations of every kind, were brought by all sorts of people. But the most agonised question was: Where would the new frontier be fixed? Was Budweiss to be handed over to the Germans or to remain Czech? We soon realised the intensity of the local feeling on these points. As we sat gloomily listening to the account of the confusion all about us, a small middle-aged man hurried to us, bowed quickly, and, as though afraid of being turned away, sat at our table. Before we could say anything, he began to talk in hurried, nervous undertones. Budweiss, he gabbled, could not be handed over to Germany. It was a Czech town, a purely Czech town. It was absolutely essential to make this quite clear to Berlin. Suddenly he raised his voice with startling abruptness. 'We are human beings!' he shouted, striking his chest with his clenched hand. 'We are not cattle or furniture, to be handed over to others.' We tried to explain to the unhappy man that we had no power to make decisions, that we were there merely to observe the fulfilment of the Munich Agreement. He did not listen to us.

Early on the next morning we fled to our area, that was east of Budweiss, leaving my unfortunate friend and his companion to struggle with their difficulties as best they might. Before we could do anything else, we felt, we had to get somewhere where it was quiet enough to think and make plans. We decided to spend the coming night at somewhere reasonably near the centre of our area, and as we drove off, discussed the task before us. Our area was far larger than that surrounding Budweiss. One thing, therefore, was clear. We had to avoid getting swamped in the troubles, miseries, and tragedies of individuals, even of individual communities, otherwise we should be merely drowned in them, without being of

any use. What then was the most important part of our task? Whatever the letter of our instructions, the spirit seemed to us plain. It was determined by the events in Munich during the previous week. In order to save the peace the Czechs had been prevailed upon to give up the Sudeten areas without fighting. By far the most important part of our task, therefore, was to keep the Czechs from taking any desperate step which might endanger peace. The tragedy of their position was now beside the point. If we could alleviate any suffering without losing sight of the main object, we should, of course, do so. But that was a secondary consideration.

It was not perhaps as pleasant and easy to arrive at this conclusion as it may sound. Our sympathies were with the Czechs. It was impossible to spend even an hour in Budweiss and remain indifferent to their feelings. The crushing superiority of the German position, and the ruthlessness with which it was used made one wish to do anything rather than urge the Czechs to submit, and this feeling was heightened by the attitude of our Stanislaus, with whom we were rapidly making friends. After his first outburst in Prague, of which he now was clearly ashamed, he made a point of being as cheerful and pleasant to us as possible. He behaved as a host who refuses to spoil the pleasure of his guests by letting them see more of his troubles than need be. There was a generosity in his attitude it is difficult to describe.

Having settled on our task in principle, the next question was how to put it into practice. The outburst and subsequent attitude of Stanislaus pointed to the answer. We would visit as many Czech commanders as possible, encourage them to speak their minds, and try to draw off their bitterness and anger in words. For even if words are not a substitute for actions, the strength of the underlying emotion is inevitably relieved. We could not, of course, tell Stanislaus our conclusions. On the contrary, if we were to do any good at all in our interviews with the Czechs, we should have to give him and them as strongly as possible the impression that we were primarily there to help them. We evolved a formula which conveyed this impression, but actually meant very little.

After driving for about a couple of hours we approached Trebon. We passed under an ancient gate-tower and

turned into the market-square. Instantly the present, with all its troubles, vanished. Our car was the only object about us that was less than three hundred years old. Tall gabled houses, faintly coloured blue or pink or green, surrounded the deserted square. A baroque fountain, its three jets sparkling in the sunlight, occupied the centre. Its splashing was the only sound we heard. The three of us looked at our maps. Trebon was not far from the centre of our area. We walked to the most imposing hotel in the square, the Golden Star. The landlord, standing on the doorstep, told us with a bow that there was plenty of room. 'All is quiet here,' he said with enormous calm, 'this is a pure Czech district, without a German for miles around; there is no question of frontier revision here.' It was difficult to believe that Budweiss was only two hours motor-drive away.

Having staked out our claim on this peaceful island, we started out into the troubled world once more. We intended systematically to visit every Czech commander in our area. The first we came to commanded a regiment. A wiry little man with piercing black eyes, he received us standing stiffly beside a table in his office. Several junior officers, standing at attention near him, gave us a curious and not friendly stare. A photograph of Dr Benesh, a black riband drawn across its corner, was the only ornament in the room. Stanislaus interpreted our formula by way of introduction and then retired into the background. The Regimental Commander remained silent. After a pause that threatened to become unpleasant, I repeated our formula, speaking in German. The Regimental Commander raised his eyebrows and, looking past me at the wall, began to speak slowly and emphatically in appalling German. The time was past, he said, when we could give him any help. He and his country were now beyond outside help. They would have to help themselves. '*That* is our only help!' he suddenly barked, pointing to a map on his table on which were marked the dispositions of his troops holding a fortified frontier district. 'Every dot you see there is a block-house. And if we are asked to evacuate these, we won't. Even if we, the officers, wished to evacuate them, our men would not obey. We have drummed it into their heads for months that they must die in these

defences. And they will die in them.' With that he closed his mouth, terminating the interview. Our scheme of drawing off emotion in words seemed sadly inadequate in the face of that cold and bitter intensity of feeling.

I was about to signal to Stanislaus, who was deeply embarrassed, to get us out of the room, when I noticed that the Commander wore the badges of an old Legionary. This meant that he had fought on the side of the Allies during the War, and as likely as not in Russia. I asked him in Russian if he spoke that language. I might have uttered a magic formula. His eyes met mine. His face relaxed. "You speak Russian!" he exclaimed, smiling. 'Then you must have some understanding of the Slav nature! You must have some heart! You must have some understanding of our position!' He went on to describe that position. His reserve went like a dyke before a flood. He walked about the room, gesticulating, talking so loudly and rapidly as to be almost hysterical. It is impossible to describe that flood. For an hour he seemed to rave. Why, why, why, he called repeatedly, why had his people been encouraged to oppose Germany, why had they been dissuaded from making terms with Germany, when France and Britain did not intend to stand by them? His men would never leave their block-houses, he declared. They would fight, no matter what happened afterwards.

I made no attempt to argue with or soothe him, but listened silently and showed as much sympathy as I could. At the end of an hour I was exhausted. I felt as though I had absorbed all the bitterness, frustration, and anger that he poured out. At last he ended in a despondent silence. He too seemed exhausted. I could think of nothing to say. To condole with him would have been banal.

'The discipline of the Czech army is surely too good for the men to refuse to withdraw,' I remarked at random. He gave me a dazed look, then smiled as though he suddenly saw an escape from his miserable situation. 'Yes,' he replied proudly, 'you are right. The men will do what we tell them, and we shall discharge our duty in full order. Few armies could be subjected to such a moral strain and remain unbroken.' His whole manner altered. He began to bustle about his office, and was

briskly cheerful. I had stumbled on perhaps the only means of really helping him. He began evidently to recover his self-respect and a purpose in life once more. He saw the task before him in a new light ; as a feat of endurance, an honourable achievement. We left him a little later, entering into his new rôle, preparing to fulfil his fresh purpose with zest.

We evolved a technique from these first few contacts with the Czechs which never failed so long as the same conditions lasted. During the next few days we interviewed too many commanders for me to remember them individually, and each time left them relieved and friendly. I always began in Russian ; and even when the Czech knew no Russian, he preferred to snatch at a word here and there that was similar to his own language and to guess at the rest, rather than to exchange thoughts more easily in German. I gave him then an opportunity to unload his bitterness, and finally led him to some new view of the miserable task of retiring which lay before him. Some took my opening at once, at the merest hint. Others were more tired or indifferent, and needed a more explicit invitation. Ultimately all reacted in a similar way. Such uniformity may seem strange. Yet is it so ? The deepest feelings of mankind cannot differ essentially in individuals.

A few days later the withdrawal of the Czech troops from the frontier fortifications in our area began. We did not hear of a single case of refusal or of any other form of indiscipline. The conduct of the Czechs was, indeed, strikingly good. The relationship between officers and men was of a kind I had seen in no other army. It was superficially formal, yet essentially close. On our drives in our area Stanislaus would occasionally beckon to some soldier to direct us. The man would dash up and stand to attention. Then, if the conversation went on, the man would relax and talk apparently on equal terms. It was not the easy relationship between a squire and his plough-boy, but rather as between two civilians, one of whom was better dressed than the other, conversing in the street. Passing through garrison towns, we often saw groups of men surrounding an officer, listening to him. Every regimental officer, Stanislaus told us, kept his men informed of the main events affecting their country from

day to day. These talks sometimes went on for hours and were informal and personal. 'If we get through these times without a social upheaval,' Stanislaus declared, 'it will be largely due to the close personal relationship between officers and men.'

Frequently in our drives we passed columns of troops withdrawing. The officers often looked preoccupied and worried. The men were stolid and silent. There was no talk, no laughter, no singing. It was strange to see those melancholy processions decorated with flowers. Huge red and orange chrysanthemum blooms dangled, fading, from soldiers' caps, horses' manes, gun-limbers, and waggons. Were the flowers due to a peasant's primitive love of bright colours? To me they accentuated the melancholy of those columns, like flowers in a funeral procession.

As soon as the evacuation of the frontier fortifications began, the attitude of the Czechs towards us altered. I had taken our usual steps to draw off the bitterness and anger at the beginning of an interview, but got no results. The feelings I had grown used to expect did not exist in the individual. Instead, he began to talk apprehensively of his fears. Now that the defences were abandoned and the country was helpless, would the Germans stop on the new frontiers? He doubted it. They would march on to Prague, swallow the whole country. There was nothing to stop them now. He spoke of his fears urgently but quietly, without a sign of the overwrought and gesticulating rant I had grown used to during the earlier days, as though he informed me of the danger and relied upon me to see that it did not materialise.

This was my impression of the new attitude of the Czechs towards us. In their helplessness they turned to us to protect them. To me it was more painful than any ranting could be. Their reliance on our help, which we were powerless to give, excited our pity. I began to feel, and not merely to understand, the tragedy of those people. War had been averted largely at their expense. In London this had seemed an insignificant price to pay for escape from another world conflagration. Now I realised the tragedy which every sacrifice must be, however great the cause.

To heighten the general fear and apprehension, no one

yet knew where the revised frontiers were to be. That was still being discussed in Berlin. The soldiers were apprehensive. The populations of the villages and towns in the frontier districts were almost frantic through the uncertainty. There was no large and undoubtedly German district in our area which, as in other areas, was organised in opposition to the Czechs and clearly destined to be transferred to Germany. The population in our area was mixed. One village might be inhabited by Germans, the neighbouring one by Czechs. They had lived peacefully next to one another, each talking the other's language, intermarrying, hardly conscious of the national differences between them. Now they hated and feared one another. We toured that mixed district. The first German village we came to was suspected by the Czech army of raiding their posts by night. Its whitewashed, solidly built stone cottages, clustered about a large pond, might have been swept by the plague. Not even a child was to be seen. At last, after wandering about and peering in at windows, I saw an old woman in a cottage and persuaded her to come to the door. She turned out to be the burgomaster's wife. After much talk, she agreed to produce her husband, who seemed to be in hiding, and after a long delay appeared with a pale, unshaven, quavering old man following her. He asked me shakily what I wanted, his eyes looking about him apprehensively. As soon as he understood that I was enquiring about armed raids in connection with his village, he almost fell at my feet. 'God forbid, God forbid!' he babbled. 'Do we look as though we could raid anyone? We are too terrified even to come out of our houses!' And he went on to describe the terror of the villagers. There had been raids, searchings, arrests by Czech gendarmes. 'If we are not taken over by the Germans soon, it is all over with us,' he ended. 'The Czechs are a gang of murderers.'

We went to the neighbouring village, a mile away, which was Czech. It was indistinguishable from the last one, save that its school and inn had Czech name-boards over their doors and the burgomaster and villagers were not in hiding. The burgomaster also was an old man and, though less frightened than his neighbour, was more apprehensive. I asked him about the raids. 'The young men of that murderous village next door all possess hidden

arms,' he declared, 'and of course they go out raiding at night.' He ended by saying, in almost the same words as his neighbour, that if his village *were* taken over by the Germans, it would be all up with them. It might have been ludicrous. I wondered if there were anything these two neighbours, who must have known each other personally, perhaps intimately for years, were not ready to believe of each other now. It was too miserable a business really to be ludicrous and hardly believable that such a change in the relationship between two old peasants could be brought about by a few months of propaganda.

On the afternoon of Oct. 7 we happened to call on the garrison commander at Neuhaus. As usual, we soon came to the subject of the future frontier and for the twentieth time pored over the map and listened to conjectures. Would the line run here or there? Immediately to the north-west of Neuhaus lay a group of three or four German villages. The Commandant eyed the map uneasily, much as a Sapper watches an unexploded bomb. Surely the Germans would not claim these few villages, he argued. If they did, it would mean losing all the purely Czech territory between them and the present frontier. It was impossible, he decided. Even the Germans had some sense of justice. Nevertheless. . . . So the argument, both sides being represented in the one individual, droned on, optimism alternating with pessimism, hope with apprehension. We had heard it twenty times before.

Suddenly there was a commotion outside the room. The door was flung open, followed by the entrance of the Corps Commander and his Chief of Staff. The General, a slight, gentle, grey-haired man capable of a strangely ingenuous, almost childish smile, and the Chief of Staff, tall, sombre, cadaverous, with thoughtful, hooded eyes generally half-closed. We had christened the latter Conrad Veidt. They were silent and composed, but had they been wailing and wringing their hands they could not have expressed despair more painfully or clearly. The General's face lit up with his astonishing smile when he saw us; then it was drawn with deep lines. Conrad Veidt silently opened a large map and spread it on the table. On it appeared a thick blue line I had not seen before. It was the new frontier. For a while we stared at it in silence. The General passed a finger along the

blue line and remained silent. I saw that his eyes were full of tears and he could not speak. Conrad Veidt then broke the silence. In a rasping voice he began to describe the effects of the frontier revision on his country. Main roads, main railway-lines would be cut; towns separated from their countrysides; country districts sundered from their towns; whole villages, even whole towns of the Czechs, included in the ceded territory. I noticed then that our burgomaster and his village of the day before were with us. 'No!' he proclaimed in a rising voice. 'We never bargained for this! We have been doubly betrayed—induced to accept certain terms, and then, once we have abandoned our fortifications, on the basis of those terms, these have been enormously raised. Had we known what we would have to give up, we should have fought, with allies or without them. We are ruined!'

Suddenly he became silent, pulled himself together and, taking me by the arm, drew me nearer to the map. 'What can we do now?' he asked. 'We are defenceless. Economically our position is hopeless. We have only one course open. We must go with Germany.' As he said this he glanced at me apologetically, as though he had said something mean. That glance of apology was perhaps the most uncomfortable of my many uncomfortable recollections of Czechoslovakia. This man found it in himself, even then, to be ashamed because his country had to turn from its former allies. 'Do you know what the worst of all this is?' he went on thoughtfully, as though trying to account to himself for the conclusion he had reached. 'It is that we no longer have any clear distinction between Right and Wrong. We have lost our faith in the rightness of Right. We can only believe in Force, and make our terms with it. And are we mistaken? Let us be realists. What plays the ultimate rôle, what is the supreme value in the world to-day but sheer, brutal, naked force?' I protested that we British, at any rate, recognised other and higher values. 'Yes,' he agreed, but it seemed rather acidly, 'that may be. You can afford that luxury. We cannot.'

Then followed our busiest days in Czechoslovakia. On the 8th, 9th and 10th October German troops moved into the ceded territories in our area. As soon as they began to advance in it complaints poured in to us. Here

the Sudeten Germans beat up a Czech family in a newly occupied village. There the retiring Czech police were overtaken by the advancing Germans and taken prisoners. But the most frequent complaints were of German troops overstepping the new frontier. They occupied villages, hills, road junctions any distance up to three or four miles beyond the frontier. In every instance the Czech commander who reported it saw the beginning of the dreaded German advance on Prague. Some had fallen to cynical indifference over it. Others talked of fighting. We rushed about soothing where we could, investigating, talking and listening—listening, listening to endless outpourings of anger, bitterness, and disillusionment.

In some cases the Germans had overstepped the frontier by mistake and withdrawn soon afterwards. In others they advanced too far deliberately for tactical reasons, for convenience, to shorten lines of communication and refused to move. Our first impulse was to interview the German commander responsible and point out his violation of the frontier. Fortunately, however, we heard of the experience of one Observer in another area who had tried to do this. Like ourselves, he possessed neither diplomatic visa nor military pass from the Germans. The German commander had merely asked him to go away. We were determined to avoid such an experience. Any prestige and influence we had acquired in the eyes of the Czechs would not have survived any such failure. For the same reason we had to do something to induce the Germans to withdraw. After discussion we decided to exploit the human weakness of respect for the unknown and the mysterious. An opportunity to try our plan presented itself the next day. The Civil Governor of a large town (since transferred to Germany and so not named as it may be kinder not to identify him), reported that the Germans had overstepped the frontier, which ran just outside his town, and were in fact in its outskirts. We drove there at once, saw the Governor and persuaded him to interview the German General and to explain that we desired to know 'by what authority' the latter had overstepped the frontier. No more. We purposely left it to the Governor to describe our status, which we did not include in our message to the German. The results were excellent. The Governor returned with the

news that the General, who had previously refused point-blank to move, was now so uncertain of himself that he had gone off to consult his superiors. We did not ask the Governor how he had described us. He cannot, however, have belittled our authority, for he was himself calling us the British Commission by the time he returned. That evening he telephoned to us that the Germans had withdrawn to the proper line.

We repeated the experiment in several other cases, with equally good results. We always left our status vague and never asked anything more definite than by what authority the Germans were acting. There were instances, however, where our plan did not succeed. Possibly the Czech who carried our message had too little imagination for the task. Possibly it was the German who had too little, or was too brazen to be intimidated by foreign potentates of unknown magnitude. So we were faced with the problem again. An idea then suggested itself to me which might not only overcome our difficulty but yield information that—to me at any rate—was highly interesting. I am convinced on psychological and moral grounds that normally the first condition of generosity, or altruism (rational as opposed to impulsive generosity or altruism) is the full satisfaction of the claims of Self. The Germans as a State had recently achieved the satisfaction of a whole series of claims evoked by their previously dissatisfied Self. Had they got to the point of final satisfaction and consequently of generosity? I proposed, in short, to accompany the next Czech officer who went to negotiate with the Germans about the violation of the frontier and to appeal to their generosity. They had gained so much at so little cost. Could they not be generous in the hour of victory to the helpless Czechs, at least to the point of taking no more than was due to them?

On the following morning, therefore, we set off with a senior staff officer who had arranged for an interview with a German officer of corresponding rank. After an hour's drive we left the car and walked. Half a mile away, at the summit of a hill and silhouetted against a background of blue sky and autumnal birchwoods, stood four men. We distinguished them as two Czech soldiers facing, a few yards away, two German soldiers. The four had young, pink faces. As we came to them, the Czechs saluted.

The Germans ignored us. Some hundreds of yards behind them German officers were marching up the hill towards us. We met them half-way between the four soldiers, and having saluted one another, the Czech colonel introduced us to the Germans. I forget what title he gave us. The two colonels began to discuss the violations. Each of them was nervous and alert, while avoiding the other's eyes. The German, an incredibly stiff little man with a short sandy moustache, admitted various violations, but made no offer to withdraw. The Czech, more suave, gently pressed for a decision. The German remained obdurate and evasive. Eventually there was silence.

It was clearly the time for us to do something. I began by pouring oil on the impasse, by complimenting both sides on their reasonable and co-operative attitude. It was essential to establish some kind of human relationship between them. The German gave me a hurried glance to see whether I was sarcastic and, being reassured by my aspect, threw out his chest. 'Soldiers can always understand one another,' declared the Czech. Another silence followed. The two were then about to salute one another to end the interview, when I appealed to the German for generosity. It was my last chance. I spoke of the Reich having gained so much at so little cost, of the value of generosity in the hour of victory, and of the helpless Czechs. The German looked at me in surprise, then remained contemptuously detached. The Czech seemed uncomfortable. When I ended, another silence followed. This time it ended the interview. 'Generosity from the Germans!' remarked the Czech as we drove off, and laughed shortly.

Our adventures in Czechoslovakia ended with that interview. On returning to headquarters, we found a message waiting for us to return to Prague and thence home. The Foreign Office had decided to withdraw all its Observers. As I said good-bye to Stanislaus and our other Czech friends, I felt like a deserter. Yet I was glad to leave their unhappy country and the sight of so much bitterness, humiliation, and suffering which I could do nothing to alleviate.

R. G. COULSON.

Art. 11.—COUNSEL'S FEES.

It is often said, even by critics, that, apart from a few spectacular instances, counsel as a whole are not overpaid. In one sense this may be accepted. For many years a junior barrister has to be content with a professional income of 500*l.* or 600*l.* per annum, and he is well above the average lot when he reaches the 1000*l.* per annum level. But it is, nevertheless, true that counsel are very highly paid per piece of work done. The reason that their incomes are modest is that they fail to do anything like a full year's work. We are not here alluding to the vacations, which are admirable institutions—although it seems anomalous, unnecessary and undesirable that all the judges and all the barristers should go on holiday at the same time. What we have in mind is that the typical barrister while sitting in chambers is consistently under-employed. A fairly prosperous man on a typical day may earn 5 guineas thus: ten minutes arguing before a Master, 2 guineas; one hour drawing a Defence and Counterclaim, 2 guineas; twenty minutes advising in conference, 1 guinea. He has earned 5 guineas by two hours' work, allowing time to look up a case or two for the summons before the Master; and for the rest of the day he has had absolutely nothing to do. His remuneration for the day may not be excessive in a social structure which admits incomes of 1000*l.* a year and upwards as reasonable for men professionally trained. But his remuneration per minute or per piece of work done is outrageously excessive. Nor would he be (in general) unwilling to work harder if litigants desired his services, even though he still made only 1000*l.* per annum. The obvious desideratum, therefore, is more pieces of work and less remuneration per piece. The Master, for instance, who heard the summons receives as much as 1,200*l.* per annum, but as he deals with twenty or thirty summonses a day his cost to litigants per job done is minute.

The assumption underlying the proposals in this article is that, if counsel will cheapen their piece prices, there will be so much more litigation by satisfied citizens that counsel's incomes will not be impaired. This assumption cannot be justified save by pointing to the public demand for cheaper justice and the known reluctance of citizens with

grievances to pay the present expense of redressing them in the High Court. The example of Germany might be quoted, where litigation has been made so cheap that the flood of cases has made a German lawyer declare that England is a paradise of peaceable living. The pith and core of these proposals, then, is drastically to reduce counsel's remuneration per piece of work done—especially where the claim is small, for there can be no objection to lawyers, like stockbrokers, getting some compensatory money for jam when very large sums are at stake.

We will begin with junior counsel. For contentious work it is suggested that counsel's remuneration should be divisible into three parts, in respect of: (1) instructions to conduct interlocutory proceedings; (2) instructions to prepare for trial; (3) brief at the hearing. We will call these, shortly, interlocutory instructions, preparatory instructions, and brief. The proportions between the three should be approximately fixed, but the absolute amounts should be on a sliding scale according to the amount at issue or—where there is no money claim—the importance of the case, with a bias towards underpayment for small claims and overpayment for large claims. As an indication of what is in mind, let us suggest 4, 2 and 4 guineas for a claim of 100*l.* and 10, 7 and 10 guineas for a claim of 500*l.* when no leading counsel is employed.

The interlocutory instructions would be delivered as soon as it is decided to start proceedings or (on the defendant's side) as soon as the writ is issued or threatened. It will be convenient to deal only with the plaintiff's case, for the principles are easily applicable to the defendant. The fee on these instructions, then, will be counsel's sole remuneration for drafting the writ and pleadings, settling any necessary particulars, seeing the professional and lay clients in conference as often as may be desirable, attending summonses, drafting interrogatories and the answers thereto, assisting on points of discovery, advising on evidence, and generally taking and co-operating with the solicitor in taking all other interlocutory steps.

Great importance is to be attached to this proposal. The present cost of an interlocutory summons (10*l.* or more to the eventual loser of the action) is preposterous. Not only is the expense of litigation thereby piled up by methods

over which the lay client has no control, but conscientious solicitors and counsel often refrain in the case of a client of limited means from taking out a summons which would be considered desirable to the proper conduct of the action if the client were able to afford such luxuries. Counsel always desire to win and they can be trusted to take all proper interlocutory steps even though they are being paid a flat rate; while, on the other hand, the insidious temptation to indulge in unnecessary sparrings of this kind will be wholly removed. Moreover, the more constant co-operation between solicitor and counsel that is thereby made available without extra expense must be greatly to the advantage of the lay client. And one final point of importance: it may be hoped that when an Advice on Evidence costs nothing, this most valuable piece of work will never be dispensed with.

If the case is settled before a brief needs to be prepared, there is no further liability to counsel. If a brief has to be prepared, it is suggested that what is now the brief fee ought to be subdivided into what we have called preparatory instructions and brief proper. It is the rule at present that, when once a brief is marked, counsel is entitled to the fee whether or no the case is fought. It is impossible for barristers of any experience to escape the conclusion that this uncovenanted premium to counsel who can effect a last-minute settlement is undesirable. Counsel are not dishonest, but it is fatally easy to persuade oneself that a settlement which may not appeal to the person actually suffering under a grievance is wise and reasonable, and it is certainly not easier to resist this temptation when one's brief fee is marked and payable whether or no the wearisome and perhaps nerve-racking struggle takes place. Probably counsel are altogether too prone to press settlements, at any rate at this stage of the action. The learned friends on either side may be intimately acquainted both with each other and with each other's instructing solicitors. Each knows the strong and weak points of his case better than the litigant. They know the risk of witnesses not speaking to their proofs and the pitfalls that underlie the strongest-seeming cases. They view the conflict impartially and *ab extra*, and their opinion that a settlement is desirable is probably sound on the false supposition that the parties are *quoad*

this dispute ideally reasonable persons. The supposition is false: the parties have grievances which they wish to air, contentions which they are only prepared to abandon at the behest of the dignified and awe-inspiring arbiter whom they have selected. A man over-persuaded to settle and repenting later will bear resentment perhaps for the rest of his life. Moreover, apart from these considerations, in which there is great weight, it offends the litigant's sense of fairness that he should pay as much to his counsel for agreeing with his learned friend in ten minutes as for fighting him tooth and nail for half a day.

It is accordingly recommended that the brief fee should only be payable if there is an actual fight in court. But counsel will probably have put in a great deal of exacting work in preparing himself for the conduct of the case which he could not rely on settling. He may have looked up complicated points of law and made himself master of an intricate web of facts and dates. He has also undergone a not unimportant nervous anticipation. It would be possible to treat this work as covered by the interlocutory fee. But that would necessitate increasing the average amount of this fee, so that litigants who settle during the early stages would pay part of the expenses of those who only settle on the morning of the trial. Probably this would work somewhat unfairly, and this method is wholly inapplicable to the fees of senior counsel. It is better to treat this preparation for trial as a separate head of remuneration, appropriating to itself about a third, or a little more, of what is now the fee marked on the brief. We have given as examples of the kind of scale in mind 4, 2, 4 guineas for a 100*l.* claim and 10, 7, 10 guineas for a 500*l.* claim (conducted in court by the junior). The hope is that the scale would be laid down by the Bar Council and that it would be generally adhered to. It would then be possible and desirable that such fees should be regularly admitted by the taxing master, the whole matter proceeding much as counsel's fees are now marked and allowed in the County Court.

Before proceeding to deal with the complication introduced by senior counsel's fees in the larger cases, it is necessary to come to a far-reaching decision. If this scale is uniformly adhered to, how are the busier juniors to prevent themselves from being flooded with work which

they cannot perform without injury to their health and to the interests of some of their clients? At present they can raise their fees in self-defence—it is, of course, contrary to existing etiquette or practice merely to decline work. But it cannot fairly be said that this problem is created by our new scheme: it exists unsolved under the present régime. Fee-raising for this purpose by busy juniors is by custom and convention very limited in extent. A man works many hours into every night of the week for several years before he bethinks himself of increasing his charge for a pleading from the normal 2 to 3 guineas. And this slight addition, unknown and therefore not deterrent to the lay client, does not in fact do much to keep the work away. It is a standing problem of the Bar that some men overwork themselves outrageously, while others have an inconvenient abundance of leisure. At the outset the relative distribution of work would probably remain much as it is. There would soon, however, be a great temptation for the busier men to raise their fees somewhat above the scale. This would be much more feasible with the new system of lump sum payments than it is at present, where so much of a junior's remuneration is made up of items (2 guineas for a pleading, 2 and 1 for a summons, 1 for a conference) the amount of which has been stereotyped by long tradition. But it is strongly recommended that this temptation be removed by making it contrary to etiquette to demand fees higher than the prescribed scale. If once the scale is permissibly exceeded by some, the average fee will rise and the whole object of the reform be defeated. The better course appears to be that it should become a recognised practice to refuse work when it cannot be adequately performed with due expedition, or when the amount at issue is small in relation to the standing of the counsel to whom the case is offered. The acceleration of interlocutory steps under recent procedural changes will make this excuse for the busy man both more necessary and more acceptable. Moreover, a desirable spreading of the work will be encouraged, without detriment to the interests of the lay client. Solicitors will extend their existing practice of giving their less important cases to the younger men in the chambers of their principal junior, and these young men, according to the admirable and universal custom,

will unofficially obtain assistance on difficult points in the odd moments when they can get a word with the busy man. Everybody will be better served, even the busy man, for (generally speaking) nothing would please him better than to share some part of his excessive work and superabundant emoluments with his younger colleagues. He is only deterred at present from doing so because it is contrary to etiquette to refuse work, and to make an exception is to risk offending the solicitor.

We have said that this decision to prohibit juniors from raising their fees is far-reaching, for the same question arises more acutely with silks. Here it may be necessary to make some concession to the claim that a man should be entitled at his own expense to employ very highly paid leaders as a kind of luxury, but in moderate-sized and routine cases we think that the same considerations make it necessary that the regular scale fee should not be exceeded. The scale might be somewhat as follows : in a 500*l.* case, where junior counsel's fees for preparation and brief would have been 7 and 10 guineas, his fees might now be reduced to 5 and 5 guineas and senior counsel's fees be 7 and 15 guineas. Preparation and trial would then cost 32 instead of 17 guineas. We may envisage it as being normal for the taxing master to allow the whole 32 guineas in a case of this size. In a smaller claim, 300*l.* for example, senior counsel must either accept a much lower fee or else he must be considered a luxury and part only of his fee be allowed on taxation. There is room for compromise here, provided a fixed limit is set not only to what may be allowed on taxation, but to what may be charged by leading counsel. Fees must not be left at large, at any rate in these smaller cases. Senior counsel should be held entitled without any shadow of impropriety to decline to undertake a brief in a 200*l.* claim where his fees could not exceed, say, 10 guineas in all.

It is useless to blink the fact that the suggested scale is far lower than that now enforced by successful leading counsel. Some of these appear to the writer, speaking frankly, to earn excessive incomes, and that by a drudgery which leaves them little leisure to enjoy their gains. And it must be remembered that leaders stand to gain at least as much as juniors by an increase in the number of cases coming to trial. They too must pin their faith to a smaller

margin of profit on a larger turnover. The few very prosperous silks whose turnover is incapable of enlargement must certainly suffer a diminution of income, although it must be borne in mind that they have open to them other tribunals than the ordinary courts—the House of Lords, the Privy Council, Parliamentary Committees.

We have been tacitly confining our attention to the King's Bench Division. If these ideas commend themselves to practitioners in Chancery, Probate, Admiralty, or Divorce, the details of their application must be worked out by those familiar with proceedings in those divisions. We may, however, mention incidentally the undefended divorce case with which even common lawyers are familiar. In the view of the writer of this article the petition should be settled by the solicitor's clerk, who need only fill in blanks in a printed form. At the hearing, if it is desirable for counsel to be briefed at all (as it probably is for the sake of expedition), we suggest that the fee should be 1 guinea or at the most 2. It should be open to any barrister with more than two years' seniority to decline these cases. The total legal costs of an undefended divorce case, excluding payments to detectives and witnesses, should be under 5*l*. The absurd fees at present paid to counsel (5 and 1, i.e. 6*l*. 16*s*. 0*d*., for the 'hearing' and 2*l*. 4*s*. 6*d*. for copying the petition out of a book of precedents) enable solicitors to charge accordingly and create a large class of persons who can neither reasonably afford this expense nor satisfy the requirements of the Poor Persons' Committee.

There are some minor matters which may be mentioned. Clerk's fees, which are at present paid by the client in addition to the number of guineas nominally constituting the counsel's fee, would need to be revised in view of the new system of lump sum payments: the clerk gains by subdivision of fees into small items. Probably the best arrangement would be to abolish the anomalous payment of clerk's fees by the client. Let the barrister make his own arrangements to remunerate his senior clerk, in the same way that he remunerates his typist and junior clerks. Refreshers are a matter requiring consideration. Perhaps it would be best to make some allowance in the brief fee for the probable length of the

case and to abolish refreshers. It is undesirable that counsel should have any incentive to prolong the hearing and it is unfair that a particular litigant should be penalised by reason of unexpected delays. It is not necessary to discuss in detail the scale of fees for an appeal to the Court of Appeal. They should be moderate and stabilised in accordance with the principles already put forward. There would be no separate counsel's fee on appeals in interlocutory matters, unless it was reasonable to bring in a leader. As the availability of counsel at no extra cost might encourage an unreasonable plethora of interlocutory appeals, a considerable court fee might be imposed on all unsuccessful appellants.

The main object of the present writer is to cheapen the trial of cases involving less than 1000*l*. Above this figure, the scale might be much more generous. At 1500*l*., junior counsel's fees might be 50, 20 and 20 guineas and senior counsel's 30 and 60 guineas. A large part of the remuneration of prosperous juniors would be derived from such cases which are settled : counsel may even obtain 50 guineas for merely drawing a Statement of Claim and negotiating a settlement. He will thus be compensated for the smaller cases where he may carry a claim for £100 right through from writ to judgment for 10 guineas in all.

But, although the above illustration may be valid where an important and complicated case yields to skilful negotiations at an early stage, it would not be right for counsel to receive 50 guineas in, for instance, a running-down case where he has merely drawn the Statement of Claim and advised in conference the acceptance of 1500*l*. paid into court. The example of the running-down case is a reminder that the mere amount at stake is not a sufficient sole criterion for a scale of fees. In this class of case, there is practically no skilled interlocutory work and the whole burden lies on the advocate who conducts the trial. A special scale ought accordingly to be laid down for such cases, the interlocutory and preparatory fees being small and the brief fee large. In other cases where it is anticipated that proceedings will not go beyond the very early stages (and such cases are frequent), etiquette should provide for lesser fees than the full interlocutory fee appropriate to the amount at stake. Some difficulty will be experienced, especially at the outset,

in determining the appropriate scale where there is no money claim. But the experience of solicitors and barristers' clerks will soon establish parities, and the Bar Council could give rulings in typical cases.

These proposals are put forward in the hope that they will provoke interest and constructive criticism. The writer has confined himself to the matter of counsel's fees, because this is the sphere where the Bar can most gracefully and effectively initiate a wider movement. But it is hoped that the wider aspect would not be forgotten. The eventual goal is, of course, the reduction of the total solicitor and client bill paid by the litigant. The reforms suggested could only fructify if solicitors were to co-operate on similar lines and if other desiderata were put in hand by the Lord Chancellor and Parliament. But we see no reason to doubt that such a move by the Bar as is here suggested would be abundantly fruitful in other directions.

Art. 12.—FACING THE FACTS IN FOREIGN POLICY.

'EUROPE,' it was said at the close of the Franco-Prussian War, 'has exchanged a mistress for a master'; and the observation comes back to mind, with the added force of history repeating itself, as the eventful year lately ended passes under review and invites a moral to complete a tale. Time has certainly done nothing to soften the stab of the terse but penetrating epigram. Sixty years after its first utterance it seems to pierce as deftly as ever to the core of European unrest. Still to all appearance do the two most powerful peoples of the Continent strive for the pre-eminence. Still do the compatriots of Ariovistus and Vercingetorix love one another no better than when Cæsar first exploited their antipathy in the Roman interest. Still do they outrage each other's sentiments, as when the marshals of Napoleon embarrassed their wives with the loot they sent back from the great houses of Germany or the soldiers of Blücher threatened to consummate their victory by the destruction of the provocatively named Pont d'Iéna. Not only have we seen the pleasant land of France needlessly devastated by the German invader, but the black troops of the French Republic needlessly quartered upon the resentful inhabitants of the German Reich. And now once again the scratch of the tigress's claw has been answered with a blow from the berserker's fist. Must this enmity endure for ever? There, perhaps, lies the ultimate question in European politics?

Not a little to its discredit English foreign policy rose from a local to a larger significance upon the basis of the fatal antagonism. Wolsey, as Professor Pollard has shown, drew his notion of a balance of power, with England holding the scales and adjusting the weights, from the diplomatic exigencies of the Holy See, of which he hoped one day to find himself the occupant. In his unspiritual hands a system, not necessarily opposed to justice, became no better than the instrument of personal and patriotic ambition. Its perils, however, were apparent to Clarendon, who observes in his elaborate way that :

'the old, mistaken, and unhappy maxim that the Crown of England could balance the differences which fell out between

the princes of Europe by its inclining to either party had made the ministers of that State too negligent in cultivating the affections of their neighbours by any real obligations; as if they were to be arbiters only in the differences which fell out between them without being themselves liable to any impressions of adverse fortune.*

Here beyond doubt lay the danger of the system; here lurked the nemesis awaiting nations, no less than men, who make no real friends and are content to trade upon the weakness or wickedness of their neighbours. Here was the source of a spiritual isolation distinguishable and needing to be distinguished from that political isolation which comes of minding one's own business and is the natural instinct of an island race.

Safe for the time behind the 'moat,' as Halifax called it, with which nature had provided her, Great Britain, as the struggle for commerce and colonies grew, exploited her prodigious advantage with little regard for moral propriety. The Treaty of Utrecht made her, in Lecky's words, 'the great slave-trader of the world'; and she won the Seven Years' War, which gave her Canada and India, with the aid of the unscrupulous brigand whom Chatham characterised as the sole champion besides England of the liberties of Europe† and whom the world remembers as Frederick the Great. A more academic imperialist than the Great Commoner in a more scrupulous century than the eighteenth found, however, a phrase to excuse or condone these power-politics. England seemed to have conquered the world, he observed, 'in a fit of absence of mind.' It may have been so; but she has shown no sign of repenting her inattention. She took under the form of mandates most of the German colonies from the Germans after the Great War, much as she had taken the Cape from the Dutch after the Napoleonic Wars. Somehow it always seemed best that the biggest things should fall into British keeping. The days of Raleigh, indeed, were gone, when empire had seemed all wonder and wild surmise; and the days likewise when Phineas Finn could declare that in Marylebone they cared only 'that Canada should not go to the States, because though they don't

* *'Great Rebellion,'* ix, 170.

† B. Williams, *'William Pitt,'* i, 305.

love the Canadians, they do hate the Americans,' and that it was 'astonishing how like the Maryleboners were to the rest of the world.' Empire had become a matter of course, an inheritance like one of those great houses whose lofty tradition dominates successive generations and holds them in spirit at least under one roof. Yet ever and again a Disraeli, a Rosebery, or a Rhodes, or the jubilee of a sovereign would flood the edifice with marvellous light and cause the faults in its construction to seem lost in some larger design—in the idea, shall we say, that as England had once and again saved herself by her efforts, so the Empire might save the world by its example?

Thus to the old insistence upon a balance of power being kept in Europe there was added a second consideration in the conduct of foreign affairs. Foreign policy had to satisfy the needs, not only of Britain but also of the Britains beyond the seas. And the pressure of this new factor, it need hardly be said, was bound to grow in a world expanding by discovery yet contracting through science.

The two elements in British foreign policy begin to meet on even terms during the administration of the late Lord Salisbury; and it is from their coincidence that his tenure of the Foreign Office derives much of its peculiar interest. The way in which he envisages their relationship is both characteristic and significant. 'A year before his death,' his biographer tells us, 'he dwelt with convinced satisfaction on the presence of Germany in Africa: we could not be sufficiently grateful for it, he said; it was the best, indeed the only guarantee that we possessed of South African loyalty.'* That is the sort of clear conception which, whether we think it still holds true or not in this particular instance, removes at once all suspicion of a political idealism out of touch with realities. Indeed, if there is any substance in the remark sometimes to be heard that this or that situation would never have arisen had Salisbury been now at the Foreign Office, it is to no slight degree because his thought is tempered by what is sometimes described as a cynical, but might more justly be called a religious view of human nature and human

* Lady G. Cecil, 'Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury,' iv, p. 302.

conditions. For the salt as well as the light that religion desiderates is present in his treatment of foreign affairs. He appears to have found more occasion to notice that man had fallen than that man was moving upward or working out the ape. He seems unaffected by the peculiar supposition of the Liberal thinkers of his time that Humanity, in a manner somewhat analogous to that proclaimed by the late M. Coué as a first principle in therapeutics, was growing better and better every day. He might even perhaps have escaped the strictures of the late Sir Grafton Elliot Smith who, in restoring to its place in history the fact of the Golden Age, pilloried three of our more recent prime ministers for their ignorance of recent anthropological research and their attribution of inhumanity to primitive man.*

So just a view of the fallen state of mankind is well calculated to avoid the empty hopes and idle indignations that are the historic lot of the idealist. 'Great men,' observes Acton, after a survey of the subject to which we can few of us pretend, 'are almost always bad men'; † and we might do wisely to take the circumstance to heart. But idealists can seldom be persuaded that the powers in opposition to them are not exceptionally nefarious and generically wicked. In the eighteenth century they took it into their heads that all the evil of the world was the fault of kings and priests. Kings and priests are now mostly gone from politics; yet our idealists rail just as hotly as ever against the ex-schoolmaster and the ex-house-painter who rule respectively in Rome and Berlin, and we may shrewdly suspect that, if they themselves ever got into great place, they would rapidly exemplify Acton's opinion to an equal degree. It has proved so with the leaders of the French Revolution and of the Russian Revolution; and there is no reason to suppose that other revolutionaries are exempt from human frailty. Meantime amongst the complications of current diplomacy the influx of idealism into the study of foreign affairs is by no means the least. The champions of our brave new worlds, having perhaps their conversation amongst angels, discover a singular incapacity in dealing with men, and still

* Elliot Smith, 'Human History,' pp. 190, 191.

† 'Hist. Essays and Studies,' p. 504.

more with supermen. For the malevolent despots of to-day, with all their faults, would, as likely as not, have been styled benevolent in less idealistic periods. Though their works and ways are not ours, their countries owe much to them; and, if ideology were not so rampant, diplomacy might become more facile.

Salisbury, perhaps because he put independence so high, never expected to mould his fellow-creatures to his own likeness. He had to deal with men whose shortcomings, though now but little remembered, were very apparent and very disagreeable. He had to do not only with 'Abdul the Damned', the murderer of the Armenians, but with Bismarck, the representative of a junker tradition which sticks at little, and with Crispi, the representative of a Garibaldian Liberalism which stuck at less. At so much less, indeed, as to make him declare that 'in cynical and arrogant injustice it is impossible to surpass Crispi's policy towards Zanzibar' and that in comparison with the Italian Bismarck is 'an angel of light'! * Yet he does not find the world too wicked for him, but schools himself to live and work with men as he finds them. Aware, as he tells the Queen, that 'the interests of Italy are so closely parallel to our own that we can combine with her safely,' † he concludes with the Italian Government 'as close an alliance' as 'the parliamentary character of our institutions will permit.' Aware that the English and German nations were, as he says, 'so necessary to each other,' he weighs with the utmost care every word he addresses to the vainglorious young Emperor. In the atmosphere of neighbourliness thus generated, he was able not only to work the European concert of Great Powers, in spite of unrest in those two permanent centres of world trouble, the Near East and the Far East, but to effect without a war that final partition of Africa among the nations of Europe which constitutes perhaps his highest title to fame.

It gives no little food for reflection that the name of one whose eye looked so far ahead and whose hands were so active in so many places should be pre-eminently associated with the policy of 'isolation.' His biographer

* 'Life of Salisbury,' iv, p. 236.

† *Ibid.*, iii, p. 24.

has indeed shown that, when he gave the notion its attribute of 'splendid' it was with a purpose different from that popularly attributed to him. But the more recent publication of a Foreign Office memorandum,* written so near the close of his political life as almost to deserve the title of a testament, proves, what indeed is also confirmed by his speech on May 4, 1898, that he held the doctrine of isolation to the fullest extent compatible with not becoming a doctrinaire. Of that memorandum our most learned diplomatic historian observes that 'there is no more impressive state paper in our recent diplomatic history,'† whilst another eminent Liberal publicist declares that 'in the entire series of British documents there is none which cuts deeper into the fundamentals of British policy.'‡ Of any survey of our diplomacy during the present century it must always be the starting-point, and, considering that the world has a way of revolving in opinion as well as in space, may also prove the terminus.

Very tersely the memorandum points out that at no time has England had cause to quarrel with isolation as a policy; that, in fact, on the solitary occasion when, with Napoleon threatening to gain command of the Channel, we felt ourselves in real danger, we had many allies, who would not, however, have saved us; and, more important still, that no British Government dare anticipate the verdict of the country upon peace and war without incurring the danger of repudiation. 'Common honesty,' therefore—and it is significant what care Salisbury has of it—precluded the giving of any pledge to Germany.

The morale behind the memorandum was the same that had four years before refused to be intimidated by the threat of Delcassé, smarting at the moment under his discomfiture at Fashoda, to put France in line with Germany against Britain. Entrenched behind that two-Power naval standard—which even still, supported by territorial establishments and an adequate air-force, might give us a better assurance of security than anything else—he contemplated with calm the worst that the Con-

* 'British Documents' (Gooch & Temperley), II, p. 68.

† G. P. Gooch, 'Before the War Studies in Diplomacy,' I, p. 13.

‡ J. A. Spender, 'Fifty Years of Europe.'

tinental Powers could do; and he was justified by the event. The French diplomatic defeat was complete and unrelieved. As in 1878 he had known, to use the words of his biographer, how to make 'the isolation which had witnessed to the indifference of foreign nations . . . appear as a circumstance of leadership,'* so it was still twenty years later. He was detached, and by virtue of detachment both supple and strong. Here lay hid the genius of that diplomacy 'coming not by observation,' in which he delighted. A friendly understanding with France was never, it must, however, be remembered, practicable in his time. 'France,' he wrote in 1888, 'is and must always remain England's greatest danger.'† A change, which he was in no position to appreciate whilst the partition of Africa was incomplete, was in fact in progress—a psychological change as notable as any political development. France was passing into the ranks of the 'satisfied' Powers. By 1902, the year of Salisbury's retirement, the French Ambassador, acting on Delcassé's instructions, was able to assure the British Foreign Secretary that the French Government were 'partisans du statu quo partout.' It was not quite true. In the back of the French mind, at the bottom of the French heart, there were the lost provinces to be regained. Yet it was true enough to enable France and Britain to draw together; and Lansdowne, as all the world knows, took Delcassé's proffered hand. But it is perhaps significant of the force of the Salisbury tradition that the rapprochement converged upon an accommodation of differences in Africa rather than a conjunction of interests in Europe. Only under Grey, with the opening of direct military conversations, does it begin to wear the look of an alliance. And Grey, we must always recollect, was warned by his old chief, Rosebery, that his policy would lead to war; as in fact it did.

The war-cloud lay, as usual, on the eastern horizon. For not only had Delcassé been active in promoting an entente between France and Britain, but also in tightening up the alliance between France and Russia and giving it an existence independent of the Triple Alliance against

* 'Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury,' II, p. 231.

† *Ibid.*, IV, p. 106.

which it had been formed and by the duration of which it was originally limited. In this way it became the repository, if not the recognised instrument of two ambitions—the desire of France to regain her provinces and of Russia to control the Straits. There is something more to be noticed. ‘We must never forget,’ as Dr Gooch puts it, ‘that France was regarded by Russia and regarded herself as the junior partner in the firm.’*

This all-important fact did not make itself felt until 1914, when the initial impetus of the World War is given in the East. We may not all of us be ready yet to go so far as Professor Fay and declare that ‘the verdict of the Versailles treaty that Germany and her allies were responsible for the War, in view of the evidence now available, is historically unsound,’† but unquestionably opinion, as exemplified in the ‘war-guilt’ findings of a joint committee of French and German experts,‡ is trending that way. It is clear that both under Aehrenthal and Berchtold Austria was leading her German ally, and not her German ally pushing her. It may have been culpable of Germany not to restrain the Dual Monarchy from a punitive expedition against a neighbour whose Government to the will to seize the Southern Slav provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had added, as we now know, the guilty knowledge of the intended murder of the Austrian heir-presumptive; but it was at least no more culpable than the failure of France to prevent a Russian general mobilisation in so bad a cause as Serbia’s. British policy ought, it is clear, never to have permitted Russia to remain the predominant partner in the Entente combination, but, as much in the French interest as in its own, to have made a lead in counsel the price of British assistance. Her desire to recover diplomatic prestige in the Balkans was no reason why Russia should have been allowed to set the Great Powers knocking one another into hostilities like a set of ninepins.

An erroneous assumption of the sole guilt of Germany governed, however, not only the length of the war but the terms of the peace, and found explicit expression in the Treaty where, designed to confound the Germans at the

* ‘Before the War Studies in Diplomacy,’ I, p. 112.

† ‘Origins of the Great War,’ II, p. 558.

‡ The very important document here referred to will be found in the *American Hist. Review* for January, 1938 (p. 321).

tribunal of history, it now merely confounds the peace-makers. Partiality could be no better proved ; and the price of partiality has been paid in the condition of Europe for the last twenty years. Little by little Germany has regained her strength, relieving herself as occasion served from the burden of the reparations imposed and taking leave, as strength returned, to fortify her demilitarised frontier and incorporate the disgruntled German nationals beyond her borders. Any proud nation might have been expected to do what Germany did, for there was apparently no other way to it. The fate of Dr Brüning confounds the objector. This admirable man, German Chancellor as late as the beginning of the present decade, sought no more than permission to conclude a customs-union with Austria ; and, had it been granted him, Herr Hitler might never have risen to power. But even this morsel of German sausage was too much for the palate of Geneva. Whilst the British Government delayed decision, the French and their friends took action. The plan was defeated and in the following year (1931), after his plea for an even measure of general disarmament had equally failed to recommend itself to the international conference concerned, Dr Brüning resigned.

Almost simultaneously, though by most men unperceived, the fortunes of the League of Nations passed their meridian point and began to decline. Some dozen years had by then gone by since, as Mr Lloyd George dramatically relates in his last book,* President Wilson explained to his colleagues at the Peace Conference that the League would make good the practical deficiencies of the Founder of Christianity in respect of international affairs. In point of fact the Founder of Christianity had not neglected to establish a foundation where the babel of nations might be superseded by peace and good will ; and St Paul was of opinion that no man could lay any other. But the President was so preoccupied with putting into force, and by forcible measures, what he took for the international ethic of Christianity, that he forgot all about its necessary basis in religion. The League as constituted appeared in fact to entertain no suspicion that the trouble of the world was as much metaphysical as moral

* 'The Truth about the Peace Treaties,' I, p. 225.

and that, as the eminent metaphysician who occupies the See of York has been heard to argue, the first issue in modern politics is the existence of God. It invoked no deity, offered no common prayer, and ended by embracing the anti-God union of Soviet Republics as gladly as any God-fearing nation. If one could not affirm that it was founded upon a rock, at least the spiritual soil on which it stood was stony. Mr Lloyd George has lately made public the impression that he formed of the nations, both small and great, as they showed themselves at Versailles; and his verdict is the more striking that he is not himself commonly reckoned an austere man. 'The cynicism of French diplomacy,' he observes, 'was never more apparent than in its dealings with Polish delinquencies. . . . Decisions,' he adds, 'given by the Council that for the time being represented the federated nations of the world were flouted whenever they interfered with the ambitions of the nation against whom judgment was given.'* In such soil did the President sow his seed and, forgetful of the Gospels, did not trouble to consider whether seed which has no root in itself will not presently wither away for lack of moisture.

If the League's farming was poor, its housing was excellent. The Palace of Nations or, as the wags declared, of hallucinations, with its dream-gates made of ivory instead of horn, rose steadily as the League's fortunes fell; and towards it British diplomacy turned as the Christian turns to the East or the Moslem to Mecca. Mankind in general, so General Smuts affirmed, was on the march; but the League, too serious-minded, perhaps, to dance, too static to walk, seemed well content to sit. The French, indeed, wished for nothing better than to keep things as the Peace had left them. And thus, with an irony that lacks nothing in finish, the progressive parties in England soon found themselves ardently supporting an institution that seemed already to have attained the stationary state.

At length in 1935 there came the rude awakening. The League, under French influence and contrary to British advice, had recklessly admitted the Abyssinians to its membership. The mistake was inexcusable and its consequences were disastrous. It is bad business to defend

* 'The Truth about the Peace Treaties,' I, pp. 312, 314.

a slave-stricken state of dubious antecedents and patent infirmities. It is good business to avoid a European War. And in 1935 it was the best business to maintain a front, such as had been formed at Stresa, against any German move menacing the peace of Europe. The prestige of Geneva, however, as distinct from the interests of England, as shown in the Maffey Report, required a breach of the Stresa Front and thus produced the greatest diplomatic mistake of the century. British diplomacy, striving beyond its strength to save the League, fell between two stools and arose from its collapse bruised and battered beyond the recollection of living man. For the Abyssinians had not been saved; the League had not been vindicated; and the Peace of Versailles had been set at naught again by the remilitarisation of the Rhineland.

It says much for Mr Eden's personal charms that his political reputation survived the events of that melancholy year. No doubt, as has lately been pointed out in a detailed and damaging critique of his foreign administration by a journalist of outstanding ability,* he received much uncritical support from the ardent adherents of Geneva; but at least no one can take from him the merit of a good man struggling with adversity in the shape of an insoluble dilemma. The extremity of his embarrassment may be perceived in his incautious admission in 1937 that he was for 'peace at almost any price'; † for his diplomatic dispositions more nearly demanded war at any moment. He could in fact neither do with the fascist dictatorships nor without them. His championship of the League desiderated a perpetual ban upon Signor Mussolini; whilst the peace of Europe required a good understanding between Italy and England. As the situation hardened and the Rome-Berlin axis became more and more the pivot of European politics, the difficulties of his position increased until his resignation became perhaps as much a relief to himself as to the observer. In the martyrology of Geneva it might be difficult to find a more canvassed name since that of Servetus.

The last radiance of the 'Liberal experiment'—as Mr Fisher so prudently calls it—now illumined those waters of

* Sisley Huddleston: 'In My Time,' pp. 350-351.

† June 25, 1937: in the House of Commons.

Lac Lemman which have mirrored the transient passage through time of as strange an assortment of sceptics and visionaries as any place in Europe. Beside the Lake where Gibbon and Voltaire, Calvin and Rousseau had in their day mocked or meditated, Henri Quatre's old fancy, revived by Briand, of a United States of Europe was being liquidated. There were valuable by-products to be drawn from the League's activities, but in respect of essentials what was universal in its feeling of humanity was already better experienced in the Christian Church, and what was practicable in its scheme of international justice better left to the Hague Tribunal.

British policy for the last quarter of a century had wandered all its ways—into alliance with Russia, into war with Germany, into vengeance with France, into the dreamland of collective security with Geneva. From the Fourteen Points in 1918 it had moved on to the Kellogg Pact in 1928, and then again in 1938 back to re-armament on a yet larger scale. Everywhere the wheel of circumstance seemed to be coming round. Russia had relapsed into a despotism more ruthless than before; Germany was her old self again and perhaps even more so; France had slipped back into democratic inefficiency; and the League appeared to be moribund. The emperors indeed were gone, but dictators had replaced them. On every side the historic ghosts were rising again—old foes with new faces. Time-honoured principles of policy seemed called for.

Mr Eden's retirement symbolised, in fact, the return from idealism; and in one respect at least the pathway to reality was smoothed. Lord Halifax's acceptance of the vacant office was in itself a guarantee that private conscience would retain its hold on public policy. No statesman of our time more nearly challenged comparison with Falkland. He had indeed in his youth displayed something of the moral indignation that was still uppermost in Mr Eden, when by the addition of his name to an ill-judged telegram he gave Mr Lloyd George one of the best defences for concluding one of the worst of Peaces. But, as experience increased, he seemed to grow more conscious that the wrath of man worketh, not the righteousness of God, but rather some increase of hatred towards one's neighbour. And if his treatment of the Abyssinian

imbroglio, when the bitter end was reached, appeared to the Bishop of Durham no better than 'the cold sophistry of a cynical opportunism' * it might be answered, in the words of one of the greatest occupants of that famous See, that 'Things . . . are what they are and the consequences of them will be what they will be,' and asked 'Why, then, should we desire to be deceived?'

If the acceptance of facts was a prominent feature in Lord Halifax's integrity, it was a dominant one in Mr Chamberlain's. The Prime Minister had risen to the highest office in the State by an administrative efficiency in matters of housing and finance which his modesty had no power to conceal. But the world had not credited him with any particular gift for diplomacy; and the imagination and initiative which he suddenly displayed in the management of foreign affairs came as something of a surprise to his critics. In a very few months he had checked a deteriorating situation and persuaded his countrymen to exchange the spirit of negation for that of neighbourliness; and this in face of the still recent outrage in Abyssinia, the burning issue in Spain, and the new shock to international legality which Germany gave by her march into Austria. Exceptional qualities were needed for such an achievement. It required patience, tenacity, perseverance, as all statesmanship does. But it required also equity to recognise what was just and fair in the German case and had to be dealt with before peace and public law could have any real chance. And it required equanimity to pick one's way calmly through a world distracted by blinding ideals and ideologies and their blinded partisans.

Grey, as Professor Trevelyan shows, had predicted that without the inclusion of the United States in the League Europe would drift back to a balance of power; and this precisely was what had occurred. In spite of their lip-service to the League idea, the Liberal and Labour Parties, had they been in power, would have proved as incapable of implementing it as any other government. Collective security had as much force as the sentiment of nationality allowed it; and that, as international psychology had shown from the Chaco to the China War, was almost no

* In the House of Lords, May 18, 1938.

force at all. To a balance of power, whether inside an assembly or without it, the nations of the world appeared to be condemned. The only real question was whether the balance could be tempered by a revival of that concert, council, or conference of the greater Powers which in Salisbury's time and even in Grey's time had operated to improve the prospects of peace. Four or five great Powers can always keep order more easily than fifty small ones, if only because their counsels are more concentrated, their resources more effective, and their procedure swifter. The Munich Conference exemplified these merits to excess; but they were merits all the same. The Czecho-Slovak crisis, as everything goes to prove, required urgent action; and Geneva might well have talked for months before anything was agreed upon. Had the case been less clear, there would, indeed, have been more cause for complaint. But the one principle that the autocratic and democratic states possessed, or at least professed in common—the principle of nationality—left no room for honest doubt.

It chanced that in the Lord Chancellor at this time the country possessed no party advocate raised by political preferment to the highest office of the law, but a judge who in the fullness of experience had passed from the Bench to the Woolsack. Lord Maugham's judgment that the state of Czecho-Slovakia ought never to have come into existence is as impressive in its way as Lord Runciman's practical view that, not only the cession to Germany of the frontier districts was required, if the wishes of the inhabitants were to be consulted, but that 'immediate and drastic action' was needed, if civil war was to be avoided.

The clearest case, however, with minds like ours, will find its opponents. From all the caves of Adullam critics who were not quite for war nor quite against it rushed out to assail the dictates of common sense. Their action was not unsuccessful. They helped the Nazis to reduce the effect of Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy and of the Munich memorandum; and for the moment they handed over to France the olive-branch of appeasement and left to their own country only the apple of discord. Yet with thoughtful people Mr Churchill's strictures would have gained in point, had he not been so unfortunate as to have stressed in his 'World Crisis' the contradiction between the large German and Hungarian minorities in Czecho-

Slovakia and the principle of self-determination; whilst Mr Lloyd George's diatribes must have produced a deeper impression, if, in addition to setting up the 'ramshackle' Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, he had not, a month or so before the crisis, accused Dr Benesh of grasping more territory in 1919 than the Czechs had any title to have. Even Mr Eden's caveats would have appeared more persuasive if the Czechs, whom Britain did not advise to fight, had not come off so much better than the Abyssinians whom, with his full concurrence, she had encouraged to do so. The real truth was, not that the Munich settlement was bad but that the German negotiator was suspect. Herr Hitler, it was urged repeatedly, was not a man of his word. He might, perhaps, have replied that, if the Austrians and the Sudetan Deutsch, whether intoxicated or not by Dr Goebbels's propaganda, threw themselves into his arms, he could not be blamed for embracing them. Seduction, after all, is not the same as rape. But unfortunately a more alarming type of defence appears to be open to him.

Pledges, it may be urged, are now so generally violated that it is hard to say who is entitled to protest against their breach. No promises, for instance, could be more solemnly phrased or more individually made than the marriage vows of members of the Established and other Churches. Yet the British Parliament evidently attaches so little value to keeping faith that it goes to the length of providing ever increasing assistance in the shape of the divorce laws for those who want to break their plighted word. If the members of the Legislature are not shocked at their own performance in this respect, there is really no occasion for them to throw up their hands in holy horror at international infidelity. No treaty can possibly be binding upon great masses of people, who as likely as not have never heard of its existence, to the same degree as undertakings of a direct and personal kind. And the good-faith of England, though it stands so high, does not stand quite high enough to licence any long course of sermons to mankind; to say nothing of the fact that our congregations never seem to hear us gladly. Consider, for instance, what was thought, not only by the Arabs, but by Lawrence of Arabia, of the way in which Britain played fast and loose with her undertakings in the East. Or consider our

unilateral decision to defer payment of the American debt. Or again consider with what degree of punctuality the secret treaty concluded by Mr Asquith to bring the Italians into the War was honoured by Mr Lloyd George when it came to the making of peace. Circumstances, we say, alter cases ; and perhaps they do. But had they so altered them between the date of the Armistice and the date of the Peace that Germany, which was promised in President Wilson's Fourteen Points 'a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims,' deserved to forfeit all her colonies without discussion, without arbitration, without plebiscite, without compensation ? Nemesis survives the decline of Greek culture. No appeasement between Britain and Germany will be complete which does not resolve this question of colonies. I can well remember the editor of this journal, who was also Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office, observing to me, when he returned from the Peace Conference, that a great mistake was being made in taking away all the German colonies. Germany, he said, was a Great Power and ought to have colonies. Such things belonged to our peace, but never for that did they attract the notice of the League of Nations when they might perhaps have been wisely and generously determined. And now that the mandates in the eyes of our colonials have twenty years' prescriptive right behind them and that the Nazis have shown by their treatment of their Jewish fellow-citizens how unfeeling their government can be, the problem of finding Germany a place in the African or any other sun may well prove more than statesmanship can master. Not the less for that does it touch foreign policy nearly !

Though but little noticed, there was no more significant passage in Mr Chamberlain's famous broadcast of September 27, 1938, than that in which he observed that 'we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war' for 'a small nation,' and 'must be very clear before we embark on it that it is really the great issues that are at stake.' This was as much as to say, not merely that 'collective security' as conceived at Versailles could no more be reconciled with Dominion than with American sentiment, but that henceforward British foreign policy would have to be cast on strictly imperial lines. Less

than ever would any local issue serve to rouse the British giant. The whole Empire must be clearly concerned. Foreign affairs, as Mr Menzies with all the weight of his position as Attorney-General of Australia had urged in the preceding July, must not be thought of any more as synonymous with European affairs.

Here is latent a great guarantee against the supposed inevitable growth of every parochial quarrel into a world war. Yet, on the other hand, if the opposition of the Dominions were to prevent any amicable agreement regarding German colonial claims between Britain and Germany, it might ultimately revive that naval rivalry which did so much to bring on the Great War. As things are, there is no omen more favourable for the success of Mr Chamberlain's diplomacy than the fact that Herr Hitler's policy, so far as can be seen, is based, not so much upon the notions of the Emperor William II as upon those of Bismarck. Let this be changed, and the prospect of appeasement instantly contracts. Let it be maintained, and there seems to be no reason why Herr Hitler, if he survives the repercussions of his appalling *Kulturkampf* with the Synagogue and the Churches and of his juggling finance, should not become, like Bismarck and like Aehrenthal when they had got what they wanted, 'a pillar' to borrow a phrase of Dr Gooch's 'of European peace.'* In the Bismarckian system both the Central Empires ranked as 'saturated' states, unambitious of wide world-power or naval parity with Britain; though this view might not have seemed to its founder to exclude the assertion of that political influence in south-eastern Europe which, by the unfortunate destruction of the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire at the Peace of Versailles, has now accrued to Germany and given a new impetus to her eastward thrust. Nothing, however, better shows Mr Chamberlain's readiness to recognise facts than his willingness to admit their force in the region of the Danube. To oppose Germany's predominance there, in the spirit of those British patriots who are always so dreadfully shocked if the Germans are ever allowed to have anything anywhere, must prove fatal to any effective policy of neighbourliness.

Not, however, that Germany is likely ever to prove an

* 'Before the War Studies in Diplomacy,' I, p. 415.

easy neighbour ! There is in the German soul a streak of ruthlessness as apparent in Luther's advice to the Princes to kill and slay the revolted peasantry like mad dogs as in Dr Goebbels's attack upon the Jews, and so little absent even from pre-War German diplomacy that we find Joseph Chamberlain accusing Germany of a policy of undisguised blackmail.* We may no doubt hope that such failings may disappear, but without expecting it, perhaps, more confidently than a change in the Ethiopian's skin or the leopard's spots.

For the rest the diplomatic air, however much it may horrify some elect spirits to have it said, is healthier since the Munich Conference in that the bluff of Paris as well as the bluff of Geneva has now been called. It is best for Great Britain as well as France to recognise that we can no more defend all the little nations individually than all the little nations collectively will defend us. And though, in a characteristically brilliant and amusing sally, French wit is proclaiming in respect of one of our ministers that 'rien comprendre, c'est tout pardonner'; yet we do understand a little about of what has been going on and have already forgiven much. We do understand that our valued ally across the Channel has got into a sad muddle with her politics both at home and abroad ; that she can barely manage her 'Reds' and that M. Barthou between his ill-judged refusal of the German offer for a military pact and his futile scheme for German encirclement did as badly by his country as M. Blum with his impracticable forty-hour week. And if in our attempt to free her from the tangle of her rash pledges to the Czechs we could not secure her precisely 'peace with honour,' we may fairly claim that the Munich agreement gave her at least peace without dishonour, which was all perhaps that Sir Robert Cecil meant by the phrase when he first used it, three hundred years ago and more, in conversation with Henry IV of France.† At all events politically her gain has been a great one. Freed from a commitment that threatened to involve her once more in the time-honoured contests of the Teutons and the Slavs, she has taken her chance to close her age-long

* Garvin, III, pp. 334-5.

† Birch, 'View of the Negotiations, 1592-1617,' p. 121.

quarrel with Germany by a pact of peace upon the Munich model. It may be that so frail a barrier will fail to stem the ancient tide of passion. Or it may be that a future age will find there the beginning of international wisdom and the work of a great diplomatist. We cannot tell, for we have no means of knowing whether the German Dictator, unlike French Democracy, will prove wise in time. We only know that England has once more striven to save Europe by her example and will, if needs must, save herself by her exertions.

It is in these circumstances that British policy has in a great measure fallen back upon its old principles—upon realism, that is, and upon self-reliance, though now with France in the foreground and the growing strength of the Dominions, not to speak of the dark, whinnying horse in America, at our back ; upon balance ; upon a concert of Europe, if and when we can get it ; and, for a touch of idealism, upon neighbourliness and even, maybe, if circumstances allow, a little graceful concession, alleviated by the use of large maps, red-splotched to remind us how great a part of the world's surface we still retain. Such things afford a prospect of appeasement. And, if it is premature, beneath a sky still so overclouded, to follow an eminent historian and acclaim Mr Chamberlain as ' the pilot who weathered the storm,' at least we have seen enough of him to learn something of his own quiet determination and resilient strength and to know what magic of diplomacy lay in that dramatic flight to Berchtesgaden which for an immortal hour made the whole world kin.

ALGERNON CECIL.

SOME RECENT BOOKS.

- The Making of a Gentleman.** Esmé Wingfield-Stratford.
Laughing Diplomat. Daniele Varè.
Letters of the Prince Consort, 1831-1861; A Royal Correspondence. Edited by John Stephenson.
Madame de Stael. Margaret Goldsmith.
Cromwell's Captains. C. E. Lucas Phillips.
Cuthbert Tunstal. Charles Sturge.
Some Makers of English Law. Sir William Holdsworth.
Pre-Reformation England. H Maynard Smith.
Civilisation, The Next Step. C. Delisle Burns.
Through the Fog of War. B. H. Liddell Hart.
The Struggle for the Danube. Robert Machray.
A Servant of the Empire. Clara Boyle.
Escape from Russian Chains. Ivan Solonovich.
Books and their Writers. Henry Crabb Robinson.
On the Art of Thackeray. H. N. Wethered.
Rabbinic Anthology. Claude Montefiore and H. Loewe.
Solitude and Society. Nicolas Berdyaev.
An Introduction to the Study of Christianity. Frank Dodd.
A Countryman's Creed. E. C. Keith.
At the Turn of the Tide. Richard Perry.
Handbook of British Birds, ii.
The Flight of Birds. C. Horton-Smith.
Background to Modern Science.
The House of Dent. J. M. Dent.

No word in our language has been more abused than 'Gentleman,' which is applied impartially to King Arthur, Sir Lancelot, Sir Philip Sidney, Sir Thomas More, Horace Walpole, George IV, and for notices of public lavatories. In its horrible contraction of 'gent' it is used to describe male underclothing. Dr Esmé Wingfield-Stratford, in his new book '**The Making of a Gentleman**' (Williams and Norgate), makes enquiry into the use, history and meaning of the word. To be a gentleman, what required? Birth, breeding, morals, achievement, intellect, polish, or good manners? Can any of these qualities be absent? Certainly, as the author shows, a holy man need not be a gentleman, nor vice versa. The Old Testament (in spite of the Fifteenth Psalm) could produce no gentleman in our real sense; nor could ancient Greece or Rome—until possibly Marcus Aurelius. From the beginning of the Christian era onwards the author gives us a brilliant survey of what might be called the different styles of gentleman. Renaissance—super-cultured; Elizabethan—manly; Cavalier—idealist; eighteenth-century French-polished and artificially veneered till all natural emotion

was suppressed; eighteenth-century English—veering between the hard-riding and usually hard-swearing country squire and the urban school of Horace Walpole or Chesterfield; Victorian—self-conscious, inclined to priggishness; and so down to the present day—and what is a gentleman now? Do we still judge by the standards of strength and gentleness, culture and courtesy? Dr Wingfield-Stratford, sometimes witty, sometimes astringent, occasionally satirical, often laudatory, at all times discriminating and discerning, has written a book of real interest and value.

If all diplomatists had abundance of humour, wars—and possibly trade-agreements too—would be almost impossible; while if dictators were similarly blessed—but we had better proceed to our business, which is to appreciate (for one cannot do anything else with it) Signor Daniele Varè's 'Laughing Diplomat' (Murray). When the author was a young man and trembling, with nervousness and confidence, on the threshold of his career, a wise old general gave him the advice: 'Do not forget to laugh. Laugh at success and laugh at failure. Laugh at the way the world is governed. Laugh at others, and above all laugh at yourself.' Though it is invariably with kindness in his laughter, Signor Varè has followed that advice and not only thereby made his difficult ways along the official corridors easier, but garnered a goodly harvest of entertainment for others. Laughter, of course, has only been the occasional accompaniment to the performance of his duties, and reading his lines and between them we realise that in representing Italy at Berlin, in China, in Paris at the Peace Conference, in Luxemburg and Denmark, as well as in England, which through his parentage is half his home, his duties have often been difficult; for his term of responsibility has lasted from pre-War and pre-Fascist days until now. Beside the gift of laughter, he has, however, the poetry of heart which can see pixies as well as rabbits and squirrels among the shadows of a wood and be thrilled by the unexpected whistle of a blackbird, as well as unfailingly by the smiles of a pretty girl's eyes. But then Signor Varè has had special privileges. Duse poured petals over him and Pavlova once for days in necessity was a voluntary nurse to his children.

An interesting contrast and comparison is shown between the lately published 'Letters of the Prince Consort, 1831-1861' and 'A Royal Correspondence' (Macmillan), edited by John Stephenson and including the letters of King Edward VII and King George V to their trusted and greatly valued friend Admiral Sir Henry Stephenson. Of the Prince Consort one realises that he felt that every letter must have its serious purpose to be developed steadily and thoroughly, without wasting time on frivolities and 'frills,' and the result is a book of solid historical interest and value to the student. The other work may in contrast even be called chatty, as it deals with family affairs, social life, sport, and general small-talk, with the consistent and more serious thread of naval matters throughout, arising from Prince George's naval career and the fatherly interest which the Prince of Wales (as he then was) took in it and the determination of both that the sailing should be genuine, with no unnecessary privileges due to royal rank. The writers would never have claimed literary distinction or eminent style for the letters, and if they had come from less exalted pens they would hardly have found publication; but they answer a real purpose in showing us the princes in undress with ordinary tastes, dealing unaffectedly and keenly with their work, pleasures, and recreations, and giving a picture of united family life.

In her 'Madame de Stael' (Longmans) Miss Margaret Goldsmith has added an interesting and well-written volume to the already long list on the subject. That Germaine de Stael was a remarkable woman of great intellect and courage and very doubtful morals is an accepted fact; but it is difficult to convey in print the impression of what must have been the real attraction in her. She was plain to look at, badly dressed, clumsy and tactless, overbearing and dictatorial, a brilliant if lengthy talker, and an able and graphic writer. Of so-called sex appeal she seems from her descriptions to have had almost none; yet she had a succession of lovers and children by four of them. Her lovers, especially Constant, had no easy time with her, and often longed to be free; but once away from her he at least longed to return. It is hard to realise from this or other books about her exactly where her power lay. One of the most interesting phases of her

restless and eventful life was her struggle with Napoleon, resulting in ten years' exile from France; but at the end even Napoleon doubted whether he had indeed beaten his redoubtable adversary.

With two of the four '**Cromwell's Captains**' (Heinemann) of whom he has written excellent biographical studies, Mr C. E. Lucas Phillips covers some new ground. With his Hampden and Robert Blake he treats of subjects already widely written about; for the great admiral, who as truly as any was the founder of the modern British navy, has had his works and activities amply described, although it may be he has not yet secured his sufficient biography; while John Hampden's story is as well known as any tragic chapter of the time. Of Phillip Skippon and, curiously, of John Lambert, who after old Oliver was as prominent as any on that stage of our history, much has to be told—and here it is. Each of the subjects, besides being a personal theme, is also with some omissions the part of a frame to the general story of the Civil War and afterwards. With Hampden we realise the causes of the conflict; with Skippon, the character of the army and the generalship which brought success to the Parliament; with Blake, the new powers of the Navy he established, and with Lambert, the culminating victories and the troubles that came to Puritan England after the Restoration. Mr Lucas Phillips in his account of Skippon, the fine duteous soldier who won the personal respect of Charles I, describes the strangely forgotten battle of Lostwithel; when, with Essex deserting his men and Skippon carrying on, the Parliament suffered as serious a defeat as it won on Marston Moor; while, with his kindly study of Lambert, the charm and weaknesses of the old general who to a point was so great and then so pathetic a failure, he has written his best.

An omission in the biographical records of the Tudor period is belatedly supplied by Dr Charles Sturge's study of '**Cuthbert Tunstal**' (Longmans), the churchman, scholar, statesman, and administrator, who managed to keep his head in more than the one way through days as difficult and ugly as any in our history. He was the Bishop of London and afterwards of Durham, and twice an emissary of the state; he was active against and then for Henry VIII in his marital, religious, and political

difficulties, and serviceable during the unhappy reign of Mary. Yet, as is somewhat archly put, he failed to secure the chancellorship, the primacy, or martyrdom. Some would say and have said that in escaping the sharp fate of many conscientious men of the time, such as More and Cranmer, he showed a time-serving spirit; but almost certainly it is truer as well as more charitable to ascribe his unspectacular end to the clearness of mind which enabled him to see both sides of a question. Dr Sturge acknowledges that Tunstal was not the stuff of which martyrs were made. His career lacked the heroic element. Yet it is clear that by not being extreme he was a better help to his times than were most of those whose aims and works, more openly active, ended at the block. He was evidently gentle and kindly as well as cultured. Erasmus spoke well of him; he was the personal friend of More and better witnesses than they to his intellectual and spiritual worth could not be found. As a conservative in a time of angers and upset his influence was valuable, and it is well that his work should have as admirable a monument as this biography proves.

The vast range covered by the workings and influence of English law, both historically and geographically, is illustrated by Sir William Holdsworth in the Tagore Lectures on '**Some Makers of English Law**' (Cambridge University Press), that were delivered by him within the last two years before Calcutta University. He points out how the Indian Federal Court, which is the first central court for the whole of India, may have a unifying effect similar to that of the central court established in England by Henry II; and declares that the concepts, principles, and rules of English law have spread over the provinces and states of India much as the permeation of Roman law (which is an essential part of our English law) was effected in mediæval Europe. His lectures give a close account of the developments in definition, particularity, and authority of the Law through the individual labours of outstanding men; beginning with Glanvil and Bracton in the twelfth century, and with the reign of Edward I as its earliest established turning-point, and continuing to our contemporaries Maitland and Sir Frederick Pollock. Included in that slow, protracted course are such historic

lawyers as More, the value of whose work as Lord Chancellor was inestimable and an expression of his genial tactfulness ; Bacon, whose low morality spoilt his greatness and the possibilities for the benefit of the English constitution that might have come from it ; and Coke, of whose influence, despite the smallness of mind shown at the trials of Essex and Raleigh, the author describes as : ' What Shakespeare has been to literature, what Bacon has been to philosophy, what the translators of the Authorised Version of the Bible have been to religion, Coke has been to public and private law.' Amongst others, we meet Hale, who, because of his acceptance of the sanctity of the law and in spite of the rationalising spirit of the age could sentence witches to death, with Mansfield, Eldon, Bentham, and Blackstone, whose ' Commentaries,' for their legal learning and the style are re-established in authority after some belittlement. The value of the work of those men, who laboured over a period of full seven centuries, is weighed and well put in this thorough volume.

We should soon be as well acquainted with the familiar life and social conditions of the Middle Ages as with any other period of history ; for although it is 120 years since Hallam's pioneer work on the subject was issued, little more of lasting quality was done until comparatively recently, when the Cambridge University Press with its *Mediæval History* and the studies of Dr Coulton, Dr Owst, Sir Charles Oman, and others, through careful research and scholarly imagination, brought those fascinating times to renewed life. And now comes Dr Maynard Smith with his comprehensive account of ' *Pre-Reformation England* ' (Macmillan), which admirably summarises the religious, economic, and social conditions of those days before the second Deluge. He has no sharp theory to justify, and as he possesses an estimable faculty for seeing the good as well as the not-so-good in most things, he reveals the Middle Ages in their reality and colour ; while it is seen how inevitably causes, often unrecognised at the time, drifted to catastrophe and the New Birth. In his first part he pictures those conditions with the Schoolmen and the Humanists, who fought their battles of Thought ; in his second he concentrates on the characters of those who more positively brought about the Reformation, and discriminates with

the detail due on Colet, Erasmus, More, and Henry VIII. Of these More is the best drawn and most loveable figure. Whether at home by the fireside drawing goslings in the ashes for the amusement of his children or taking his gentle but brave part in the eager controversies of the time, he is shown as the saint with humour.

In 'Civilisation, the Next Step' (Nicholson and Watson), Dr Delisle Burns is so hopeful of the future of mankind that he is ready to knock down many institutions, governmental and in manners, to attain the results he looks for and desires. His last words in this volume: 'We are at the beginning of civilised life, and the next steps must be such as to make more widespread and powerful the feeling for justice,' show how far we have to go in taking the measures he demands, for they mean the rejection of many old superstitions, prejudices, and snobberies that are not going to die with the readiness of fallen leaves. Obviously his suggested readjustments in the systems of civilisation will raise opposition; not only from the comfortably established and intellectually complacent, but from many of those whose ways of life could only be improved by juster conditions. Many a slum-house provides the sufficient delights of home to its inmates who know nothing better; and as his 'next step' implies altered relations between workers and the 'gentry,' between the white races and the brown, yellow, and black, and other such alterations that go to the bases of our present conditions, there are rocks and quicksands in the way. Yet one can feel hopeful. Compare with him the conditions of normal life now and fifty years ago, and things look generally far better for all; while in spite of the intervention of the War there has been an increase in the standard of comfort with less of the despair of poverty. But there is no call for complacency. Civilisation must march and the Dictators go.

Ten years ago Captain Liddell Hart wrote a book of great value and interest called 'Reputations: Ten Years After.' His newest work, 'Through the Fog of War' (Faber and Faber), might well be called 'Revaluations: Twenty Years After.' During the last decade there has been an immense flood of memoirs, autobiographies, reminiscences, histories, and essays about the War. Most of the great leaders have told their own stories,

sometimes enhancing their reputations and sometimes doing the opposite. The material for revaluation of opinions on men and events is vast : indeed, the military fog may be deemed to have come after rather than during the War. Captain Liddell Hart is an omnivorous and discerning reader. He seems to have digested everything in all languages, and he writes with authority. He gives an excellent short summary of the salient features of the War, followed, firstly, by biographical sketches of the leaders ; secondly, by a critical examination of personal records (such as the ample volumes by Mr Lloyd George, Marshals Foch and Joffre, General Pershing, and others) ; thirdly, by historical views on the campaigns in France and Gallipoli, and he ends with some striking episodes and an epilogue on Lessons from History. It is an admirable work, though many will regret the persistent and indeed wearisomely monotonous belittling of Haig and some other military leaders in France and at home, a belittling which at times reads almost like obsession and thereby fails of its effect.

The rapid dramatic events of the last few months, which ended in the loss to Czecho-Slovakia of much essential territory, have done serious disservice to Mr Robert Machray's account of '**The Struggle for the Danube**' (Allen and Unwin) in making it at once and definitely a piece of ended history. Yet it still has its usefulness as a record for students of political events from 1829 until last July, when Lord Runciman was sent to Prague in the forlorn and, as it proved, futile hope that the agitations between the Sudeten Germans and Dr Benesh's government might be brought to a settlement honourable to both. That was not to be, and Czecho-Slovakia has had seriously the worst of it ; with that great man, the late President Marzaryk, to whom this work is dedicated as the President-Liberator of his country, and Dr Benesh, his successor, and the most honourable figure in all those recent disputes, made political cockshys by their country's enemies. How it came about—at least before the last subjugation through Nazi threats was dreamed of—is told here clearly and fairly ; and sad it is that all the endeavours made to establish the Little Entente between Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czecho-Slovakia should have come to so uncertain a pass.

Having read Clara Boyle's biography of her husband, that is fitly entitled '*A Servant of the Empire*' (Methuen), one is conscious of having been in the company of a rare man, Harry Boyle, whose name is not plastered over the sky but yet is treasured in numerous hearts. It is well to be reminded of those who serve in what are called the lesser places, though they are still of far-reaching effect; while there is no question of the value of the work done by Boyle, especially in his co-operation with the first Lord Cromer during his greatly constructive years in Egypt, as well as afterwards in his General-Consulship at Berlin, which ended in the months before the War. The official side of Boyle's career is little more than sketched-in; but yet, as told here, one gets engaging views on Cromer's administration of Egypt and on the unsettlements that entered with the well-meaning Sir Eldon Gorst. Boyle's influence and his exceptional gifts for work and knowledge of languages were proved afterwards when, sent to Egypt by the British Government to sound the conditions there which had become almost disastrous, he became the trusted confidant both of Lord Allenby and of his leading nationalist opponent Saad Zaghloul. Best of all in this engaging book we are shown the man himself; true, efficient, and kindly; with his love for his country and for animals, even feeding the mice and rats in his bedroom, and keeping a guinea-pig in his pocket or on the table at august committee-meetings and being the while in his freedom as untidy and dirty as his heart desired.

The colossal inefficacy of the Soviet system is being found out, as more and more revelations are made of the evils there predominant: the crass stupidity, the poverties, brutalities, and the continuous spying that prevail. M. Ivan Solonovich has earlier described the bitterness suffered by the many prisoners in modern Russia, and in '*Escape from Russian Chains*' (Williams and Norgate) he explains, not without an inward humour, the elaborate manner in which he and his son, with his brother co-operating elsewhere, prepared for their flight to freedom across the Finnish frontier, and achieved it. He was an expert in physical culture and through pretending to organise a Spartaciad or sports-festival in which the prison-camps were to provide the competitors, the aim being political rather than sportive, was granted liberties

which enabled him to escape. That, as all else in this book, is interesting ; but far more so is the account of the conditions in Russia in its later days, with the severe methods of Lenin, punitive and economic, failing through incompetence, ignorance, and fear. Even the loyalty of the Soviet guards seems to be crumbling, 90 per cent. of them, it is said, being weary of their allegiance ; but still the tyranny must go on because of the ceaseless bureaucratic machinery and the spies everywhere, peering, whispering, and betraying. Also, the make-believe continues and visitors to Russia are shown what it suits the officials to show. Most vile of all there, it seems, are the Bolshevos, where children are herded together to become in time adepts in cunning, vice, and crime. One of these loathsome institutions 'impressed the foreign visitors in accordance with their critical or credulous character. Mr Bernard Shaw, for instance, was uproariously beguiled.'

Some years ago Miss Edith J. Morley made a selection from Crabb Robinson's diary and notes of reminiscences of his meetings and talks with Lamb, Wordsworth, and Coleridge. Now, through the enterprise of Messrs. Dent, she is publishing a far larger selection from those voluminous notes under the title of '**Books and Their Writers**' ; and for Robinson's sake it is worth while. Although he declares that no part of them was written for the Press and not more than a tenth was fit for selection, this work is interesting throughout because of the light it throws on his tastes and opinions. He had an alert if conservative mind, was a wide reader of biographies and fiction, and fortunate in his familiar associations with the best of the contemporary writers for over sixty years. His judgment of men and things, if not extraordinarily original, was generally sound. He had no great admiration for the works or personalities of Godwin, Crabbe, and Carlyle ; Hazlitt he disliked, and not only for his ill-tempers. He early discovered the ordinariness of Tennyson's thought and his excellence in delicate expression. Byron's verse he did not admire ; but he came to like Lady Byron, of whom he gives gracious glimpses and shows her on the whole as helping the good name of her husband. He noted the crotchetyness of Rogers, the meanness of Ruskin's countenance, and declared that '**Self Help**' was a paltry book ; and in that case, as often with other works, did not

later modify his earliest impression. But his loving friendship with Wordsworth and Lamb, and some way afterwards with Coleridge, is well brought out.

It is good to have a new book '*On the Art of Thackeray*' (Longmans); for although, with Goldsmith and Elia, Thackeray is loved for his personality as well as his writings, it is to be feared that his works are not so widely read now as they deserve to be and that his influence in life and letters is waning. Mr H. N. Wethered has made a sympathetic and discriminatory study of him and his books, with his ways and whims—literary and personal. Possibly he wrote with too fluent a pen, which could easily grow garrulous, and often uttered flippancies that hardly survived their appearance in print. But the heart of the true and good man was always there; and even in his rogues of both sexes—and he could not overlook, nay, was fascinated by the sordid in life, as he was with the Snob in his infinite aspects—he was aware of the something good that exists even in things and persons that were evil; and, though sometimes with only partial success, he tried to show it. He was an egoist. He took the world into his confidence over himself and sometimes was not reticent when to be silent would have saved him pain. But his works are the richer because, with his gallantry and truthfulness, he was in the heart of them.

However valuable may have been the learning and wisdom of the scholarly Rabbis of something more than 1500 years ago, the most attractive and stimulating parts of this fine '*Rabbinic Anthology*' (Macmillan) rest in the two introductions written by its compilers, the late Claude Montefiore and Mr H. Loewe, of Queen's College, Cambridge. With breadth of mind and a mutual sympathy which have rarely characterised past differences in religious discussion, whether Christian or Judaic, they introduce their co-operated work; Dr Montefiore having belonged to the Liberal school of modern Judaism, while Mr Loewe is orthodox, though not a fundamentalist. To illustrate the width and depth of the bases in this Anthology is impossible; for its range is as universal as the consideration of the Old Law—the Rabbis having taken no interest in history—could be; and merely to name some of the subjects under which the quotations are ranged is to justify that assertion of its universality.

The Nature and Character of God and His relation with Man, the Law, Merit and Atonement, Prayer, Charity, Poverty and Riches, Hospitality and Courtesy, the Family, the Gentiles ; but we have suggested enough the fullness of thought practical and idealistic culled from those old priestly thinkers and law-makers. That their ideals and ideas had many limitations is inevitable ; yet much in this wisdom is good for all times : but, as Dr Montefiore says, ' It needs tact and insight, and perhaps also a certain sense of humour, to know when we must take their sayings very literally, and when we must take them with a grain of salt.' With that mild caution remembered, this Anthology may be recommended not only to theologians and students of the Old and the New Dispensations, but to the thoughtful laity who will surely gain spiritual refreshment, and it may be renewed inspiration, through checking their modern experiences in the light of those ancient Jews.

In 'Solitude and Society' (Bles) M. Nicolas Berdyaev, while recognising that philosophy, the most vulnerable part of culture and concerned primarily with man's inner life, is little regarded in these days of haste and unrest, which lead to short cuts taken especially in the processes of thought, has turned his attention to the loss of freedom suffered by the Ego through the many concentrations of present-day life. 'Formerly men used to live in a comparatively confined space. . . . To-day they are on the whole beginning to live in the great universe, in the midst of immensity, in the perspective of a boundless horizon, which only inspires them with a growing sense of isolation and abandonment.' How is that isolation, in its limitations, to be overcome ? M. Berdyaev, who is one of the more encouraging, as well as distinguished, of the thinkers of to-day, sees in love and friendship man's only hope of triumph over it ; but in the sexual activities that are a natural part of love there is a 'demoniac element' which makes sexuality a deadly and destructive thing. Through such effects and discordances, however, man has to work out his own destiny, which in the author's expressive phrase is the ultimate problem of the personality. He calls the personality a mask, but that word for it in English may mislead. 'Semblance' might be the better word. For a mask is a plane surface that serves to hide ;

whereas personality is inward and revealing ; no simplicity but extraordinarily complex. On his main theme there may be differences in the detail, but there can be little doubt of its truth to those who are not misled by the claims of extremists.

Whatever may be said by those who judge from the seeming emptiness of some of the churches at many of their services, there is no indifference over religion nowadays. Humanity in its heart is as eager as ever to discover religious truths ; although at the same time it looks for some spirit of reasonableness to strengthen and justify the orthodox—and other—assertions made. This interest, often intense, finds expression in the book of a layman, Mr Frank Dodd. **'An Introduction to the Study of Christianity'** (Allen and Unwin), with necessary brevity, but also lucidly and fairly, examines the documents and evidence on which the Christian faith is established ; traces the growth of its community out of Judaism, with the contributory or opposing influences of Islam and other external forces upon it ; describes the formation of traditional Christianity, bears witness to the crystallisation of dogma, and so proceeds to an estimate of the Church in its many branches and activities as it exists to-day. To bring this vastness of theme to graspable proportions means that much compression and many omissions have been required ; but Mr Dodd has carried out his work as well as can be expected. Naturally, the miracles are a special subject of his interest, and he applies to those phenomena the test that while wonders are possible in nature, no miracle is likely to be contrary to its laws. We must not, however, endeavour to follow him over the wide and intricate course that he has pursued, but are content to commend his work for its sincerity, clearness, and spirit of charity.

'A Countryman's Creed' (Country Life), by Mr E. C. Keith, is an attractive book and one to bring pleasant visions and memories, especially to the town-dweller who would be elsewhere. The title is, however, somewhat misleading, for two-thirds of the book are taken up with sport and only one-third with farming, forestry and the routine of country life ; while there is nothing about gardens, which surely should have a large place in any countryman's creed. Mr Keith shows himself to be a

good sportsman, loving horses, birds and beasts (quite apart from their sporting value) and well-tilled fields, well-kept woods, the upland or marsh at dawn, the harvest-field at midday or in the cool of the evening. Also he loves to be alone with Nature, to study her ways, probe her secrets, and absorb her philosophy. The conclusion he comes to is, 'The more one sees of the Nature World, the more difficult it is to understand the rules which govern it. There appears to be a race, like the armament race in the human world, between death and production, but never any attempt to curtail either. The unseen hand provides, but does not protect, and premature death is the order of the day.'

Mr Richard Perry is an enthusiastic and experienced bird-watcher and naturalist, and readers of his '**At the Turn of the Tide**' (Lindsay Drummond) will be led to share his interest. His watching grounds are the marshes, meres and sand flats of Solway and East Anglia and the cliffs of Northumbria, and there he introduces his readers to geese and wild duck, terns, gulls, kittiwakes, shearwaters, divers, herons, puffins and cormorants. It is not only vivid accounts of the birds that he gives but also interesting reflections on subjects such as flight-movement, migration, colour, nesting, meeting and general habits and idiosyncracies. Some of his conclusions may challenge accepted views, but this will only add interest to the book for the skilled ornithologist, while the ordinary reader can delight in its style and descriptive powers and in the illustrations, coloured and monochrome, from sketches by Peter Scott and others.

The second volume of Messrs Witherby's '**Handbook of British Birds**' should be more attractive to bird-lovers even than was the first volume; for under the division of 'Warblers to Owls' it includes such popular creatures as the robin, the thrush, the nightjar, the swift, and especially the cuckoo, that with all its blatan-
cies of voice and behaviour retains its fascinating mystery. Yet that mystery is being pierced, for in this volume there are six photographs, taken by Mr Howard Lancum, showing the last egg of a yellow bunting being gradually evicted by a nestling cuckoo: extraordinary evidence of an inherited ingenuity and determination. The letter-press also explains the methods by which the cuckoo lays

her egg and removes one laid by the foster-mother to make room for it. Elsewhere also in these pages we have definite information as to the fare of the little owl, over which there is frequent controversy. It is asserted, with the exactitude of fractional calculations, that it subsists for nearly a half on insects, to about the same amount on such mammals as mice and rats with reptiles, while less than 5 per cent. of its food is derived from birds. Its beneficent effects, therefore, greatly out-do the harmful.

The new important pastime and industry of mechanical flight, which is a leading wonder of our scientific age and will grow still more marvellous as that clever animal, Man, continues to overcome the mysteries of air-dynamics, owes a debt to the birds. From Leonardo da Vinci onwards their movements and effects in flight have been studied, but nothing really worth while came of it until the engine was invented which produced an energy that more than counteracted the burden of its weight. Man has largely triumphed in his endeavour to imitate the flying freedom of the birds; but with all his efforts never can outdo the wonder of their structure, means of flight, and methods which, through the infinite generations of avian life, have made them for their purposes the most perfect of living machines. This truth is brought out in Mr C. Horton-Smith's '*The Flight of Birds*' (Witherby), wherein the winged conditions of the flying lizard, the flying-fish, and the bat also are considered. But the bird is supreme in his grace and efficiency of flight, and in this little volume, we see how its flight-powers have been developed to make the styles of the species distinct. The lithe swiftness of the peregrine, the soaring skylark, the bustling, business-like progress of the pigeon, the seesaw of the finches, the tumbling and manœuvring of the lapwings and other such divergencies are well-known even to casual observers of bird life, to whom this little book will be useful.

Under the title '*Background to Modern Science*,' the Cambridge University Press has published a remarkable book. In eleven lectures, short but in their compactness clear, ten of the foremost scientific authorities associated with the University have recorded their impressions of the progress made in various branches of science during the last forty years. They are a brilliant

team and their subjects range from Natural Philosophy to Physics, including Radio-activity, to Crystal Physics, the Atomic Theory, Astronomy, Physiology and Pathology, Parasitology, Evolution, and Genetics. The idea arose from the recognised need of some organisation for the study in Cambridge of the history of science, and beside this series of lectures, delivered in 1936, an exhibition of scientific apparatus of historic interest was exhibited there. The choice of the last forty years for the period of comparison was wise, as its beginning was almost coincident with the discovery of the Röntgen rays, followed by that of radium, which may be regarded as marking the renaissance of modern science. It is impossible to suggest the many striking developments that arose in those forty years; but they include, as Sir Arthur Eddington points out, the transfer of particular astronomical interest from planets to galaxies and the thrusting-back of the 'boundary' of the material universe from the 3,000 light-years as then assumed, to beyond 500 million light-years, which is the present limit of telescopic survey. At the opposite extreme of scientific enquiry we get from Mr F. W. Aston diagrams which represent the extreme smallness of the atoms when reduced to the stage at which further division would alter their properties. No effort of fiction could touch the imagination as surely as this brilliant work of reality does in its simplicity that after all is most complex.

Honour to those to whom honour is due: and with gladness we offer our tribute of congratulation to 'The House of Dent' (Dent), which after years of growth and struggle crowned with success has come to its Jubilee; for it began its course in 1888. Mr Hugh R. Dent, the head of the Firm, whose death has been announced, to the very great regret of all who knew him, as these pages were passing through the press, has celebrated the event by republishing the Memoirs of his father and its founder, Joseph Mallaby Dent, with additional chapters by himself describing the progress of the business since 1926. It is a story that brings honour to these days; for the establishment in so short a time of a House that has to its credit an unequalled number of the books best worth reading and living with is a remarkable achievement.

